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ABSTRACT 
 
Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & 
Barreto, 2013; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015), that has been consistently pointed out as part 
of what makes us uniquely human (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). 
On the other hand, the extent to which we see others as fully human also impacts on other’s 
moral status (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 
1990). The two dimensions seem to have a narrow relation, which has recently begun to 
capture more attention (Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012; Khamitov, Rotman, & 
Piazza, 2016; Vasiljevic, & Viki, 2014). 
This thesis aims at analysing the relation between morality and humanness in group 
relations. A first research paper analysed the attribution and denial of moral traits to groups, 
integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. By means of two 
studies we tested the hypothesis stating that within the moral domain, participants choose 
different strategies to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup depending on trait 
humanness and valence. Our results support this hypothesis, as we found that participants 
attributed more uniquely human traits to the ingroup, but only in case these were positive; in 
case these were negative the uniquely human traits were more attributed to outgroups. 
In a second paper we analysed the relation between immorality and humanness, by 
using the evaluation of criminal behaviours as a proxy to address this relation. In our data, we 
found that Human Uniqueness and immorality did not correlate with each other. With this 
paper we also aimed at providing researchers with a range of validated stimuli to address 
these topics, which was exactly what we purposed ourselves to do in the last research paper 
presented in this thesis. 
In a third paper we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance, 
integrating the role of ingroup threat. Specifically, we analysed the humanness perception of a 
deviant ingroup member that behaves in an immoral but uniquely human way. We found that 
when the deviant behaviour was less threatening, the ingroup members humanised the deviant 
as much as the ingroup itself. However, when the deviant behaviour represented a threat to the 
ingroup image, the ingroup members dehumanised more the deviant member. In a second 
study we analysed the dehumanisation of the ingroup deviant, regarding two different types of 
behaviours, which vary in humanness and immorality. In both studies we also measured the 
perception of moral blame of the deviant member, integrating our results with previous 
findings (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). Finally we addressed the different intragroup 
strategies that ingroup members use to deal with threats to the ingroup image. 
Results are discussed in terms of their contribution to the relation between humanness 
and immorality, as well as the implications for dehumanisation theory. Future research is 
outlined.   
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Chapter I. Dehumanisation 
Dehumanisation is a psychological process that involves seeing others as less than 
human. Historically, the study of dehumanisation focused on the processes that justify 
interpersonal or intergroup conflicts. For Kelman (1973), one of the first authors to address 
this topic, dehumanisation provided an explanation for the mass violence that occurred in the 
context of genocidal policies, such as the Nazi Holocaust. Kelman argued that when people 
deprive fellow human beings of what makes them human, they are excluded from the human 
category. This replacement outside the category of humanness is what makes the moral 
restraints against killing more readily overcome. Opotow (1990) also defended that placing 
people outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply 
is what facilitates dehumanisation. The author argued that people morally excluded are seen 
as non-entities, denied basic humanness, and consequently harming them appears to be 
acceptable. Similarly, Bandura (1999) viewed dehumanisation as a psychological mechanism 
that allows the perpetrators to disengage from their damaging behaviour, after all 
dehumanised others worth less ethical treatment. 
On the intergroup conflict’s side, Bar-Tal (1989) proposed that dehumanisation is a 
delegitimization strategy, that consists in a collective shared representation of outgroups as 
non-human (e.g., savages, monsters), that justify extreme intergroup violence, and provide it 
with a sense of superiority. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered to be an 
example of a conflict that is fuelled by delegitimise representations of the respective sides, 
where the intervenients dehumanise the other group, perpetuating the violence and preventing 
a peaceful resolution (Oren & Bar Tal, 2006). Struch and Schwartz (1989) proposed that 
people are dehumanised when they are seen as lacking prosocial values or when their values 
are seen as incongruent with those of the perceiver’s ingroup. The authors found that 
intergroup conflict is associated with greater perceptions that an outgroup is in violation of 
pro-social values (e.g., helpfulness, forgiveness, and compassion), which increases support for 
outgroup negativity. In line with this reasoning, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, and Mihic (2008) 
found that Canadian participants express greater contempt for refugees and less support for 
Canadian refugee policies when refugees are described in a dehumanising manner (i.e., as 
violating moral values).  
The theories described have in common a focus in blatant forms of dehumanisation 
that are believed to predict or justify violence at the interpersonal or intergroup level. 
Contemporary theorising, however, broadened the study of dehumanisation to more subtle 
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forms, emerging even in the absence of extreme intergroup violence. The main contributions 
for this new approach to dehumanisation were made by Leyens and colleagues (2001; 2007), 
with the Infrahumanisation account, and the Model of Dehumanisation proposed by Haslam 
(2006). Both approaches focused on the subtle tendency of scaling others on the human 
dimension (Haslam, 2015; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008; Leyens et al, 2000; 
2003; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & 
Miranda, 2012). The present work will be developed within this framework, and from now on 
the term dehumanisation will be used to refer to this subtle bias, except when specific 
terminology is required. 
Infrahumanisation Theory 
In the beginning of the century, Leyens and colleagues developed a framework for the 
study of subtle dehumanisation. The authors begun to establish what it means to be human, 
recognising that there are some characteristics are uniquely human, and not shared with 
animals (Leyens et al., 2000). Intelligence, language, emotions, sociability and values were 
the uniquely human categories cited more often in Leyens and colleagues sample, which 
found correspondence with the features identified by other authors (Chulvi & Perez, 2003). 
Building on the idea that humanness is a fundamental dimension of social judgment in 
intergroup relations, the authors developed an approach to the study of subtle dehumanisation 
that they called infrahumanisation. Leyens and colleagues (2000) focused on the emotional 
side of humanness, considering that the attribution or denial of uniquely human emotions as a 
form of intergroup differentiation had not been investigated yet, unlike other uniquely human 
dimensions, such as intelligence (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) or language (Giles & 
Coupland, 1991). Furthermore, emotions are unlikely to depend on structural relationships 
between groups, and are not strongly associated with social norms that could enable social 
desirability, like intelligence or language (Demoulin et al., 2004b). 
To test the infrahumanisation hypothesis that humanness is a fundamental dimension 
which groups reserve for their members, Leyens and colleagues analysed the differential 
attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and outgroup 
(Leyens et al., 2001, for a review Leyens et al., 2007).  
In a cross-cultural study, Demoulin and colleagues (2004a) tested the distinction 
between secondary or uniquely human emotions and primary or non-uniquely human 
emotions in lay theories. The results showed that people differentiate between emotions which 
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are considered uniquely human (e.g., admiration, pride, regret) from those which are not (e.g., 
joy, sadness, anger), showing a high agreement concerning the criteria that lead to this 
differentiation. Uniquely human emotions are caused by internal factors, are not easily 
observable, occur late in development, are not experienced in the same way by every people, 
and tend to last longer. On the other hand, emotions shared with other species are caused by 
external factors, are universally shared, are easily observed in others, and appear early in 
development. Rodriguez-Torres and colleagues (2005) also found evidence of the distinction 
between primary and secondary emotions, finding that it is a spontaneous categorisation used 
by lay people, which behaves like other meaningful categorisations. According to the authors, 
the distinction between primary and secondary emotions is useful for people precisely 
because it is an implicit differentiation which they are not aware of. 
Demoulin and colleagues (2004a) also observed that uniquely human emotions are 
implicitly associated in memory with the human category. Participants associated uniquely 
human emotions to human beings faster than they did with animals. Moreover, the authors 
found that participants not only tend to associate more primary emotions with animals rather 
than humans, but also demonstrated some reluctance in associating these emotions with the 
human category. 
Ensuring that emotions capture the essence of humanness, the infrahumanisation 
hypothesis was systematically studied in the last fifteen years. Using an attribution paradigm, 
Leyens and colleagues (2001) showed that people attribute more uniquely human emotions to 
their groups, and less to outgroups, suggesting that outgroups are seen as less human. No 
effect was found regarding non-uniquely human emotions, as these were equally attributed to 
both groups. Also, the greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroup was 
independent of trait desirability, indicating that what drove participants’ trait choice was 
humanness and not ingroup bias. This effect was also tested in a within participants design 
(Cortes, Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 2005; Gaunt, 2009), with 
the same results. 
To ensure the generalisability of the infrahumanisation hypothesis, different paradigms 
were used, replicating the same conclusions. Paladino and colleagues (2002) used an 
adaptation of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), using 
groups with different status. In four studies the authors found that participants were faster at 
associating the ingroup to secondary emotions and outgroups to primary emotions, regardless 
of the emotions being positive or negative, and the outgroup possessing a lower or higher 
6 
 
status than the ingroup. Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, and Leyens (2007) went further in a 
series of priming experiments by elucidating that what was causing the effect was actually the 
association between the ingroup and secondary emotions, and not an alternative association 
between the outgroup and primary emotions. Using a lexical decision task (Wittenbrink, Judd, 
& Park, 1997), the authors found that people were particularly quick in associating the 
ingroup with secondary emotions compared to the outgroup, while no differences were found 
for primary emotions. 
An alternative explanation for the preferential attribution of uniquely human emotions 
to the ingroup was tested by Cortes and colleagues (2005). Taking into account Demoulin and 
colleagues’ (2004a) findings concerning the greater visibility of secondary over primary 
emotions, it would be reasonable to design the hypothesis that secondary emotions are more 
attributed to ingroup rather than outgroups because they are more difficult to identify, and are 
thus assigned to ingroup due to greater familiarity. However, this explanation was ruled out 
when the authors found that the familiar self was not more humanised than the ingroup or the 
outgroup, neither did participants attributed secondary emotions depending on the level of 
familiarity of different outgroups. 
Finally, the Infrahumanisation Theory claims that what drives the differential 
attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions to ingroup and outgroups is the idea 
that one´s ingroup is fully human. Boccato, Capozza, Falvo, and Durante (2008) tested 
directly the association between the ingroup and the human concept in two studies, finding 
that participants associated the ingroup to human stimuli faster than they did with the 
outgroup. Vaes, Paladino, and Leyens (2006) also provided empirical support for this 
assumption, finding that, when primed with ingroup members (compared to outgroup 
members) who express themselves with secondary emotions, participants used more words 
related to uniquely human concepts in a word completion task. These results suggest that 
ingroup and outgroup members are perceived differently in human terms, and that the 
accessibility of the human concept is differently activated. 
Although initially operationalised based on the differential attribution of uniquely and 
non-uniquely human emotions to ingroup and outgroups, the Infrahumanisation Theory was 
expanded to a non-emotional sphere. Viki, Winchester, Titshall, and Chisango (2006) used 
human-related (e.g., citizen) and animal-related (e.g., creature) words in a series of studies, 
concluding that participants differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup based on human-
related words, whereas no such distinction was made regarding animal-related words. 
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Capozza, Boccato, Andrighetto, and Falvo (2009) also used another type of stimuli, this time 
human and ape faces, ambiguous and not ambiguous, finding that participants categorised 
ambiguous stimuli as ape more often in the ingroup than the outgroup condition. Vaes and 
Paladino (2010) also contributed to a different operationalisation of the infrahumanisation 
effect, by using stereotypical traits of the groups considered in the study.  
Altogether, the infrahumanisation authors provided a tool to measure humanness, 
found evidence that ingroups are seen as more uniquely human when compared to outgroups, 
and emphasised the relative nature of the humanness intergroup differentiation, contrasting 
with the previous dehumanisation theories.  
Although the subtle nature of this approach to dehumanisation, its consequences are 
not subtle at all. Indeed, seeing outgroup members as less human is a common and pervasive 
phenomenon that impacts negatively on people’s behaviour. For instance, people are more 
willing to help an ingroup member that expresses himself with uniquely human emotions, 
than an outgrouper in the same condition (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes, Paladino, 
Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002), demonstrate more 
avoidance reactions towards outgroup members (Vaes et al., 2003) and are less willing to take 
their perspective (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004). The perception of uniquely human 
emotions also increases intergroup forgiveness in post-conflict situations (Tam et al., 2007), 
and impacts the support for reparation policies after wrong doing (Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, 
& Doosje, 2008) and the empathy felt for a victim group (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 
2009).  
Bi-Dimensional Model of Dehumanisation   
Infrahumanisation represented an innovative approach to the study of humanness 
attribution, defining the human concept as that which is unique to our species. Haslam (2006; 
Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008) extended the comprehension of dehumanisation, 
by considering that the animal distinction was not the only way to define humanness. The 
author took Kagan’s (2004) definition of how objects can be represented, i.e., either by its 
description, listing the core traits, or by comparison with the non-human, and proposed a bi-
dimensional approach to represent humanness, including two senses, namely Human Nature 
and Human Uniqueness. 
Attempting to demonstrate that the two senses of humanness did correspond to 
different constructs, Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, and Bastian (2005) used personality traits 
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from the five dimensions of the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and Schwartz’s 
(1992) values taxonomy. The authors found that not only the two representations of 
humanness correspond to different themes, but they are also uncorrelated. Human Nature 
referred to the central or typical traits, the core of human essence, involving emotionality, 
warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth. On the other hand, Human Uniqueness 
represents what is uniquely human, not shared with other species, comprehending civility, 
refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity. 
If there are two distinct senses of humanity, then two distinct forms of dehumanisation 
should be expected (Haslam, 2006). When a person or a group is deprived of Human Nature 
traits, mechanistic dehumanisation takes place, linking humans to inanimate objects, 
portraying individuals as lacking warmth, emotion, individuality, and human essence. When a 
person or group is denied Human Uniqueness traits they are deprived from what distinguishes 
humans from animals, thereby linked subtly or overtly, to animals, and seen as lacking 
refinement, self-control, morality, and rationality. This form of animalistic dehumanisations 
draws a parallel with the infrahumanisation bias. 
The evidence found by Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and Suitner (2008) 
supported this dehumanisation model. The authors developed a study in three distinct cultural 
samples (Australian, Chinese, and Italian) concluding that emotions and desires, Human 
Nature components, are the properties that best differentiate robots from humans, while 
properties involving high cognition and refined emotions, components considered uniquely 
human, are the ones that best differentiate humans from animals. 
Subsequent studies demonstrated that different groups can use in a different manner 
the two types of humanness to differentiate their ingroup from outgroups, showing that the 
two types of humanness are contextually determined (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, 
Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014; Bain, Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Bain, Park, 
Kwok, & Haslam, 2009). 
The dual model extends beyond the Infrahumanisation Theory by incorporating the 
human-object distinction alongside with the human-animal distinction, which brings some 
innovations into the comprehension of the dehumanisation phenomena. First of all, it 
encompasses a new form of dehumanisation that relates to denials of Human Nature. 
Secondly, it can be applied to diverse forms of dehumanisation, subtle or blatant, like other 
models here discussed, and at the intergroup or interpersonal level, by bringing the self-
humanisation effect into discussion. On the basis of Human Nature traits, the self can be 
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ascribed more humanness when compared with the generalised other (Haslam et al., 2005; 
Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Loughnan, Reynolds, & Wilson, 2007; Loughnan et al., 
2010), which is not the case of the Uniquely Human dimension that operates at the intergroup 
level (Cortes et al., 2005). 
Attribute, Metaphor, and Target Based Approaches to Dehumanisation 
Humanness is a broad concept, as we have seen so far, and it can be either attributed 
or denied through different approaches. 
Loughnan, Haslam, and Kashima (2009), in an attempt to integrate the different 
approaches to dehumanisation, started by differentiating between researches about 
dehumanisation that focus on the denial of human characteristics to others, the attribute-based 
approach, and those that focus on the association of others with non-human entities, the 
metaphor-based approach. 
 The attribute-based approach first defines and selects human characteristics and then 
verifies whether these are attributed differently to social targets. Research on 
infrahumanisation exemplifies this approach, focusing specially on the denial of uniquely 
human emotions to outgroup members (Boccato et al., 2007; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et 
al., 2002), as well as the work of Haslam and colleagues (Haslam et al., 2005; 2008), which 
selected different personality traits to measure dehumanisation.  
Metaphor-based approaches focus directly in the possibility that outgroups are linked 
to a non-human entity, such as animals or robots. Throughout history there have been many 
examples of enemy descriptions containing direct references to animal images, namely during 
the Second World War where the Nazis called the Jews “rats”, or usage of the term 
“cockroach” to designate Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
and Jackson (2008) showed that this type of association still occurs today, and is not limited 
to intergroup conflict situations, by demonstrating that the association between Blacks and 
apes still persists in the mind of White Americans. The authors observed that White 
Americans tended to implicitly associate Blacks with ape images more often than they did 
with other wild animals, while none of these associations was observed on White targets. 
Furthermore, this association has negative consequences on Black compared with White 
criminals convicted of capital crimes, resulting in a higher probability of actually being 
executed (Goff et al., 2008, study 6). 
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Martínez, Rodríguez-Bailón, and Moya (2012) also focused on metaphors to measure 
animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. The authors used both explicit and implicit 
measures, concluding that while some outgroups are more associated with animal-related 
words (i.e., Gypsies), others are more associated with machine-related words (i.e., Germans). 
Loughnan and colleagues (2009) were the first ones to show that attribute-based 
dehumanisation is strongly related with the attribution of the corresponding dehumanising 
metaphors. The authors gave participants a description of a fictitious group which either 
lacked one type of humanness or was associated with a non-human metaphor (animal or 
machine), verifying that participants were able to infer the attribute-based from the metaphor-
based dehumanisation and vice-versa. 
A new approach to dehumanisation was coined “target-based approach”, as a reference 
to the target to which humanness is attributed or denied, disregarding the specific 
characteristic that is denied to others (for a review on this topic see Vaes et al., 2012). This 
approach proposes that not only uniquely human characteristics are more attributed to 
ingroups, but also that characteristics attributed to ingroups are judged to be more human than 
those same characteristics attributed to outgroups. This assumption is supported by Paladino 
and Vaes’ (2009) findings, where the authors gave to the participants bogus information about 
their ingroup’s typical characteristics (for instance, Italians) as well as of different  outgroups 
(Slavs, Albanians, and Belgians), but only half of the participants were correctly informed, 
whereas the other half received the typical ingroup and outgroups traits reversed. The authors 
found that when the characteristics were said in advance to characterise the ingroup, they 
would be rated more human than when said to characterise the outgroup. These findings were 
shown to be independent of the characteristics’ valence and type of traits used to describe the 
groups, suggesting that humanness is generalised to all kinds of things associated to our 
groups. 
These results are in line with the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), stating that people tend to project, 
and therefore to perceive the ingroup and its characteristics as more prototypical of the 
superordinate category (in this case humanness) than the outgroup and its characteristics. 
Based on Paladino and Vaes’ (2009) conclusions, Vaes and Paladino (2010) 
formulated an operationalisation of humanness based on group stereotypes. The authors 
looked at the uniquely human content of stereotypes in a large set of intergroup contexts, 
using the warmth and competence divide proposed by the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, 
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Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Overall, Vaes and Paladino (2010) observed that ingroup stereotypes 
were judged more uniquely human than outgroup stereotypes, independently of the specific 
intergroup comparison situation, i.e., independently of the warmth or competence with which 
it was associated, the ingroup was seen as uniquely human. Moreover, a post-hoc analysis 
revealed that the ingroup stereotypes also differed in terms of competence and warmth as a 
function of the intergroup situation. Although similar variations in warmth and competence 
influenced the perception of the outgroup in human terms, the ingroup stereotypes remained 
invariably human. 
These results reinforce the ones founded by Paladino and Vaes (2009), indicating that 
it matters to whom a trait is attributed, giving more support to the target-based 
dehumanisation. These results also highlight the distinction between the roles of ingroup and 
outgroup in differentiating both groups in human terms (Vaes et al., 2012).  
In earlier formulations of the Infrahumanisation Theory (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000; 
2003) it was defended that it comprised at the same time ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
derogation. Indeed, the Infrahumanisation Theory was conceptualised as deriving directly 
from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), postulating that even in meaningless 
contexts the ingroup is seen as more uniquely human than the outgroup (Demoulin et al., 
2009). Moreover, since the effect was consistently observed independently of valence, as we 
have already pointed out, it could not be explained by ingroup bias, including necessarily 
ingroup humanisation, and outgroup dehumanisation. Although the two biases often stand 
side by side, that may not always be the case (Brewer, 1999). Vaes and Paladino’s (2010) 
results support this latter case. In their study, the humanness distinction between ingroup and 
outgroup was mainly created through the ingroup humanisation, whereas in other contexts 
what divided the effect was the combination of the ingroup humanisation and the denial of 
humanity to the outgroup. Vaes and colleagues (2012) pointed out that this variation suggests 
that what guides the process of humanness attribution may differ in the ingroup and outgroup.  
Vaes and Paladino (2010) also signalised an issue which will turn out to be 
particularly relevant for this work. Although the literature on social stereotypes focuses 
largely on competence and warmth, a more recent set of studies showed that the two 
fundamental dimensions of perception are not the most important dimensions to positively 
distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup. 
In fact, Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) found that morality is the most important 
dimension in order to feel good about the ingroup, and moreover it is largely independent of 
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competence and warmth. Furthermore, Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, and Yzerbyt 
(2012) examined the importance of the three social dimensions for predicting reactions 
towards outgroups, showing that while doing a global impression of outgroup, participants 
were mostly affected by morality characteristics. 
Vaes and Paladino (2010) confronted the ingroup with several outgroups that differed 
on competence and warmth, unfolding changes of perception on the two dimensions. 
Nevertheless, the ingroup perception in the human dimension remained unchanged, regardless 
of the comparasion outgroup’s competence and warmth. The authors considered that these 
results together with the ones founded by Leach and colleagues (2007) revealed the 
importance of deep-seated, uniquely human characteristics, such as morality, at describing 
one’s own group. 
Having that in mind, we shall devote the next chapter to discuss the importance of 
morality within intergroup relations. 
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Chapter II. Morality 
Moral considerations play an important role in society by asserting what is right or 
wrong in human conduct. Due to its centrality in human life, morality has been a popular 
topic among academics, although the approaches to its study have been particularly 
changeable over time (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). During the middle ages morality 
was defined by virtue-based approaches, where honour occupied a prominent place, a heritage 
of Aristotle´s ethical treat Nicomachean Ethics. In the post-Enlightenment era the approach to 
morality evolved to a deontological approach, emphasising logical and universal principles, 
independent of individual’s personal relations, or interpersonal consequences (Kant, 
1797/2005). One still had to wait 200 years before the field of moral psychology departed 
from Philosophy, having its roots in Piaget’s (1965) and Kohlberg’s (1969) developmental 
approaches to moral intuitions and reasoning. However, it did not depart from the 
philosophical approach, in the sense that it did not incorporate the social-relational contexts in 
which moral judgements naturally occur. The cognitive-developmental approach to morality 
saw social influences as biases which may distort the expressions of moral judgements. Turiel 
(1983) put forward one of the most influential definition of morality within this approach, 
defining the moral domain as ‘‘prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare 
pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other’’ (p. 3). 
For social psychologists the study of morality was first dominated by themes  were 
close to the moral domain and had been longstanding interests in the field, such as honesty 
(e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Coovert, 1986), justice (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Lind, 
& Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), pro-social behaviour (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; 
Isen & Levin, 1972), and empathy and egoism (e.g., Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & 
Isen, 1983). In fact, morality has become a current topic in Social Psychology ever since the 
70s until now (Pagliaro, 2012), which is not surprising given its core role within social 
interactions (Rai & Fiske, 2011). What people consider morally ‘‘good’’ (Giner-Sorolla, 
2012) is not just a purely individual question. As Leach, Bilali, and Pagliaro (2015) put it “if 
each individual operated under a purely idiosyncratic sense of morality, individuals would 
never have any sense of what others consider moral, and as a result would not know what 
actions to expect from others, and would have little basis for deciding how to act themselves.” 
Morality can therefore be conceptualised in different ways (trustworthiness, cooperation, 
justice, or caring), but it always concerns treatment of people within social relationships.  
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During the past few decades social psychologists have addressed more systematically 
the social implications of morality in interpersonal relations and group processes, within 
various fields (Pagliaro, 2012). As a result, researchers have discovered the central role of 
morality in social judgment (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Leach et al., 
2007), for instance, the importance in self and ingroup evaluations (Ellemers, Kingma, van de 
Burgt, & Barreto, 2011; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Leach et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Manstead, & Fisher, 2002a), and in forming impressions of other individuals or groups 
(Brambilla et al. 2011; 2012), or even group norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 
2008; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). These empirical researches have demonstrated 
the prominence of morality over other evaluative dimensions in determining the social 
judgments of individuals and groups (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013; Ellemers & van 
den Bos, 2012; Leach et al., 2015). In this chapter we will revise some of the literature from 
these areas, which will hopefully help to broader our understanding of morality’s role within 
social relations. 
The Importance of Morality in Social Judgements 
Being moral and acting morally are parts of one’s essential self (Blasi, 1983), despite 
of what people consider morally “good” may differ different groups and cultures (Sacheva, 
Singh, & Medin, 2011). What seems to be consistent is the importance that individuals 
attribute to morality matters. For instance, Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues (2002a) 
examined samples from more (Spain) or less (Netherlands) honour oriented cultures, 
concluding that cultural values and norms can vary, but the importance of trustworthiness (a 
moral concern) is constant. The authors found that individuals were more likely to report 
negative feelings about themselves if they were thought to be dishonest or untrustworthy (vs. 
honest or trustworthy) (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b).  
People not only value morality, but also tended to see it more in themselves than in 
others. Epley and Dunning (2000) found that people tended to over-estimating one’s own 
morality, the “holier than thou” effect. University students in the U.S. tended to overestimate 
how much they would donate to charity, cooperate with a peer, or help a peer compared to 
their actual behaviour. Epley and Dunning (2000) found that this sense of individual morality 
was achieved mainly by over-estimating one’s own morality, rather than under-estimating 
others’ morality. A similar conclusion was drawn by Balcetis, Dunning, and Miller (2008) in 
a study with students from individualist (western Europe, US) and collectivist (Spain, China) 
societies. The authors found that individualists, like Epley, and Dunning’s participants, tended 
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to over-estimate the degree to which they would behave in a moral way. Similar to the “holier 
than thou” effect is the “Muhammad Ali effect”, a reference to the famous boxeur and to his 
not less famous claim to be “the greatest, not the smartest” (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 
1989). In Allison and colleagues studies, participants indicated they would be more likely to 
perform moral behaviours than other people, but not more likely to perform intelligent 
behaviours. Van Lange and Sedikides (1998) examined the reasons for this moral self-
aggrandisement, finding that moral traits (in this case honesty) are believed to be more 
descriptive of the self than others, more desirable, more controlled and less verifiable than 
intelligence. 
Morality is not only determinant to self-concept, it also dominates the impressions 
people form of others around them. When forming an impression of an individual or a group, 
people are confronted with a variety of information comprising traits and behaviours 
(Neuberg, & Fiske, 1987; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Several 
studies have shown that two fundamental dimensions of perception underlie this information, 
usually labelled as agency and communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007) or competence and 
warmth (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Despite differences 
in names there is a wide agreement on the common core underlying each of those dimensions 
(Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008). However, recent experimental work by Leach and 
colleagues (2007) demonstrated that the warmth dimension actually encompasses two distinct 
aspects, distinguishing between sociability and morality. Whereas sociability refers to 
cooperation and intention to connect with others (e.g., friendliness, likeability), morality 
refers to perceived correctness of social targets (e.g., honesty, sincerity, and trustworthiness). 
Although morality and sociability traits can be seen as falling along the same general 
dimension of evaluation (namely, warmth), they are conceptually distinct and play different 
roles at group and individual levels (Leach et al., 2007). A substantial amount of research has 
examined the importance attached by people to moral information when perceiving others 
behaviour or intentions (e.g., De Bruin, & van Lange, 2000; Martijn et al., 1992; Wojciszke, 
2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), but generally encompassed traits that indicate 
both morality and sociability. Taking into account the evidence found by Leach and 
colleagues (2007) regarding the independence of the two dimensions, research has shown that 
people favour information indicating morality rather than sociability or competence in 
interpersonal and intergroup relations (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 
2016). When asked to form a global impression, Brambilla and colleagues (2011) found that 
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participants were more interested in gathering information about individual’s morality (such 
as sincere, honest, righteous, trustworthy, and respectful) than their sociability (such as kind, 
friendly, warm, likeable, helpful) or competence (intelligent, competent, efficient, skilful, and 
capable). Pagliaro, Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, and Ellemers (2013) examined how 
information about morality and competence impacts on people’s behavioural intentions 
towards a newcomer at work. Following the procedure developed by Brambilla and 
colleagues (2011), employees of primary schools received a short page with trait information 
describing the degree of morality and competence of a prospective school manager. The 
school employees reported a more positive emotional and behavioural response towards the 
prospective new manager when he was described as a moral (vs. immoral) person. By 
contrast, the competence of the prospective school manager impacted less strongly on the 
emotional responses, and had no impact on the behavioural intentions reported by school 
employees. 
Individuals attend to others’ morality because it is an important guide on how to 
interact with them, but also on what to expect from them. People are so adept at inferring 
others’ morality that they do this very quickly and spontaneously in interactions, on the basis 
of very little information. Willis and Todorov (2006) exposed participants to novel faces for 
either 1/10th of a second, half a second, or one second. Then participants would judge the 
faces on attractiveness, likeability, honesty, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness. 
The authors found that even when exposed to the faces for only 1/10th of a second, 
participants were able to made very quickly (in about 1.7 seconds) fairly confident judgments 
of people’s honesty and trustworthiness, whereas judging non-moral traits (such as likeability 
and competence) took longer. Self-reports also indicate that in social interactions people 
primarily express an interest in understanding whether someone’s intentions are beneficial or 
harmful, rather than whether or not they are competent in enacting those intentions (e.g., 
Cuddy et al., 2008). When disclaiming others intentions are at quest, nothing is more 
informative than morality. 
The Inferential Power of Morality 
In social interactions people are primarily concerned about others’ moral character, so 
they can infer whether someone's intentions are beneficial or harmful, whether this interaction 
will represent an opportunity or a threat (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008; 
Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Cottrell and 
Neuberg (2007) found that people consider trustworthiness as the most important 
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characteristic for the ideal other to have. Without information about trustworthiness it is 
difficult to ensure someone’s moral character, and rely in their beneficial intentions (Leach et 
al., 2015). 
 When faced with negative information the inferential search about another´s morality 
is heightened. Those are the so called negativity effects – the greater impact of negative 
evaluative information rather than of equally intense positive stimuli when forming an 
impression of others (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) – which are particularly pronounced in the 
case of morally relevant behaviours. Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt, and Jakobs (1992) found 
that while forming an impression of another´s morality, people place greater weight on 
negative information than on positive information, but do not do so with competence. In fact, 
people search mostly for evidence of immorality because immoral behaviours are taken to be 
specially diagnostic of a person's moral character (Reeder & Coover, 1986; Trafimow & 
Trafimow, 1999). Skowronski and Carlston (1987) found that dishonest behaviours are more 
diagnostic of immorality than honest behaviours are predictive of perceived morality. People 
expect dishonest people to act dishonestly, whereas both honest and dishonest people may act 
honestly because honest behaviour is normative (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). 
Individuals seem to share a concern for evaluating others’ morality since doing so is 
essential for choosing how to interact with them. This concern can be particularly relevant in 
the case of outgroups; knowing outgroups morality can disclaim whether we are facing a 
threat, or whether their intentions are beneficial.  
Morality in Outgroups  
A few studies addressed the moral content of outgroup stereotypes. In a cross-national 
research, Phalet and Poppe (1997) investigated the role of competence and morality, finding 
that participants viewed morality as a more desirable characteristic for outgroups to possess 
than competence. Leach, Minescu, Poppe, and Hagendoorn (2008) also addressed outgroup 
stereotypes, stressing the importance of examining both the generality and the specificity of 
stereotype content. The authors characterised views of two contrasting outgroups, Chechens 
and Jews, examining whether the power and benevolence dimensions, and the more specific 
characteristics that fall along them (e.g., trustworthiness, peacefulness, antagonism), offer 
complementary characterizations of the stereotypes of these two outgroups. 
Leach and colleagues (2007) had already established the independence of morality and 
sociability, showing that these two dimensions represent distinguishable clusters of traits that 
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individuals ascribe to groups. In the third study the authors showed that the specific 
characteristics of morality (i.e., honest, sincere) and sociability (i.e., warm, likeable) were 
related to the positive evaluation of outgroups, depending on ingroup success. When an 
outgroup was said to be more successful than the ingroup, the perceived outgroup’s morality 
was more important to positive evaluation than its perceived sociability. However, when this 
same outgroup was said to be less successful than the ingroup, it was the perceived sociability 
of the outgroup that was more empirically important to participants’ positive evaluation of the 
outgroup. These results showed that although the characteristics of sociability and morality 
fall along the general dimension of benevolence, they capture different facets of benevolence, 
and hence should be treated as different dimensions of group perception (Leach, et al., 2015).  
Building on Leach and colleagues’ work, Brambilla et al. (2012) examined the 
importance of morality, sociability and competence on individual’s impressions of outgroups. 
The authors instructed Italian students to imagine that an unfamiliar ethnic group, described 
as high or low in one of the three dimensions, would be immigrating to Italy in the next year. 
Participant´s global impression of the outgroup was most affected by morality traits; when 
described as morally high, the outgroup was evaluated more positively, on the contrary, when 
described as morally low, the outgroup was more negatively evaluated. In a third study, the 
authors investigated the link between morality and the experience of threat, finding that the 
more the members of the unknown outgroup were perceived as immoral, the more they were 
perceived as representing a threat.  
Later on, in a new series of studies, Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, and Ellemers (2013) 
addressed this question. Italian students were asked to evaluate a target who was presented as 
an ingroup member (Italian descent) or outgroup member (Indian descent); to indicate if they 
felt threatened by the target (i.e., in terms of the group’s identity or the group’s safety); and 
finally, to indicate their behavioural intentions to approach (e.g., cooperate with) or avoid 
(e.g., distance themselves from) the target. The morality of the target was found to be the only 
dimension that significantly affected participants’ experiences of threat, as well as their 
behavioural intentions. However, the impact of the target’s morality differed depending on 
whether the target represented an ingroup or an outgroup member. The ingroup target lacking 
morality was experienced as a threat to the image of one’s group, whereas the immoral 
outgroup target was seen as representing a threat to the safety of one’s group. Even though 
both ingroup and outgroup targets raised behavioural avoidance rather than approach 
intentions when lacking morality, the desire to avoid the target was mediated by the 
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experience of group image threat in the case of an ingroup target, and by experiencing group 
safety threat in the case of an outgroup target. 
Although people seem willing to avoid outgroup and ingroup targets which lack 
morality, they do so for different reasons. Avoiding immoral outgroups is a question of group 
safety, whereas avoiding an immoral ingroup member is a way of cutting implications for the 
image of the group.  
Morality in Ingroups 
According to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) any dimension of 
evaluation can serve as basis for a positive ingroup evaluation, which has probably 
discouraged much of the empirical research at considering the nature of the dimensions of 
evaluation to be theoretically meaningful (Ellemers et al., 2013). Leach and colleagues (2007) 
were the first to consider the importance of morality for a positive ingroup identity, examining 
the role of morality for the group-level self-concept. In a series of studies the authors used 
different methods and different ingroups, and consistently found that participants considered 
morality traits (honest, sincere, trustworthy) as a primary source of ingroup virtue, and 
suggested that positive evaluations of a group in terms of morality can contribute more to a 
positive social identity than traits can indicate the group’s competence (competent, intelligent, 
skilled) or sociability (likable, warm, friendly). Moreover, morality also revealed to be 
determinant for ingroup identification, with participants reporting identification with an 
experimentally created ingroup only depending on how moral they though it to be. 
In a final set of studies, Leach et al. (2007) resorted to bogus information about 
ingroup level of morality, sociability, and competence, finding that ingroup pride only 
depended on the perceived morality of the group. Furthermore, only when the morality of the 
ingroup seemed deficient did participants distanced themselves from the group, by 
emphasising intragroup differences or claiming they were different from other group 
members. Informing the participants that their group lacked competence or sociability did not 
contribute to the tendency of distanciating the self from the ingroup. These results point in the 
same direction the aforementioned results of Brambilla et al. (2013). 
Taken together, these evidences suggest that morality plays a role in groups’ 
behavioural regulation. Ellemers and van den Bos (2012) addressed this topic arguing that 
shared moral standards help individuals defining who they are and where they belong, by 
providing them with self-relevant behavioural guidelines that they can use to express a 
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distinct and specific group-based identity. Identifying what is “right” or “wrong” can be used 
to judge whether the individual is a good group member, with social exclusion being the 
ultimate consequence for those who do not behave in line with group morals.  
Pagliaro and colleagues (2011) showed that group members followed moral norms 
because they believed that such behaviour earned them the respect of fellow ingroup 
members, regardless of the specific behaviour prescribed by the norm. But when the group 
norms are not followed the ingroup can react against the deviant. Prior work on the black 
sheep effect has demonstrated that people tend to distanciate and exclude ingroup members 
that deviate from the group’s norms (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). 
When members of a particular social group agree upon specific moral standards, this 
provides them with a definition of what is considered to be right and wrong within their group 
- which is not necessarily shared with other groups (Ellemers et al., 2013). Taking the social 
identity approach into account, different behaviours, values, or goals, may be seen to 
characterise one’s group, depending on whether and how these may contribute to the group’s 
distinct identity. This means that, in principle, even negatively valenced group characteristics 
may fulfil the aim of establishing a distinct group identity (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Ont the 
other hand, and given what was already exposed about the importance of morality, for groups 
and for self-concerns, to be seen as immoral may jeopardize the positive and distinct group 
identity. In this case, the group members will do everything to defend ingroup’s moral self-
image against the threat represented by wrongdoing (e.g., Iyer, Jetten, & Haslam, 2012). 
Some research has showed how groups deal with ingroup wrongdoings. For instance, 
Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) confronted European American students with historical 
evidence regarding the mass killing of Native Americans. Those who were told that the mass 
killing was an intentional extermination saw Native Americans as less human. The 
dehumanisation of the victim outgroup served to reduce the perceived responsibility of 
European Americans and to legitimise the violence. Because the same standards of morality 
are thought not to apply to sub-humans or non-humans, violence against such outgroups is not 
perceived as a moral violation (Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990). Despite moral norms and 
codes being often said to apply universally – to all people under all circumstances – it seems 
to depend largely on the appreciation of others humanness. If we are not seen as equally 
human (Leyens et al., 2007), then the moral treatment that we inspire should be different too. 
It seems clear then that morality stands in relation with dehumanisation. In the next 
chapter we will revise some of the investigation relating these two topics. 
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Chapter III. Dehumanisation and Morality 
By principle, every person deserves moral treatment simply by virtue of being human 
(Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012). However, as we have already seen, humanness 
is not universally ascribed to everyone. When we see others as fully human, we see them as 
deserving moral treatment and concern about their well-being. However, when people are not 
seen as fully human, they are excluded from the moral circle, and consequently their suffering 
becomes less visible and our willingness to help them decreases (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, 
& Hodson, 2012; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Opotow, 1990). Moral standing and moral 
action are therefore entwined with humanness, having great consequences in various social 
domains. 
In the beginning of the first chapter we referred to some studies that focused on moral 
exclusion and more blatant forms of dehumanisation. In this chapter we will cover some work 
that links the study of humanness and subtle dehumanisation with moral psychology. 
Mind Perception, Moral Status, and Humanness 
Recently research linked the perception of mind with moral status. Gray, Gray, and 
Wegner (2007) began to demonstrate that mind attribution falls along two separate 
dimensions, namely Agency and Experience. In an international survey they asked people to 
evaluate the Agency, Experience, and the moral standing of different entities, including a dog, 
a normal adult, a child, a person in a vegetative state, a foetus, a robot, a dead person, a 
chimpanzee, and God. The authors found that moral standings tapped on moral rights, by 
asking which entities would be the most difficult for the participants to harm – which entities 
deserved more protection from harm – and which entities should be more punished for 
causing someone’s death – moral blame. The results showed that people perceived the minds 
of these entities along the two mentioned mental dimensions (Agency and Experience), and 
more important, that those two dimensions of mind predicted the entities moral standards. 
Agency is the capacity to do and intend, and includes mental capabilities such as 
thinking, self-control, and communication, and endows an entity with moral responsibility 
and warranted punishment for killing another. Experience is the general capacity for sensation 
and feeling, and includes attributes such as emotion, consciousness, and personality, which 
determine whether an entity deserves moral rights and protection from harm. Those perceived 
as having more agency are moral agents – entities capable of doing good or evil, right or 
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wrong – and those perceived with more experience are moral patients – capable of 
experiencing good or evil, right or wrong, done to them (Gray & Wegner, 2012).  
These dimensions are generally independent, which means that an entity can have 
agency without experience or experience without agency. More broadly, this demonstrates 
that mind-having is not simply a matter of degree (less vs. more) but of type (agency, 
experience, or both). These two dimensions of mind map onto other dimensions through 
which we perceive others, including warmth (experience) and competence (agency; Fiske et 
al., 2007) as well as Human Nature (experience) and Human Uniqueness (agency; Haslam et 
al., 2008; 2012). 
Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011) confirmed this pattern in relation 
to perceived humanness, finding that people seen as lacking uniquely human traits were 
viewed as less blameworthy and punishable for immoral behaviour, whereas people seen as 
lacking Human Nature were judged less worthy of protection, less capable of rehabilitation, 
and less deserving of praise for moral behaviour. These results indicate that basic aspects of 
moral status are associated in distinctive ways with the dimensions of humanness.  
Bastian and colleagues (2011) established the relation between Human Uniqueness 
and moral blame for immoral behaviour. However, in later studies a different pattern of 
results was found. Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013) found that the more dehumanised was 
the agent of an immoral behavior, the more morally blame he was considered to be.  
The authors analysed the impact of dehumanisation and moral outrage in retributive 
justice, in response to criminal behaviour. Bastian and colleagues (2013) found that people 
feel morally outraged by harmful crimes, and dehumanise the perpetrators of these crimes. 
They also found that the more dehumanised was the agent of the criminal behaviour, the more 
morally blamed he was considered to be. Although they used a unique measure for 
dehumanisation that comprises both Human Uniqueness and Human Nature, the relation 
between humanness and moral blame took a different direction from the one found in the 
previous studies developed by Bastian and colleagues (2011). The authors later advanced the 
hypothesis that these differences were due to the nature of the behaviour; when 
dehumanisation appears in response to criminal behaviour, it can be combined with the moral 
character of the individual, leaving his responsibility unchanged. 
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Overall, it seems that the extent to which individuals or groups are ascribed or denied 
humanness is therefore likely to affect the everyday moral judgments involving them. On the 
other hand, immorality also seems to have some costs in the perception of humanness. 
The Humanness Costs of Immorality 
Acting or being viewed as immoral has costs for the humanness of individuals, 
ingroups, and outgroups. For instance, Bastian and Haslam (2010) analysed the effects of 
social ostracism, behaviour considered immoral, in dehumanisation. The authors found that 
when people were ostracised they judged themselves and those who ostracised them as less 
human and believed they were also viewed as less human by the perpetrators. 
Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding, and Fasoli (2013) extended these results, by 
examining how people evaluated themselves in response to their own harmful behaviour. The 
authors found that when engaging in the social ostracism of others, people see themselves as 
less human. Specifically, the authors provided evidence that perpetrators of social ostracism 
see themselves as less human compared with when they engage in a more positive 
interpersonal interaction. Moreover, they showed that it was the perceived immorality of 
one’s behaviour that which explained the self-dehumanisation process. In contrast with the 
moral disengagement literature, these studies highlight that self-dehumanisation also arises 
from engaging with the moral consequences of behaviour. 
As stated in the previous chapter, dehumanising others may also serve to reduce the 
affective and moral consequences of one’s actions. In the above cited studies, Castano and 
Giner-Sorolla (2006) used different ingroups (humans, British, White Americans) and 
outgroups (aliens, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans), finding that when 
participants were made aware of ingroup’s mass killing of outgroup members, they 
dehumanised the victims more. The perception of collective responsibility, not just the 
knowledge that outgroup members had died in great numbers, was shown to be necessary for 
this effect. Dehumanisation also occurred concurrently with increased collective guilt but was 
unrelated to it. The authors proposed that dehumanisation might be a strategy for people to 
reestablish psychological equanimity when confronted with a self-threatening situation and 
that such a strategy may occur concomitantly with other strategies, such as providing 
reparations to the outgroup. This follows the idea that denying full human status to the victims 
allows people to disengage self-sanctions (Bandura, 1999). 
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Immorality has also negative consequences for outgroup dehumanisation. Esses and 
colleagues (2008) tested the role of refugees’ dehumanisation, who were claimed to be 
immoral, by determining emotional reactions and attitudes toward them, and toward the 
current refugees’ policy. The authors demonstrated that dehumanising refugees lead to greater 
contempt and lack of admiration, resulting in less favourable attitudes toward the group and 
toward the nation’s current refugees’ policy. The authors suggested that eliciting negative 
emotions facilitates openly expressing negative attitudes toward the group in question and 
denying the group access to required resources. 
The impact of moral and humanness perceptions has a wide impact in various social 
domains, and it may be a perverse phenomenon by affecting daily judgments that are beyond 
our conscience. 
Overview of the Studies 
Despite the extensive literature on morality and humanness, empirical evidences on 
the relation between these two dimensions are still limited. The set of empirical studies that 
form this thesis aimed at analysing the relation between morality and humanness both in inter 
and intragroup relations. 
Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups (Ellemers et al., 2013; 
Leach et al., 2015) and is consistently pointed out as part of what makes us uniquely human 
(Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). Therefore, our first goal was to 
address the attribution and denial of humanness to groups in the moral domain. In the 
dehumanisation literature, the attribution and denial of humanness to groups is consistently 
referred as a process that occurs independently of the valence of the uniquely human 
characteristics (Leyens et al., 2001; 2007; Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Taken the importance of 
morality for ingroup proud and ingroup positive evaluation (Leach et al., 2007), we 
hypothesised that ingroup members would have some reluctance in ascribing moral traits that 
are uniquely human, though negative, to their groups.  
In paper 1 - “More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of 
humanness with moral characteristics” - we analysed the attribution and denial of moral traits 
to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. Across 
three studies we tested the hypothesis stating that in moral domain ingroup members choose 
different strategies to differentiate ingroup and outgroups depending on trait humanness and 
valence.  
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In paper 2 - “The relation between Human Uniqueness and Immorality: An index of 
behaviours” - we focused mainly on the evaluation of criminal behaviours in morality and 
Human Uniqueness dimensions. Criminal behaviour is considered immoral, as it involves 
harming another person. This immoral evaluation of the criminal behaviour is pointed out as 
impacting the perception of the person who practices the behaviour as lacking humanness 
(Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). Therefore, we used this evaluation as a proxy to address 
the relation between immorality and humanness. 
In paper 3 - “Dealing with inside Immorality and Human Uniqueness: The role of 
ingroup threat” - we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance, specifically, 
how they evaluate the humanness of an ingroup member that behaves immorally but uniquely 
human. We integrated the role of ingroup threat to address the perception of humanness of the 
deviant member. In two studies we manipulated the level of ingroup threat (Study 1) and used 
two criminal behaviours taken from paper 2 (Study 2). We hypothesised that depending on the 
level of threat that the deviant behaviour represents to ingroup image, the deviant would be 
more or less dehumanised, compared with the ingroup. In this paper we also analysed how 
morally blame the deviant was considered to be, integrating Bastian and colleagues’ (2013) 
findings. Finally, we analysed the different strategies ingroup members may choose when 
dealing with ingroup threat. 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section II 
Empirical Section 
 
28 
 
 
29 
 
More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of humanness with moral 
characteristics 
Patrícia Henriques1†, Maria Gouveia-Pereira2 
 
Abstract  
Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups and is consistently pointed out as 
part of what makes us uniquely human. In this paper we analyse the attribution and denial of 
moral traits to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup 
differentiation. Across two studies we test the hypothesis that within the moral domain, 
participants choose different strategies to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup 
depending on trait humanness and valence. Our results support this hypothesis, since 
participants attributed more uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup, but only when 
positive; when negative the uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to outgroups. 
We did not found the same pattern of results on non-uniquely human moral traits, allowing to 
discard the explanation of a valence-based ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. The results 
are discussed within dehumanisation, ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. 
Key-words  
Morality, Dehumanisation, Valence, Intergroup relations 
 
Dehumanisation has been a popular topic in Social Psychology literature. History is 
filled with examples of human groups pictured as closer to animals, not entirely human, as for 
example indigenous people stereotyped as brute savages, immigrants linked to invasive pests, 
or victims of genocide labelled as vermin by the perpetrators. The multiple episodes of mass 
murderer and ethnical conflicts during the twentieth century motivated social psychologists to 
analyse dehumanisation systematically, searching for an explanation for those episodes. One 
                                               
1 William James Center for Research, ISPA – Instituto Universitário, Lisbon, Portugal 
 
2 Centro de Investigação em Educação (CIE), ISPA – Instituto Universitário, Lisbon, Portugal  
 
* Paper submitted to Journal of Social Psychology 
 
† Correspondence to: Patrícia Henriques, ISPA- Instituto Universitário, R. Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149 -041, 
Lisbon, Portugal; E-mail: ahenriques@ispa. 
 
 
30 
 
of the first authors to address this topic was Kelman (1973). He argued that when fellow 
human beings are deprived of what makes them human, we are excluding them from the 
human category. This replacement outside the human category is what makes the moral 
restraints against killing more readily overcome. The idea that moral exclusion is a form of 
dehumanisation was also defended by Opotow (1990). She argued that placing people outside 
the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply, makes these 
people to be seen as non-entities, and consequently harming them appears acceptable. 
Morality seems to have a narrow relation with dehumanisation, at least for the 
explanation of these phenomena in conflict contexts. Over the last fifteen years the study of 
dehumanisation has moved from an approach based on extreme intergroup phenomena, and 
has been analysed outside the domains of violence and cruelty. Two main research 
programmes have been responsible for this paradigm shift: Leyens and colleagues with the 
formulation of the infrahumanisation theory (Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, 
Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007) and Haslam and colleagues’s dehumanisation model (Haslam, 
2006; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008). Both research programmes started at 
capturing what it means to be human, as a first step to analyse what is denied to others when 
we dehumanised them. 
Morality has been pointed out as one humanness dimension (Demoulin et al., 2004; 
Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006), but in what subtle dehumanisation concerns, it has been 
understudied. In this paper we intend to fill this gap by analysing the attribution and denial of 
humanness to groups within the moral domain. 
Infrahumanisation and Dehumanisation 
Leyens and colleagues were the first authors to overcome the dehumanisation link to 
violence and moral exclusion, arguing that this process may be subtle, in contrast with the 
blatant denials of humanness described by early dehumanisation theorists. They called this 
subtler form of perceiving others as less human as “infrahumanisation”, to distinguish it from 
other forms of dehumanisation (Leyens et al., 2001). The infrahumanisation effect is the 
tendency to ascribe more human qualities to ingroup than outgroups. Humanness was defined 
by the authors as those characteristics that are unique to our species, exemplified by 
secondary emotions, which are reserved to one’s groups and denied to outgroups, 
independently of characteristics’ valence. This differential attribution of uniquely human 
characteristics implies that the ingroup is more human than the outgroup, leaving the outgroup 
to be seen as not fully human (Leyens et al., 2007). The infrahumanisation effect was 
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consistent in a large body of research (for reviews, see Leyens et al., 2007; Vaes, Leyens, 
Paladino, & Miranda, 2012), and it appears in different intergroup contexts and in the absence 
of intergroup conflicts (Leyens et al., 2003; Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & 
Leyens, 2009). The effect was demonstrated in judgment tasks, typically involving the 
attribution of emotions to groups, and also using implicit association methods (Boccato, 
Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002). It can be shown in which cases 
humanness is represented through secondary versus primary emotions or through more 
directly human- and animal-related words (Viki, Winchester, Titshall, & Chisango, 2006), 
and has a variety of behavioural implications (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes, Paladino, 
Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). 
Infrahumanisation theory provided a clear understanding of what humanness is, by 
contrasting humans with animals. It also provided methods to analyse subtle dehumanisation 
based on the primary-secondary emotion distinction, through which the differential attribution 
of humanness to ingroup and outgroups can be tested. 
Haslam’s dehumanisation model expanded the understanding of what is denied when 
we dehumanise, by developing a bi-dimensional approach to the representation of humanness. 
Considering that humanness can be represented by the comparison with or the description of 
the non-human (Kagan, 2004), the authors proposed a representation of the concept as Human 
Uniqueness, i.e., the human-animal distinction, and Human Nature, which consists in the 
opposition of humanness and inanimate objects, such as machines and automata. Ratings of 
the extent to which traits reflect Human Uniqueness and Human Nature are uncorrelated, and 
have different content. Whereas humans are distinguished from animals on the basis of 
attributes involving cognitive capacity, civility, and social refinement, we differ from 
inanimate objects on the basis of our emotionality, flexibility, and warmth (Haslam, 2006). A 
large body of research demonstrated that lay people recognise the two distinct forms of 
humanness (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, 
& Suitner, 2008), that knowledge of them is highly convergent across cultures (Bain, Vaes, 
Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Park, Haslam, & Kashima, 2012) and finally that they also 
appear to be denied to groups in different ways (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; 
Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). 
Given two senses of humanness, two forms of dehumanisation can be expected. 
Haslam (2006) proposed that whenever individuals are denied Human Uniqueness they are 
subtly or overtly linked to animals. According to Haslam this “animalistic” form of 
32 
 
dehumanisation captures phenomena ranging from the most blatant genocidal labelling of 
people as vermin to the subtlety of infrahumanisation. On the other hand, when a person or 
group is denied Human Nature they are linked to inanimate objects or automata, and seen as 
lacking the human essence.  
The two approaches to the study of dehumanisation started by defining what it means 
to be human, and both identified morality as a feature that distinguishes humans from animals 
(Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). Therefore, we can hypothesise that humanness is an 
important dimension when groups ascribe and deny moral traits. In this paper we will analyse 
the attribution of morality mapped onto humanness, following Leyens and colleagues’ (2001) 
procedure. However, in the case of morality, and contrary to what happens with emotional 
dehumanisation, we believe that valence is also relevant for intergroup attributions. Morality 
is known to be an important social dimension within and between groups (Ellemers & van den 
Bos, 2012; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015) and furthermore it impacts on ingroup proud and 
ingroup positive evaluation (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).  
The Importance of Morality in Groups 
Morality plays a central role in social relations. Being moral and acting morally are 
part of one’s essential self (Blasi, 1983), impacts on self-evaluations (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Manstead, & Fisher, 2002), influences the process of forming impressions of other individuals 
or groups (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & 
Ellemers, 2013), and gives inform about others intentions (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy, 
Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworszki, 1998). 
Although traditionally analysed through an individual approach, the study of morality 
has been further extended to groups. Leach and colleagues (2007) examined the importance of 
morality on individual’s positive evaluation of ingroups. In a series of studies, the authors 
compared the importance which individuals ascribe to morality, sociability, and competence, 
showing that participants considered morality traits (honest, sincere, trustworthy) as a primary 
source of ingroup virtue and pride, and contributing to a more positive social identity than 
traits indicating group’s competence (competent, intelligent, skilled), or sociability (likable, 
warm, friendly). Moreover, in this study morality has also revealed to be determinant for 
ingroup identification, the more an experimentally created ingroup was considered to be 
moral, the greater was the identification reported by participants. 
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The authors also analysed how morality impacts on outgroup’s evaluations. They 
manipulated group success and examined the attribution of positive traits to a relevant 
outgroup that was more or less successful than the ingroup. The attribution of morality was 
not the most important condition for an outgroup’s positive evaluation, independently of 
relative group success. Indeed, competence was more important to positively evaluate the 
more successful outgroup, and sociability was more important to positively evaluate the less 
successful outgroup. More interesting were the ingroup´s attributions. Despite the context 
being largely irrelevant to morality, the authors found that morality was once again the 
characteristic that was most important to positively evaluate the ingroup, regardless of the 
ingroup’s relative success. These results suggest that morality plays a central role in the 
evaluation of ingroups, but not in the outgroups evaluation, hence implying that morality is a 
dimension reserved to ingroups. 
Brewer and Campbell’s (1976) work corroborates the idea that morality is the one 
characteristic that ingroups consistently attribute more to themselves than to outgroups. The 
authors conducted a survey of intergroup perceptions in East Africa were they presented a 
lengthy list of character traits (both positive and negative) and asked respondents to indicate 
which groups were most likely to exhibit each trait. The authors found that the attributions of 
positive traits, such as peaceful, honest, and friendly, were almost universally reserved for 
ingroup, whereas the assignment of negative traits, such as dishonest and cruel, varied 
considerably across outgroups. But more interestingly, the results did not reveal a similar 
level of ingroup positivity bias on traits such as smart, wealthy, and progressive. Later on, 
Brewer (1986) found similar results in 20 different locations. In ethnographic interviews, she 
learned that some groups were willing to describe themselves as lacking competence, 
sociability, prestige, or strength, but not morality. Across this diverse set of ethnic groups, 
members of nearly every ingroup described themselves as highly moral. 
These studies highlight the importance people attach to ingroup morality, revealing the 
ingroups motivation to not be seen as lacking morality. On the other hand, some studies can 
help us to understand what ingroup members do once confront with ingroup immoral actions. 
When faced with an ingroup’s wrongdoing, ingroup members need to find strategies to cope 
with the threat posed by the immoral behaviour. This can be done by making flattering 
interpretations of the ingroup’s wrongdoing and its consequences for others (e.g., Leidner, 
Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), or by moral disengagement strategies (Bandura, 
1999), such as dehumanising the victims of ingroup’s wrongdoing (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 
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2006). In intergroup conflicts, ingroups can also maintain their moral superiority over their 
adversary by endorsing narratives that legitimise ingroup violence, delegitimise the opponent, 
and emphasise the ingroup’s victimisation (Bar-Tal, 1989). These studies reinforce the idea 
that it is unlikely that ingroup members would be willing to be associated with negative moral 
traits, quite on the contrary, they are motivated to be seen as highly moral. Therefore, we 
hypothesise that valence, along with humanness, has an important role in the attribution of 
morality. 
In two studies we tested the hypothesis that in moral domain the dehumanisation effect 
will be verifiable only for positive traits. More specifically, we expect ingroup members to 
attribute more uniquely human traits to the ingroup than to outgroups, only when the moral 
traits are positive; when negative, we expect ingroup members to attribute less moral traits to 
the ingroup than to outgroups, independently of whether the trait is uniquely or non-uniquely 
human. In Study 1 we used a between design, in order to make a direct test to our hypothesis, 
namely by allowing participants to see only positive or negative uniquely and non-uniquely 
human moral traits. In Study 2 we used a within subject design, and made a robust test to the 
hypothesis by extending the results to two different outgroups, Gypsies (Study 2a) and 
Moroccans (Study 2b).  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 62 Portuguese citizens (47 of which female) with ages ranging from 
18 to 54 (M = 31.79, SD = 8.99) in the positive trait condition, and 50 Portuguese citizens (35 
of which female) with ages ranging from 19 to 43 (M = 27.38, SD = 5.13) in the negative trait 
condition. 
Procedure and materials. 
Participants took part in this study through an online platform. Before initiating the 
study, it was asked for the participants’ informed consent. After agreeing on participating 
voluntarily, each participant was assigned to one of the two study conditions. In both 
conditions participants were asked to complete the moral dehumanisation measure, both for 
the ingroup and outgroup. Finally participants also responded to the ingroup identification 
scale, as a control measure.  
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Moral dehumanisation measure. 
We used Leyens and colleagues’ (2001) methodology, each participant saw a list of 6 
moral traits, and then were asked to pick those traits which they thought to better describe 
ingroup members (Portuguese). Afterwards they were asked to do the same for outgroup 
members (Gypsies). The order of the group presentation was counterbalanced. Participants 
assigned in the positive trait condition only saw positive moral traits, whereas participants in 
the negative trait condition only saw negative moral traits.  
A pre-test was conducted in order to identify the positive uniquely and non-uniquely 
human moral traits, as well as the negative uniquely and non-uniquely human moral traits. 
Thirty moral traits taken from Henriques, Gouveia-Pereira, and Miranda (2010) were 
pretested, of which 12 were selected for the final measure: 3 positive uniquely human (e.g. 
“justiça” [justice]; M uh  = 5.66, SD uh  = 1.12, M val  = 6.69, SD val  = 0.36), 3 positive non-
uniquely human (e.g. “lealdade” [loyalty]; M uh  = 3.96, SD uh  = 1.45, M val  = 6.68, SD val  = 
0.58), 3 negative uniquely human (e.g. “desonestidade” [dishonesty]; M uh  = 5.77, SD uh  = 
1.59, M val  = 1.47, SD val  = 0.53) and 3 negative non-uniquely human (e.g. “crueldade” 
[cruelty]; M uh  = 3.94, SD uh  = 1.46, M val  = 1.67, SD val  = 0.63). 
The analysis performed assured that the moral traits were orthogonal as to their level 
of uniquely humanness and valence. As such, uniquely human moral traits were judged as 
more uniquely human than non-uniquely human moral traits (F(1, 29) = 53.628, p ≤ .0001, ηp2 
= .649), but did not differ in terms of valence (F(1, 29) = .04, p = .842). At the same time, the 
positive moral traits were evaluated as more positive than the negative moral traits (F(1, 31) = 
1244.134, p ≤ .0001, ηp2 = .976) and this effect was not qualified by moral traits’ human 
uniqueness (F(1, 31) = 2.709, p = .110).  
Identification scale. 
We used Leach and colleagues’ (2008) identification scale. The scale comprises of 14 
items and participants indicated their agreement with them on 7-point scales (α = .9) ranging 
from 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree. 
Results and Discussion 
Ingroup identification. 
Ingroup identification was calculated taking the mean of the fourteen identification 
items. In both conditions the mean ingroup identification was higher than the middle point of 
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the scale (M = 4.515, SD = 1.222; M = 4.666, SD = .934; for positive and negative conditions 
respectively), and since there was no variation between conditions (F(1, 109) = .513, p >.1), 
this variable will be left out in the remaining analyses. 
Moral dehumanisation. 
For each condition, two composite scores of the number of moral uniquely and non-
uniquely human words attributed to the Portuguese group and the Gypsies group were 
computed for each participant by combining the selected words. This number could vary 
between 0 and 3. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to check for significant differences in 
the association of the ingroup versus outgroup with uniquely and non-uniquely human words. 
A significant interaction between humanness and target group was revealed by condition (F(1, 
110) = 48.456, p < .001, ηp2 = .306). As expected, in the positive trait condition participants 
selected more uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup (F(1, 61) = 4.773, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.363), whereas the non-uniquely human moral traits were more selected for the outgroup  
(F(1, 61) = 9.254, p < .003, ηp2 = .132) (see Table 1). We did not find a target main effect 
(F(1, 61) = 2.297, p = .135), indicating that participants differentiate the ingroup from the 
outgroup based on the humanness of the positive moral traits. Overall, when restricted to 
positive traits to choose, participants selected the uniquely human traits for their group, 
assuring the humanness of the ingroup. 
In the negative trait condition a target main effect was found, indicating that these 
traits were more attributed to the outgroup (F(1, 49) = 33.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .407), and the 
effect was qualified by the trait humanness. The negative uniquely human moral traits were 
more ascribed for the outgroup than ingroup (F(1, 49) = 41.263, p < .001, ηp2 = .457), whereas 
the non-uniquely human negative moral traits were equally attributed to the outgroup and 
ingroup (F(1, 49) = 1.205, p = .278) (see Table 1). The outgroup was evaluated more 
negatively than the ingroup, though not any type of negativity, but rather uniquely humanness 
negativity. 
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Moral Traits Target 
Positive Trait Condition Negative Trait Condition 
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
Uniquely 
Human 
Ingroup 1.145** .105 .600* .099 
Outgroup .403* .067 1.400* .111 
Non-Uniquely 
Human 
Ingroup .855** .119 .680 .083 
Outgroup 1.306* .099 .800* .103 
* p ≤. 05; ** p ≤ .01 
Table 1: Means and standard errors of the attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human 
moral traits to the ingroup and outgroup in positive and negative traits conditions. 
 
Overall these results suggest a different intergroup differentiation pattern in each 
condition. In the positive trait condition our results follow those of Leyens and colleagues’ 
(2001), since as expected participants attributed more uniquely human moral traits to the 
ingroup compared to the outgroup. The novelty concerns the negative trait condition, since in 
this case the uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to outgroup. This effect was 
not just a reflection of outgroup negativity, as the negative non-uniquely human moral traits 
were equally attributed to both groups. In Study 2 we aimed at replicating these results in a 
within subject design, and test whether these results could be generalised to other groups. In 
order to do so, we performed two identical studies, except for the group target. 
Studies 2a and 2b 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants in Study 2a consisted of 38 undergraduate Psychology students from a 
Portuguese university. Of these, 2 participants were excluded for not being native Portuguese 
speakers, leaving the sample with 31 female and a mean age of 21.67 years old (SD = 5.91).  
In Study 2b participants consisted of 34 undergraduate Psychology students from the 
same university as Study 2a. Once again, 3 participants were left out of the final sample for 
not being native Portuguese speakers. In the end 27 were female and the sample’s mean age 
was 20.97 years old (SD = 4.2). 
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Procedure and materials.  
The materials and procedure of Study 2a and 2b were exactly the same, the only 
difference between the two studies being the outgroup target: in Study 2a we used the Gypsies 
group as the outgroup target, same as we did in Study 1, while in Study 2b the outgroup was 
the Moroccan. In both studies we used Portuguese as ingroup. 
The studies were conducted in the university’s laboratory, and participants took part in 
exchange for course credits. The procedure followed that of Study 1, where participants were 
first asked to complete the moral dehumanisation measure, but this time the measure 
comprised of both the positive and the negative traits used in each condition of Study 1. 
Participants saw the 12 traits at the same time and were asked to select those which they 
thought to better describe the members of the ingroup (Portuguese) and likewise the members 
of the outgroup (Gypsies or Moroccan). Once again the order of the group presentation was 
counterbalanced. After having completed the moral dehumanisation measure for each group, 
participants answered the ingroup identification scale. This measure was again used as a 
control variable. 
In the end, all participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Ingroup identification. 
Similarly to Study 1, in Study 2a and 2b the mean ingroup identification was higher 
than the middle point of the scale (M = 4.651, SD = 1.044; M = 4.856, SD = .965; for each 
study respectively), and since there was no variation between studies (F(1, 65) = .694, p >.1), 
this variable was not further considered in the remaining analyses. 
Moral dehumanisation. 
Following the procedure of Study 1, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA to 
check for significant differences in the association of each group with uniquely and non-
uniquely human words, this time with valence taken as a within factor. 
In Study 2a (Portuguese and Gypsies) this analysis revealed a significant interaction 
between humanness and valence by group target (F(1, 35) = 10.977, p = .002, ηp2 = .239). A 
main effect of target indicates that participants attributed more positive traits to the ingroup 
than outgroup (M ingroup  = 1.04, SD ingroup  = .682; M outgroup
 
= .618, SD outgroup = .551; F(1, 35) = 
16.716, p < .001, ηp2 = .216), and this effect was qualified by humanness. Positive uniquely 
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human traits were more attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup (M ingroup  = 1.139, 
SD ingroup  = .83; M outgroup
 
= .306, SD outgroup = .577; F(1, 35) = 35, p < .001, ηp2 = .5), which was 
not the case of positive non-uniquely human traits, as these were equally attributed to both 
groups (M ingroup  = .972, SD ingroup  = .91; M outgroup
 
= .917, SD outgroup = .77; F(1, 35) = 19.163, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .354). These results indicate that the ingroup was evaluated more positively than 
the outgroup, but only in the uniquely human traits, revealing a differentiation strategy based 
on humanness, as in the previous study. In the case of negative traits a main effect of group 
target indicates that these traits were more attributed to the outgroup (M outgroup
 
= 1.013, 
SD outgroup = .486) compared to the ingroup (M ingroup  = 54, SD ingroup  = .512 (F(1, 35) = 20.109, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .365), as expected, but in this study this effect was not qualified by humanness 
(F(1, 35) = 1.197, p < .281, ηp2 = .033). The results just described are illustrated on figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Mean number and error bars of positive and negative non-uniquely and uniquely 
human moral traits attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup in Study 2a. 
 
The results of Study 2a have some similarities and differences when compared with 
Study 1. Participants in Study 2a ascribed more positive uniquely human moral traits to the 
ingroup than to outgroup, and attributed more negative uniquely human traits to the outgroup 
than ingroup, replicating the results of Study 1 for the uniquely human moral traits. The 
difference relied on the attribution of non-uniquely human moral traits. Contrary to Study 1, 
participants in Study 2a selected more negative non-uniquely human traits to the Gypsies 
outgroup, but the same amount of positive non-uniquely human traits for both groups. 
Overall, the outgroup was evaluated more negatively, being these results not just a reflection 
of group derogation, as witnesses by the equal attribution of positive non-uniquely human 
traits to both groups.  
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In Study 2b (Portuguese and Moroccan) a 2 (humanness: UH vs non-UH) x 2 (valence: 
positive vs negative) x 2 (target: ingroup vs outgroup) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a 
significant interaction between humanness and valence by group target (F(1, 30) = 8.786, p = 
.006, ηp2 = .227). In the case of positive traits a main effect of target indicates that participants 
attributed these traits more to the ingroup than to the outgroup (M ingroup  = 1.097, SD ingroup  = 
.611; M outgroup
 
= .581, SD outgroup = .509; F(1, 30) = 14.369, p = .001, ηp2 = .324). However, in 
this study no effect of humanness was found significant for positive traits (F(1, 30) = .078, p 
= .782). 
In the case of negative traits an interaction between humanness and target (F(1, 30) = 
8.541, p = .007, ηp2 = .222) indicates that negative uniquely human traits were more attributed 
to the outgroup than to the ingroup (M outgroup
 
= .742, SD outgroup = .815; M ingroup  =.419, SD ingroup  
= .502; F(1, 30) = 3.363, p = .077, ηp2 = .101), despite this interaction was only marginally 
significant. In this study the negative non-uniquely human traits were also more attributed to 
the ingroup than to the outgroup (M ingroup  = .1.194, SD ingroup  = .749; M outgroup
 
= .774, 
SD outgroup = .669; F(1, 30) = 7.59, p = .01, ηp2 = .202). Study 2b results are illustrated on figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2: Mean number and error bars of positive and negative non-uniquely and uniquely 
human moral traits attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup in Study 2b. 
 
Once again, Study 2b had a similar results pattern regarding the uniquely human moral 
traits, with more positive traits attributed to the ingroup, and more negative traits attributed to 
the outgroup. And again, the results concerning the non-uniquely human moral traits were not 
consistent with previous studies’ results. Contrary to what we found for the Gypsies outgroup, 
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participants in Study 2b selected more positive and negative non-uniquely human traits for the 
Portuguese group than the Moroccan outgroup. The fact that both positive traits, non-uniquely 
and uniquely human, were more selected for the ingroup could indicate a general positivity 
toward the ingroup. However, the negative non-uniquely human traits were also more 
attributed to the ingroup, suggesting that these findings are not just a mirror of an ingroup bias 
based on valence. 
General Discussion 
In this paper we aimed at analysing how groups differentiate within the moral domain. 
Across two studies we analysed the attribution and denial of morality traits mapped onto 
humanness and valence. In what morality concerns, and contrary to emotional 
dehumanisation, our results showed that humanness and valence are two important 
dimensions in intergroup differentiation. 
In a between participants design we found that depending on the traits’ valence, people 
used different strategies to preserve ingroup’s positive differentiation. Faced with a choice 
that only provided positive traits, participants followed the emotional dehumanisation pattern, 
by choosing the uniquely human traits to their ingroup. However, when restricted their choice 
only to negative traits, participants had to go for another strategy. In this case, and contrary to 
emotional dehumanisation reasoning, participants attributed more negative uniquely human 
moral traits to the outgroup. 
We replicated this tendency in a within subject design, with two different outgroups. 
In Study 2a and 2b the positive uniquely human traits were consistently more attributed to the 
ingroup, and the negative uniquely human traits were more ascribed to outgroup. In both 
studies we discarded the explanation of a classical ingroup bias and outgroup derogation 
based on valence by looking at the non-uniquely human traits. In Study 2a we rejected the 
hypothesis of outgroup derogation based on valence due to the fact that although participants 
chose more negative uniquely and non-uniquely human traits to the Gypsies outgroup, they 
attributed the same amount of positive non-uniquely human traits to both groups. In Study 2b 
participants attributed more positive moral traits in general to the ingroup, reflecting an 
ingroup bias, despite participants also having chosen more negative non-uniquely human 
traits to their ingroup.  
The results pattern regarding the uniquely human moral traits was consistent 
throughout the two studies; overall, the positive uniquely human traits were more attributed to 
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the ingroup, and the negative uniquely human traits were more ascribed to outgroup. What 
seems to differ is the attribution of the non-uniquely human moral traits. 
In the case of the Gypsies outgroup, the general negative evaluation exhibited in Study 
2a is not entirely surprising. In Portuguese society there is still a negative attitude deeply 
rooted toward this minority group (Moscovici & Pérez, 1999), that became more evident in 
the within subjects study. This is not the case of the Moroccan outgroup, with whom 
Portuguese do not have much contact and information. In this case participants did not 
showed a general negative attitude toward Moroccan, ascribing more negative non-uniquely 
human traits to the ingroup, despite having ascribed more negative uniquely human traits to 
this outgroup. In fact, throughout the two studies the negative uniquely human moral traits 
were consistently attributed more to outgroups, which was not the case of negative non-
uniquely human moral traits. There seems to be reluctance in attributing moral traits 
perceived as negative and uniquely human to the ingroup. 
Brambilla and colleagues (2012; 2013) found out that while forming impressions of 
outgroups, participants are more affected by moral information. Furthermore, when the 
members of the outgroup were perceived as immoral, they were perceived as representing a 
threat. Morality was the only dimension that significantly affected participants’ experiences of 
threat. However, depending on whether the target represented an ingroup or an outgroup 
member the impact of the target’s morality was different. An ingroup target lacking morality 
was experienced as a threat to the ingroup image, whereas an immoral outgroup target was 
seen as representing a threat to the safety of one’s group. In any case, group immorality is 
always a threat. These results can explain why ingroup members do not want to be associated 
with negative moral traits, although they do not explain the special reluctance in being 
associated with uniquely human immoral traits. There is something about negative uniquely 
human moral traits that makes them not ingroup suitable. We need more studies to better 
comprehend why groups repel uniquely human immorality, we can only conjecture that 
immorality can be seen in a different light as morality, and not just the opposite pole of the 
same dimension. Whereas morality is consistently pointed out as a uniquely human 
dimension, it is not known whether with immorality that is also the case. 
The two studies presented in this paper support the hypothesis that moral traits are not 
attributed to ingroup regardless valence, but they depend on humanness too. We gave 
empirical support to the groups’ tendency to reserve morality for their ingroup, along with 
humanness, and we help to raise the veil over the possibility that there might be more to say 
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about the relation between immorality and humanness than what is currently known in the 
field. 
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The relation between Human Uniqueness and Morality: An index of behaviours 
Patrícia Henriques3†, Maria Gouveia-Pereira4 
 
Abstract  
In humanness literature morality is consistently referred to as a capacity that makes us 
uniquely human. Social psychologists have been increasingly interested in studying the 
relationship between these two dimensions, specially in how negative morality impacts on 
humanness evaluations. In this paper we rank 27 criminal behaviours in Human Uniqueness 
and Morality dimensions, as well as severity. For assisting other researchers in the field, we 
provide all the data concerning rankings, raw scores, and z-scores for the dimensions under 
study. Furthermore, we also analyse the relation between negative Morality and Human 
Uniqueness in our data, finding that, similarly to other authors’ findings, the two dimensions 
do not correlate with each other. Taken together this paper contributes to a better 
comprehension of the relation between negative Morality and Human Uniqueness, and 
provides researchers with a range of validated stimuli to address these topics. 
Key-words  
Morality, Human Uniqueness, Criminal Behaviour, Severity 
 
Morality plays a key role in social interactions. For instance, our first evaluation of 
people relies more on moral information than on competence or sociability (Brambilla & 
Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Wojciszke, 2005; 
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworsk, 1998). Morality gives individuals important cues about 
others intentions (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013), impacts on social 
identification and ingroup pride (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) and helps regulating 
individual behaviours within groups and in social systems (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 
2013, for a review see Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015).  
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Moral concerns, despite being considered theoretically universal, depend on a large 
scale on the appreciation of others’ humanness. When we perceive others as fully human, we 
see them as deserving a moral treatment and care about their welfare. But when we deny 
others humanness, subtly or overtly, these people are excluded from the moral circle, their 
suffering is less visible and we are less willing to help them (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & 
Hodson, 2012; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Haslam, Loughan, & Holland, 2013; Opotow, 
1990). 
The link between morality and humanness has major consequences in various social 
domains, and social psychologists have been increasingly interested in this relation (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2010; Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; for a review see Haslam, 
Bastian, Laham, & Loughan, 2012). In order to support the work of these researchers, there 
exist indices of specific behaviours evaluated in the moral (Chadwick, Bromgard, Bromgard, 
& Trafimow, 2006) as well as in the humanness domain (Wilson & Haslam, 2012), but none 
yet in both dimensions simultaneously. With this paper we aim at filling this gap, by putting 
forward an index of behaviours judged on the moral and humanness dimensions, to support 
the work of other researchers in the field. 
Furthermore, we also intend to address the relation between negative morality and 
humanness. Quite recently, some researchers have been analysing how negative morality 
impacts on dehumanisation (Henriques & Gouveia-Pereira, 2016; Khamitov, Rotman, & 
Piazza, 2016; Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, & Russo, 2016). We have therefore chosen to use 
criminal behaviours in this paper, as these are usually associated with immorality, in order to 
address this relation. 
Summing up, in this paper we provide an index of behaviours judged on the moral and 
humanness dimensions taken together, and further analyse the relation between both 
dimensions. 
Humanness and Morality 
Haslam and colleagues proposed a model of dehumanisation based on two distinct 
forms of humanness: Human Nature and Human Uniqueness (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, 
Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). The former refers to what is essentially human, the core 
aspects of humanness, which can be shared with other species. The latter is essentially what 
makes us unique, what distinguish us humans from animals. This domain of humanness is 
related to the one proposed by Leyens and colleagues, in their formulation of 
51 
 
infrahumanisation theory (Leyens et. al, 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, Paladino, 
2007). These authors used emotions to stress the boundaries between humans and animals. 
Laypeople distinguish between non-uniquely human emotions, those which humans share 
with animals, and uniquely human emotions, which are less visible to others, are acquired 
through socialisation rather than innate, are generated internally, are experienced over a long 
duration, and are morally informative (Demoulin et. al, 2004). 
Recently Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) formulated a framework about mind 
perception, based on laypeople’s beliefs about mental capacities, which finds correspondence 
in humanness dimensions. The authors identify two dimensions of mind perception, namely 
agency, which involves the capacity for reason, self-control and morality, and experience, 
exemplified by consciousness, primary emotions and basic appetites. Agentic capacities 
highlight the boundary between humans and animals, and stand in parallel with Haslam’s and 
Leyen’s formulation of uniquely human traits and emotions. 
When individuals or groups are denied Human Uniqueness, they are perceived as 
lacking civility, refinement and rationality, and hence are seen as coarse, unintelligent, 
immoral, or as in Haslam and colleagues’ (2012) words, bestial. Since morality consistently 
appears as a uniquely human capacity, in this paper we will only focus on this dimension. As 
previously mentioned, we will also focus in the relation between humanness and negative 
morality.  
The Importance of Negative Behaviours 
Negative information is specially diagnostic and harder to disconfirm than positive 
information (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Van der Pligt & Eiser, 1980). 
This is particularly true for moral information, when compared with the other dimensions of 
perception, competence and sociability (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; 
Marijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowrarski & 
Carlston, 1987; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). When 
evaluating moral character, immorality is what we look for (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). 
People do not want to interact with targets that lack moral qualities, because that kind of 
negativity can represent a threat, either to our ingroup image, when performed by an ingroup 
member, or even to our own safety, when it comes from an outgroup member (Brambilla et 
al., 2013). 
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The target of this paper is criminal behaviour, often perceived as immoral, since it 
involves harming another person. This immoral evaluation of the criminal behaviour is 
pointed out as impacting on the perception of the person who practices the behaviour as 
lacking humanness (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Vasiljevic & Viki, 2014). Therefore, 
in this paper we will use criminal behaviours as a proxy to address the relation between 
immorality and humanness. 
This paper provides a ranking of behaviours belonging to the criminal domain, in 
terms of Morality and Human Uniqueness. This information can be useful not only in the field 
of Social Psychology, but also for criminal and legal psychologists as well, by informing on 
how people with these kinds of behaviours are evaluated by others. Penalties tend to be 
harsher when defendants are evaluated as less human and more morally blame (Bastian et al., 
2013). Such an evaluation increases the endorsement of violence against the suspects and 
ultimately these are more likely to get convicted for capital crimes, and increases endorsement 
of violence against suspects (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 219 Portuguese citizens (159 of which female female) with ages 
ranging from 19 to 75 (M = 31,8; DP = 10,9).  
Materials. 
In order to obtain a diverse set of behaviours, a sample of 20 undergraduate students 
(14 women, aged between 18 and 21) were asked to identify various criminal behaviours, as 
diverse as possible. 
The material generated by the participants was subject to a selection procedure taking 
into account behaviour repetitions and redundancies. The final list of behaviours was 
composed of 27 crimes, which were randomly divided into three versions, to avoid 
participants’ lack of interest when performing the task, which might have undermined the 
validity of the information.  
The instructions given for the three versions were the same. Participants rated each 
one of the behaviours in 7 questions, 3 referring to the Morality domain, 3 referring to the 
Human Uniqueness (HU) dimension, and one referring to the Severity of the behaviour. All 
seven items were rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (noting) to 7 (very).  
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Morality. 
To access the morality of each one of the behaviours we used three items which are 
usually considered to be moral diagnostics in the literature: honesty, sincerity and trustworthy 
(Leach et al., 2007) (e.g., “To what extent a person performing this behaviour is honest?”) 
Human Uniqueness. 
We used Bastian and colleagues’ (2011; 2013) measure to access the perception of 
Human Uniqueness (HU). (“To what extent a person who practices this behaviour is refined 
and cultured/ is rational and logical/ has self-restraint?) 
Severity. 
Finally, we had one item to access crime severity ("To what extent practice this 
behaviour is serious?"). 
Procedure. 
Participants took part in this study through an online platform. Before initiating the 
study, participants were asked for their informed consent. After agreeing on participating 
voluntarily, each participant was assign with one of the three survey versions. 
All participants responded to one single version of the survey, as follows: 71 
participants responded to version 1, 65 participants to version 2, and 83 participants to version 
3.5 
Each of the 9 behaviours that comprised each version was presented randomly. The 
pr6esentation order of the questions was also counterbalanced, by ensuring that half of the 
participants responded first to the questions related to the Morality dimension, and half 
responded first to the questions related to the HU dimension. 
Participants took approximately 15 minutes to complete the survey. 
Results 
All analyses were conducted without taking into account neither the order nor the 
version of evaluation, since the usage of different versions was introduced only to control for 
material presentation order effects. 
                                               
5 Any change from the number of participants presented results from missing data 
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A factor analysis was performed for each one of the behaviours with the Morality and 
the HU items. The rotated solution accounted explained between 61.82 and 89.65 of the rating 
variance, and yielded two factors with eigenvalues over 1.0, one factor with Morality items, 
with Cronbach´s alpha between .69 and .96, and one factor with HU items, with Cronbach´s 
alpha between .57 and .92. 
Two new variables were then computed, aggregating the Morality and the HU items, 
in order to have a measure of Morality and HU for each one of the behaviours. 
To allow comparisons between the three dimensions, the correlations between the 
rating of each participant and the average ratings of all participants on the dimensions was 
calculated, following the practice of Rothbart and Park (1986) and Wilson and Haslam 
(2012). Participants whose judgments correlated negatively or near zero (less than .10) with 
the mean score on each dimension of evaluation were excluded. Thirteen judgments that 
correlated either negatively or near zero were identified and eliminated, with no more than ten 
from any given dimension. 
Following Wilson and Haslam (2012), reliability was assessed by Cronbach’s alpha 
and the intraclass correlation coefficient, reversing items and judges, so that what is under 
consideration here is the degree of agreement among the judges over the items (i.e., the 27 
behaviours). The reliability coefficients for the original and the screened sample for unreliable 
judges are presented in Table 1. The data from the latter sample was used in forthcoming 
analyses. 
 
Dimension Original N 
Original 
alpha 
value 
Original 
ICC value Final N 
Final 
alpha 
value 
Final ICC 
value 
Morality 54 .95 .95 50 .96 .96 
Humanity 52 .91 .91 46 .92 .92 
Severity 54 .96 .96 51 .97 .97 
Table 1: Number of judges and reliability values before and after deletion of unreliable 
judges. 
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Correlations between dimensions 
The data from the reliable judges was aggregated, and the mean value of the 27 
behaviours was computed for each dimension, to be used in correlation analyses. The 
Morality and HU dimensions did not correlate with each other (r = .09, p = .65), indicating 
that the two dimensions are independent. Both dimensions were negatively associated with 
Severity (r = -.74, p ˂ .01, r = -.51, p ˂ .01, for Morality and Human Uniqueness, 
respectively). 
Behaviours distribution across Morality and HU ratings 
The non-standardised ratings of reliable participants were converted to z-scores, in 
order to emphasise the status of a given behaviour’s Morality and HU scores within the 
distribution of the 27 behaviours. The rankings, raw scores and z-scores of the participants’ 
Morality and HU ratings are provided in the appendix, as well as the participants’ Severity 
ratings of the 27 behaviours. 
A cluster analysis was also run on the 27 behaviours using their Morality and HU 
ratings, in order to examine whether the behaviours cluster together on the basis of the two 
dimensions. A hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward`s method produced four clusters, 
which were significantly different in the main (see Table 2). Cluster 1 was defined by 
behaviours that rated low on Morality (M = 1.98, SD = .11) and high on HU (M = 3.76, SD = 
.13). Cluster 2 was defined by behaviours that rated low on both dimensions (M =1.94, SD = 
.12; M = 2.46, SD = .13, for Morality and HU respectively), while Cluster 3 by behaviours 
that rated high on both dimensions (M =3.84, SD = .14; M = 3.21, SD = .2, for Morality and 
HU respectively). Finally, cluster 4 was defined by behaviours that rated high on Morality (M 
= 3.36, SD = .05) and low on HU (M = 2.51, SD = .18).  
Although both Morality and HU ratings are relative measures, in the sense that all 
behaviours were rated below the middle point of the scale, the differences between clusters 
are statistically significant (F(3, 23) = 43.9, p ˂ .001, F(3, 23) = 22.08, p ˂ .001, for Morality 
and HU respectively). Regarding Morality, a contrast analysis revealed that the clusters that 
rated high on these dimensions (i.e. cluster 3 and 4) were significantly different from those 
rated low on this dimension (i.e. cluster 1 and 2) (t(23) = 10.97, p ˂ .001). The clusters rated 
high on HU (i.e. cluster 1 and 3) were also significantly different from those rated low on this 
dimension (i.e. cluster 2 and 4) (t(23) = 7.21, p ˂ .001). 
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We found significant differences in Severity between clusters as well (F(3, 23) = 
45.06, p ˂ .001). A contrast analysis revealed that the cluster high on both dimensions was 
evaluated as less severe than the others (t(23) = 56.63, p ˂ .001), whereas the cluster low on 
both dimensions was evaluated as the most severe one (t(23) = 81.27, p ˂ .001). There were 
no differences between clusters 1 and 4. 
 
Cluster 1 
(Low Morality; High 
HU) 
Cluster 2 
(Low Morality; Low 
HU) 
Cluster 3 
(High Morality; 
High HU) 
Cluster 4 
(High Morality; Low 
HU) 
Terrorism 
Identity Falsification 
Tax evasion 
Corruption 
Robbery 
Swindle 
Extortion 
Theft 
Defamation 
Fraud 
Plagiarism 
Traffic 
Domestic Violence 
Torture 
Hit and Run 
Murder 
Rape 
Child Abuse 
Kidnapping 
Human Rights 
Violation 
Online Piracy 
Prostitution 
Insult to Authority 
Illegal immigration 
Aggression 
Racism 
Drink Driving 
Table 2: Cluster analysis of 27 behaviours as defined by Morality and HU ratings. 
 
Discussion 
The first purpose of this paper was to provide researchers with an index of criminal 
behaviours in the Moral and Humanness domains taken together. With the material available 
in the appendix, we wish to endow researchers with a powerful tool which may help them in 
the elaboration of experimental studies, allowing the selection of behaviours in terms of their 
Moral and Human Uniqueness evaluation. Depending on the requirements of the research, 
researchers can either use the rankings, in case the data is ordinal; or the mean ratings, in case 
the equitable intensities of the items along their respective dimensional scales are requested; 
or even the standardized z-scores, in case the comparison between items on the basis of their 
positions and others items pertaining to the same trait is what they are looking for. 
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The second goal of this paper was to analyse the relation between Morality and 
Human Uniqueness. We found that the two dimensions did not correlate with each other. This 
result, although at first sight may seem unexpected, given the documented relation of these 
two dimensions in the literature, is not completely surprising. Indeed, in Wilson and Haslam’s 
(2012) data the two dimensions did not correlate either. The authors explained this fact 
through the type of behaviours that exemplified HU in their data, which were dominated by 
non-social behaviours that reflected uniquely human capacities for language and reason. In 
our data however, we believe that the most likely explanation is due to the negative scope of 
the behaviours. Morality is a HU dimension, but evidences that immorality is so have not yet 
been found. This can also explain why behaviours were not rated as more uniquely human, 
but rather below the middle point of the scale. Our results can be interpreted as a reflection of 
immorality and humanness incompatibility. In fact when someone’s behaviour is so morally 
wrong people tend to picture it in a bestial way, comparing such act as an animal behaviour 
(Bastian et al., 2013; Haslam et al., 2012). 
Both dimensions were negatively associated with Severity. Unsurprisingly, the less 
moral or uniquely human a behaviour was, the more serious was consider to practice it. This 
association was also illustrated by the clusters analysis. The cluster high on Morality and HU 
dimensions was evaluated as less severe than the other three, whereas the cluster low on both 
dimensions was evaluated as the most severe one. 
Summing up, the main contributions of this paper can be shortly described as follows. 
On the one hand, we have built an index of behavioural judgements on the moral and 
humanness dimensions taken together, which to the authors’ knowledge, fills a missing gap in 
the literature. It may also serve as a basis for other researchers’ work in the field. On the other 
hand, by analysing our data, we also put forward some further contributions towards a better 
understanding of the relation between Morality and Human Uniqueness. 
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Table 3  
Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized Morality rating (highest to lowest) 
Behaviour Rank M DP z 
Insult to Authority 1 4,15 0,98 2,15 
Illegal immigration 2 3,89 1,14 1,82 
Prostitution 3 3,82 1,46 1,74 
Online Piracy 4 3,49 1,60 1,33 
Aggression 5 3,46 1,21 1,30 
Racism 6 3,33 1,23 1,14 
Drink Driving 7 3,29 1,22 1,09 
Tax evasion 8 2,63 1,37 0,29 
Terrorism 9 2,43 1,46 0,04 
Murder 10 2,37 1,33 -0,02 
Plagiarism 11 2,31 1,11 -0,11 
Torture 12 2,20 1,32 -0,23 
Defamation 13 2,18 1,21 -0,26 
Human Rights Violation 14 2,17 1,30 -0,27 
Domestic Violence 15 2,13 1,11 -0,33 
Traffic 16 2,04 1,34 -0,43 
Identity Falsification 17 1,99 1,16 -0,49 
Robbery 18 1,97 1,16 -0,51 
Theft 19 1,92 0,85 -0,57 
Hit and Run 20 1,88 0,92 -0,62 
Rape 21 1,71 1,11 -0,83 
Fraud 22 1,66 1,12 -0,89 
Corruption 23 1,65 0,92 -0,90 
Extortion 24 1,64 0,87 -0,92 
Kidnapping 25 1,57 1,03 -1,00 
Child Abuse 26 1,45 0,78 -1,15 
Swindle 27 1,29 0,46 -1,35 
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Table 4 
Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized HU rating (highest to lowest) 
Behaviour Rank M DP z 
Tax evasion 1 4,45 1,43 1,56 
Corruption 2 4,23 1,50 1,27 
Fraud 3 4,21 1,54 1,25 
Swindle 4 4,21 1,41 1,25 
Illegal immigration 5 4,20 0,87 1,23 
Online Piracy 6 4,17 1,42 1,20 
Identity Falsification 7 4,11 1,35 1,12 
Prostitution 8 3,72 1,24 0,61 
Terrorism 9 3,68 1,70 0,56 
Extortion 10 3,66 1,22 0,53 
Plagiarism 11 3,52 1,22 0,34 
Traffic 12 3,44 1,57 0,25 
Insult to Authority 13 3,34 1,32 0,12 
Defamation 14 3,28 1,34 0,03 
Robbery 15 3,22 1,24 -0,04 
Theft 16 3,18 1,14 -0,09 
Drink Driving 17 2,85 1,15 -0,52 
Human Rights Violation 18 2,85 1,39 -0,52 
Torture 19 2,81 1,47 -0,57 
Kidnapping 20 2,78 1,42 -0,62 
Murder 21 2,60 1,20 -0,85 
Hit and Run 22 2,54 1,06 -0,92 
Aggression 23 2,42 1,03 -1,09 
Racism 24 2,27 0,99 -1,28 
Domestic Violence 25 2,08 1,04 -1,53 
Rape 26 2,02 0,99 -1,60 
Child Abuse 27 1,96 1,02 -1,69 
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Table 5 
Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized Severity rating (highest to lowest) 
Behaviours Rank M DP z 
Domestic Violence 1 6,93 0,25 1,10 
Rape 2 6,82 0,78 0,96 
Kidnapping 3 6,80 0,57 0,94 
Child Abuse 4 6,71 1,15 0,82 
Murder 5 6,70 1,10 0,81 
Torture 6 6,68 1,00 0,79 
Human Rights Violation 7 6,67 0,69 0,78 
Terrorism 8 6,61 1,08 0,70 
Hit and Run 9 6,59 1,00 0,68 
Corruption 10 6,52 1,07 0,60 
Extortion 11 6,43 0,91 0,49 
Robbery 12 6,37 1,03 0,42 
Swindle 13 6,36 1,03 0,40 
Traffic 14 6,29 1,22 0,33 
Racism 15 6,26 1,04 0,29 
Fraud 16 6,22 1,06 0,24 
Drink Driving 17 6,20 1,00 0,21 
Identity Falsification 18 6,00 1,25 -0,03 
Aggression 19 5,90 1,26 -0,14 
Theft 20 5,82 1,48 -0,24 
Tax evasion 21 5,67 1,42 -0,42 
Defamation 22 5,43 1,24 -0,71 
Plagiarism 23 5,20 1,30 -0,99 
Insult to Authority 24 4,71 1,38 -1,57 
Prostitution 25 4,34 1,65 -2,02 
Online Piracy 26 4,22 1,65 -2,16 
Illegal immigration 27 4,10 1,63 -2,31 
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Dealing With Inside Immorality and Human Uniqueness: The Role of Group Threat 
Patrícia Henriques7†, Mariana Miranda8, Maria Gouveia-Pereira9 
 
Abstract  
In this paper we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance. Specifically, we 
integrated the role of ingroup threat in analysing the humanness perception of a deviant 
ingroup member that behaves in an immoral way. In a first study we manipulate the threat that 
a deviant behaviour represented to ingroup image, and found that when the deviant behaviour 
was less threatening, ingroup members humanised equally the deviant and the ingroup. 
However, when the deviant behaviour represented a threat to ingroup image, the ingroup 
members did dehumanise the deviant member. In a second study we extended the analysis to 
include deviant behaviours, varying in terms of its perception of humanness and immorality 
and addressed intragroup strategies to deal with ingroup threat. Implications for 
dehumanisation and moral literature were discussed. 
Key-words  
Humanness, Dehumanisation, Morality, Ingroup Threat 
 
Morality occupies a central position in social relations, as it is important for self-
evaluations (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), in 
forming impressions of other individuals or groups (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 
2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012), and for group norms 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). As such, 
morality impacts social identification (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) and helps regulate 
individual behaviour both within groups and in social systems (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 
2013, for a review see Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015).  
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Alongside this framework, dehumanisation theory has focus on the fact that people are 
not seen as equally human, as we attribute more human characteristics to ourselves (Haslam 
& Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), and to the groups we belong 
(Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Haslam and 
colleagues distinguished between two basic conceptions of humanness: Human Nature and 
Human Uniqueness (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). According 
to the authors’ framework, Human Nature refers to what is essentially human, including 
characteristics such as emotionality, vitality, warmth and openness, while Human Uniqueness 
refers to what makes us unique and distinct from animals, and includes characteristics like 
refinement, rationality, civility, and self-control. Previous research has provided evidence for 
the distinctiveness of each dimension, highlighting that people can be ascribed or denied 
humanness in two distinct ways (e.g., Haslam et al., 2005; 2008; Loughnan, Haslam, & 
Kashima, 2009). 
Recently, Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011) found that these 
humanness dimensions have different implications for judgments of moral status. 
People are differently perceived in moral terms, we do not expect the same moral 
duties from a child or an adult (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Specifically, one might be 
differently evaluated as to the degree to which one is responsible for immoral behaviour 
(moral blame), deserve praise for good deeds (moral praise), or is the recipient of morally 
relevant actions (moral patiency) (Gray & Wegner, 2012; Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & 
Loughnan, 2012). Most importantly to this paper’s scope, Bastian and colleagues (2011) 
found that this moral status is directly linked to the perception of humanness, suggesting the 
independent role of each dimension in moral judgment. The authors manipulated the Human 
Uniqueness and Human Nature of four characters, finding that Human Uniqueness was 
associated with greater moral blame for immoral acts, but not with moral praise or moral 
patiency. On the contrary, Human Nature was associated with moral praise and moral 
patiency, but was unrelated to moral blame. 
Bastian and colleagues established, therefore, the relation between the two dimensions 
of humanness and moral status at an interpersonal level. However, as stated before, one the 
one hand, people value humanness, not only for themselves, but for their groups too (Leyens 
et al., 2007). One the other hand, Morality is a central dimension within groups too (Leach et 
al., 2007), so when an ingroup member behaves immorally that is a problem for the other 
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group members. So what happens when an ingroup member shows a behaviour that is 
uniquely human, but also immoral? 
Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013) developed a series of studies that can help to 
clarify this question. The authors analysed the impact of dehumanisation and moral outrage 
on retributive justice in response to criminal behaviour. Specifically, they isolated three types 
of criminal behaviour (white collar, violent behaviour and child molestation) and analysed the 
influence of moral outrage and dehumanisation on the severity of the punishment ascribed to 
the offender. The authors found that people felt morally outraged by harmful and violent 
crimes and dehumanise the perpetrators of these crimes. Furthermore, this subhuman 
perception was associated with harsher and longer punishment and a perception that the 
offender is unsuitable for rehabilitation. Bastian and colleagues (2013) also found that the 
more dehumanised was the agent of the criminal behaviour, more morally blamed he was 
considered to be. Although they used a unique measure for dehumanisation that comprises 
both Human Uniqueness and Human Nature, the relation between humanness and moral 
blame took a different direction from the one found in the previews studies developed by 
Bastian and colleagues (2011). In the first studies, the authors found that when an individual 
was evaluated as uniquely human, he was also considered more moral blame for his actions. 
However, in the latter studies, the authors found that when a perpetrator of a criminal 
behaviour was more blamed for his actions, we was also more dehumanised. As Bastian and 
colleagues (2013) pointed out, this difference might be explained by the nature of the 
behaviours: when dehumanisation appears in response to criminal behaviour, it can be 
combined with the moral character of the individual, leaving his responsibility unchanged. 
In this paper we aim at further understanding the relation between Human Uniqueness 
immorality within groups. Specifically, we hypothesise that ingroup threat can dictate how 
uniquely human a deviant member might be perceived. Criminal behaviour should represent a 
threat to the image of the ingroup, as it poses a conflict for ingroup members. In one hand, the 
deviant is a member of the ingroup, and therefore should be seen as uniquely human. But in 
the other hand, he committed a behaviour that due to its immoral character can compromise 
the positive ingroup image, impelling ingroup members to dehumanise the deviant as a form 
of derogation and of self-protection. 
Threat in Group Relations 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) established the importance of 
belonging to positive valued groups for member’s self-image, advancing that when this 
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positive image is jeopardized ingroup members will react. Threat to ingroup image can come 
from various sources, such as conflict in values, norms or believes between groups, i.e., a 
form of symbolic threat (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000). 
Being moral is important for groups, so putting ingroup’s morality at risk should be a problem 
for ingroup members. Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) have already established a relation 
between threat and dehumanisation. The authors  manipulated the humanness of an outgroup, 
finding that when the outgroup was less uniquely human, it was also more discriminated, and 
this relation between dehumanisation and derogation was mediated by symbolic threat. 
But what happens if the source of the threat comes from an insider? Marques and 
colleagues developed a series of studies addressing this question (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & 
Hogg, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010), proposing a 
theoretical framework of reactions to group deviance. When an ingroup member engage in an 
undesirable behaviour, it affects the group as a whole, leaving the ingroup with the need to 
restore the group image. Ingroup members can choose to deal with this internal threat by 
derogating or punishing the ingroup deviant, even more than they would do if the threat 
would come from an outgroup member. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988) called this 
process as black sheep effect, i.e., when deviant ingroup members are evaluated more 
negatively than outgroup members for violating ingroup norms, in an attempt to restore 
ingroup positivity. 
The studies conducted by Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, and Ellemers (2013) highlight 
the relation between threat and morality. The authors demonstrated that the morality of a 
target affects significantly the experience of threat, depending on whether the target represents 
an ingroup or an outgroup member. An ingroup target that lacks in morality is experienced as 
a threat to ingroup image, whereas an immoral outgroup target is seen as representing a threat 
to the safety of one’s group. In any case, group immorality represented a threat. 
Taking into consideration the threat that an immoral deviant behaviour represents for 
ingroup positivity, we developed a study in order to test if this variable will determine how 
ingroup members evaluate the humanness of a deviant ingroup member. We hypothesised that 
if the behaviour of the deviant ingroup member is not considered a threat to group’s image, 
the ingroup members will evaluated the deviant as uniquely human as the ingroup. In the 
other hand, if the behaviour of the deviant ingroup member is considered a threat to group’s 
image, ingroup members will evaluated the deviant as less uniquely human as the ingroup. 
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Furthermore, we expect that this effect will remain regardless of the moral status ascribed to 
the deviant member, that is, that his perceived moral blame.  
In order to test these hypothesis we manipulated the threat that a deviant behaviour 
represents to the ingroup image. Furthermore, we only measured Human Uniqueness 
dimension, as it was this humanness dimension that was found to relate to moral blame 
(Bastian et al., 2011; 2013). 
Study 1 
Method  
Participants. 
Fifty four students (33 of which female) with ages ranging from 19 to 57 (M = 23.68; 
DP = 7.38) participated voluntarily in this study. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two study conditions, low threat (n = 27), high threat (n = 27). 
Procedure and materials. 
Participants were asked to take part in a survey about an event that took place in their 
University. All participants were randomly assign to one of the two threat conditions. After 
reading the newspaper article all participants responded to the dehumanisation measure as to 
the ingroup and as to the deviant member, to the blame measure and to the perception of 
threat questions. At the end, all participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Manipulation. 
In order to manipulate ingroup threat, we had two different experiment conditions, low 
threat and high threat. The threat manipulation was the same in both conditions, except for 
one last paragraph. All participants read a newspaper article telling how a student of their 
University, Daniel Silva, had swindle several colleagues, by deluding them and selling them 
fake tickets for a party. Afterwards participants were informed that a new evaluation to the 
Portuguese Universities was being prepared, which would include an evaluation of each 
University’s student community. In the low threat condition the newspaper article ended with 
the following paragraph:  
“This new evaluation has raised some rumours, but some say that the case of Daniel Silva will 
have no impact on the evaluation of University Name, and its student community, since the 
values, customs and identity of the University and its students remain unchanged.” 
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And in the high threat condition the newspaper article ended as followed: 
“This new evaluation has raised some rumours, and there are those who say that the case of 
Daniel Silva will impact the evaluation of University Name, and its student community, since 
the values, customs and identity of the University and its students may have been changed.” 
We selected swindle as a behaviour because it has been considered immoral in a 
norms paper (Henriques & Gouveia-Pereira, 2016). Also, we assured the behaviour was not in 
itself non-uniquely human, so that it would not per se drive the dehumanisation of its 
perpetrator.   
Dehumanisation measure. 
We adapted the dehumanisation measure from Bastian and colleagues (2013), and 
used four items to measure the Human Uniqueness (HU) dimension (To what extent do you 
find the students from this University/Daniel Silva to be: “refined and cultured”, “rational and 
logical”, “has self-restraint”, “sophisticated”). The measures reveal good internal consistency 
for both the ingroup (α = .84) and the deviant member (α = .80). All items were rated on 7-
point scales ranging from 1 = Nothing to 7 = Very. 
Moral Blame. 
Two items assessed the perception of the deviant member’s moral blame (e.g., “To 
what extent do you think Daniel Silva is responsible for his behaviour?”) on a 7-point scale, 
ranging from 1 = Nothing to 7 = Very (α = .89).  
Threat.  
Three items assessed the perception of ingroup threat (e.g., “To what extent do you 
think Daniel Silva’s behaviour will undermine the core values of the students of this 
University?”) (α = .89). We also assessed the deviant behaviour’ impact on ingroup reputation 
in one item (“To what extent do you think Daniel Silva’s behaviour will undermine the 
reputation of the students of this University?”). Finally, we added one item to assess the 
perception of the deviant behaviour’s immorality (“To what extent do you think Daniel Silva 
is immoral?”). All five items were rated on 7-seven point scales, ranging from 1 = Nothing to 
7 = Very.  
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Results and Discussion 
Dehumanisation 
We begin by analysing the dehumanisation of the ingroup and the deviant ingroup 
member. In order to do that, we run ANOVA with the evaluation of the uniquely humanness 
of both deviant member and ingroup as a repeated measure and the threat manipulation as a 
fixed condition. We found a main effect showing an overall higher humanisation of the 
ingroup (M = 3.98; SD = .95) compared to the deviant member (M = 3.22; SD = .1.26; F(1, 
52) = 14.544, p < .001, ηp2 = .219). The direct test of our hypothesis came from the analysis of 
the interaction effect, which also yield significant (F(1, 52) = 5.408, p = .024, ηp2 = .094). A 
contrast analysis with Sidak adjustments showed that whereas in the low threat condition the 
ingroup (M = 3.64; SD = .91) and the deviant member (M = 3.34; SD = 1.19) were considered 
equally human (F(1, 52) = .528, p = .471), there were differences in the high threat condition 
(F(1, 52) = 7.753, p < .007, ηp2 = .130). Specifically we observed a significant lower 
humanisation of the deviant member (M = 3.09; SD = 1.33) than of the ingroup (M = 4.31; SD 
= .87). All comparisons are illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Mean values and error bars of Human Uniqueness of the deviant member and of the 
ingroup by threat condition. 
 
We found support to our hypothesis that the level of ingroup threat determines the 
humanness perception of a deviant ingroup member. 
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Moral blame and deviant dehumanisation. 
Next we analysed the perception of moral blame of the deviant ingrouper. We did not 
found significant differences between conditions (F(1, 48) = .556, p = .460), as the deviant 
ingroup member was considered equally blameworthy in the low threat condition (M = 6.60, 
SD = .71) and in the high threat condition (M = 6.42, SD = .98). These results may support 
Bastian and colleagues’ (2013) claim that in response to criminal behaviour, dehumanisation 
and moral blame are independent, contrary to what was found in Bastian and colleagues’ 
results (2011), when analysed the dimensional relation of humanness and moral status. 
Perception of threat. 
Finally, we analysed the perception of threat and the impact on ingroup reputation 
reported by participants. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences for ingroup 
threat between conditions. Contrary to our expectations, participants reported the same threat 
levels in the two conditions (M Low
 
= 2.86, SD Low
 
= 1.70; M High  = 2.83, SD High  = 1.46; F(1, 
52) = .005, p = .943). The same occurred for the ingroup reputation: in both conditions 
participants reported that the deviant behaviour would undermine the reputation of ingroup 
members to the same extent (M Low
 
= 3.26, SD Low  = 2.05; M High  = 3.30, SD High  = 1.81; F(1, 
52) = .005, p = .944). Moreover, in both conditions the deviant was considered equally 
immoral (M Low
 
= 6.00, SD Low  = 1.33; M High  = 6.04, SD High  = 1.29; F(1, 52) = .011, p = .918). 
A post-hoc explanation of the fact that the checks of the threat manipulation did not 
function is of its order in relation to other measures. Specifically, we argue to be plausible that 
being able to punish the deviant member allowed them to restore their ingroup image.  
To support this post-hoc interpretation we run a post-test assessing only the threat 
participants report after our two cover stories. 
Post-test 
In order to test if the cover story used to manipulate ingroup threat did, in fact, 
represent a threat to ingroup image, we asked 32 participants (28 of which female) to rate 
each cover story used to manipulate low and high threat. We used the exact same measures as 
in Study 1 to measure ingroup threat. We found significant differences in the perception of 
threat by threat condition (F(1, 31) = 9.472, p = .004, ηp2 = .240), as participants reported 
higher levels of perception of ingroup threat when read the cover story that induced high 
threat (M = 3.51; SD = 1.15), than in low threat (M = 2.35; SD = .98). 
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The results of these post-test taken together with the effect described in Study 1 make 
way for our hypothesis that when ingroup members first have the opportunity to derogate the 
ingroup deviant the perception of ingroup threat decreases.  
Study 2 
Because Bastian and colleagues (2013) found that the type of criminal behaviour has 
an impact of the perpetrator moral status, we introduced in a second study variations to the 
type of deviant behaviour presented. Specifically we compare the same behaviour used on 
Study1 (swindle) with another considered less uniquely human (aggression), and predict that 
the deviant member will be consider more blameworthy and more uniquely human when he 
practices a behaviour that is more immoral and uniquely human compared to one less 
immoral and uniquely human. Nonetheless this variations due to the different type of 
criminal, we expect that – likewise Study 1 – the tendency to dissociate their own group from 
the deviant ingroup member in what is uniquely human will remain unaltered.    
In line with results from Study 1 and of the post-test as to the threat evaluation after an 
immoral behaviour by a ingroup member, in this  second study we systematically tested our 
claim that there is a greater assessment of threat to the ingroup before participants have a 
chance to distance the deviant from their group. As such, in a one-shot threat condition we 
varied the order of presentation of study measures. We expect that when participants first 
respond to the threat perception questions, the level of threat reported should be higher than 
when they respond to the measures pertaining the uniquely humanness of the deviant and the 
ingroup first. 
We have been arguing that, alike the black-sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988), the 
chance to derogate the deviant is in itself a strategy to maintain a posit ive evaluation of one’s 
group and therefore of one self. Nonetheless, much can be added to the description of 
strategies ingroup members engage when facing ingroup defavourability. Here we wish to 
further extend our comprehension of group members reactions to the immorality perpetrated 
by an ingrouper opposing individual and group strategies. According to Social Identity 
Theory, people would prefer to engage in social mobility, specially when considering an at 
least relatively permeable ingroup context (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979), which could be argued to be the case of University membership. Ellemers, 
Spears, and Doosje (1997) have found that ingroup identification is a strong predictor of the 
willingness to adopt a collective strategy rather than an individual one. As such, we  measured 
the identification to the ingroup prior to the threat story been introduced and expect that the 
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higher the identification to the group the higher the tendency to distance the deviant from the 
ingroup and therefore dehumanise him. Finally we introduced the same measure of 
identification of the ingroup in the end of the experiment and used its relation to the initial 
identification as a measure of an individual mobility and  explored its influence on the 
derogation of the deviant ingrouper. 
Method 
Participants and Design. 
Ninety five undergraduate students (82 of which female) with ages ranging from 17 to 
49 (M = 21.88, DP = 6.45) participated in this study in exchange for course credits. 
Participants were randomly assigned in a 2 (type of behaviour: swindle vs aggression) x 2 
(order of measures: manipulation checks first vs HU measure first) between subjects design.  
Procedure and Materials. 
In this experiment participants started by completing an identification scale as to their 
ingroup. The following part was presented as a separate study, reason why we introduced next 
a distracter task (deductive reasoning task). Then all participants read a newspaper article 
telling a story about Daniel Silva, a student from their University, who had swindled several 
colleagues, or who had attacked a colleague during a class, according to the manipulation 
condition to which they were assigned. We wanted to test our hypotheses in a controlled 
setting of threat to the ingroup. As such, we presented the story only with an ingrouper 
performing an immoral behaviour, which has been shown to represent threat (Brambilla et al., 
2013 ). Compared to Study 1, the last paragraph on the University’s evaluation that induced a 
higher or lower level of threat was left out.   
After reading the description of Daniel Silva’s behaviour, participants responded to the 
dehumanisation measures, the blame measure and to the threat perception measures. The 
order of presentation of these measures were counterbalanced, so half of the participants in 
each manipulation condition responded first to the dehumanisation measures and blame 
measures, and half responded first to the threat perception measure. Finally, all participants 
responded to the identification scale again. 
The experiment took about 20 minutes. In the end participants were fully debriefed 
and thanked for their participation. 
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Identification Scale. 
We used Leach and colleagues (2008) identification scale, which comprised 14 items 
and participants indicated their agreement with them on 7-point scales (α = .90) ranging from 
1 = Totally disagree to 7 = Totally agree. 
Criminal Behaviours.  
In this study our manipulation had two different behaviours, swindle and aggression. 
Both behaviours differ significantly in terms of morality (M Aggression =3.35, SD Aggression = 1.145; 
M Swindle  = 1.317, SD Swindle  = .528; t(39) = 10.549, p ˂ .001, d = 2.28) and Human Uniqueness 
(M Aggression  = 2.333, SD Aggression  = .1.032; M Swindle  = 4.205, SD Swindle  = 1.466; t(38) = -8.295, p 
˂ .001, d = 1.48) 
Dehumanisation, Moral Blame and Threat Measures. 
Materials in this study were the same as in Study 1. All showed good reliability 
(αDeviantUH = .734; αIngroupUH = .739; αMoral Blame = .721; αThreat = .913). 
Results and Discussion 
Perception of threat and of moral blame. 
To test our first hypothesis that when first responding to the threat perception 
questions participants report a higher level of group threat we performed a MANOVA with 
the perception of threat, immorality and reputation as dependent variables, introducing the 
order of measures’ presentation and the cover story manipulation as between-subject factors. 
We found an effect of presentation order of the measures in threat perception (F(1, 87) = 8,9, 
p = .004, 2
p  = .093) and reputation (F(1, 87) = 7,402, p = .008, ηp
2 = .078). As we 
hypothesised, when first responded to the threat perception questions, participants reported 
that the deviant’s behaviour threatened more the ingroup image (M = 4.04, SD = .27) and 
decreased ingroup reputation (M = 4.3, SD = .27), than they did when first responded to the 
dehumanisation measure (M Threat = 2.93, SD Threat = .26; M Reputation  = 3.29, SD Reputation  = .26). No 
other effects were found significant. 
Therefore, these results help to clarify why we did not find differences in the threat 
conditions in Study 1. As we suggested, having the opportunity to dehumanise the deviant 
ingrouper in a first moment, the ingroup members felt that the image of the ingroup was not at 
risk anymore. However, when participants did not had the change to distance themselves from 
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the ingroup deviant, they felt that the deviant behaviour was, indeed, a threat to ingroup 
reputation. 
The type of behaviour in the cover story affected the perception of immorality (F(1, 
87) = 5.703, p = .019, ηp2 = .062). Participants considered the deviant member more immoral 
for his behaviour in the swindle condition (M = 5.88, SD = .25) compared with the aggression 
condition (M = 5.06, SD = .24).  
A 2 (type of behaviour) x 2 (order of measures) ANOVA on the perception of the 
deviant’s blame showed a significant main effect of the type of behaviour (F(1, 87) = 6.064, p 
= .016, ηp2 = .065), the deviant member was considered more blamed when he swindle his 
colleagues (M = 6.52, SD = .15), a more immoral behaviour, than when he attacked one of 
them (M = 5.99, SD = .15). The order of measure’s presentation did not affect the deviant’s 
blame (F(1, 87) = .577, p = .45). 
Dehumanisation. 
We run an ANOVA with the evaluation of deviant vs. ingroup humanness as a 
repeated measure and the type of behaviour manipulation and the order of measures 
presentation as between-subjects factors. We found a main effect of the target of the uniquely 
human (F(1, 91) = 113,125, p < .001, ηp2 = .554). Alike Study 1, in a presence of a threat to 
the group image the deviant was considered less uniquely human (M Deviant
 
=3.06, SD Deviant = 
.12) than the ingroup (M Ingroup  = 4.67, SD Ingroup  = .09), independently of order of measures (F 
< 1). We also found that the deviant member was considered more uniquely human in the 
swindle condition (M = 3.68, SD = .17), compared with the aggression condition (M = 2.43, 
SD = .17) (F(1, 91) = 18.363, p < .001, ηp2 = .168). The type of behaviour did not affect the 
ingroup HU (F < 1). We did not find any significant effect of the order of measures 
presentation in the deviant and ingroup uniquely humanness (F(1, 91) = .876, p = .352). 
We found empirical support for our claim that the deviant ingroup member would be 
considered more blameworthy and more uniquely human when he practiced a behaviour that 
was more immoral and more uniquely human, compared with when he practiced a behaviour 
that was less immoral and less uniquely human. Most importantly for our central hypothesis, 
this did not have an effect of the willingness to humanise the deviant to a lesser extent than 
the ingroup when in face of a threat to the ingroup, which remain unaltered.  
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Identification. 
A repeated measure ANOVA for the ingroup identification measured in the beginning 
and in the end by the type of behaviour revealed a significant decrease of identification after 
the threat was introduced (MId_beginning = 4.85; SDId_beginnig = .92; MId_end = 4.71; SDId_end = .95; 
F(1, 93) = 5.554, p = .021, ηp2= .056). Also, this effect was not qualified by the type of 
behaviour (F(1, 93) = .353, p = .554).  
A hierarchical multiple regression equation was computed to explore our goal of 
opposing mobility and collective strategies. The first block with the distance between ingroup 
and deviant uniquely humanness and initial identification was marginally significant (R2 = 
.08, F(1, 44) = 4,023, p = .51). Here, the initial identification to the ingroup positively 
predicted the distance between the ingroup and the deviant member (b = 0.189, SE = 0.094, p 
= .051). The second model, in which the ingroup identification measured in the end was 
added, proved to explain a significant amount of variance (R2 = .877, F(2, 43) = 153,775, p < 
.001), but it also showed to be a significant improvement compared with the first one 
(Fchange(1, 43) = 278,184, p < .001). Here, as one could predict both measures of ingroup 
identification, despite being different from each other, were significantly correlated (b = 
0.867, SE = 0.052, p < .001). Most importantly, when introducing this covariation, the relation 
between the ingroup identification and of the distance between the ingroup and deviant 
member disappeared (b = 0.024, SE = 0.036, p = .515; see Table 1).    
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
UH Distance ingroup - deviant  .189 .094 .289 .024 .036 .036 
Final identification    .867 .052 .926 
R2 .084 .877 
F for change in R2 .051 .000 
Table 1: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for initial identification, distance of the 
deviant from ingroup, and final identification 
 
These results are interesting as they allow us to map the presence of both individual 
and group strategies participants engage when on face of ingroup threat. If on the one hand it 
seems that the relation between the initial identification and the decreased final identification 
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annulled a more group-level strategy of derogation of the ingroup, the fact is that this 
derogation is present regardless as a consistent main effect.   
General Discussion 
We wish to highlight some contributions to the field of dehumanisation, morality and 
intragroup relations provided by this paper. In this paper we wanted to address how ingroup 
members perceived the humanness of an ingroup member that behaves immorally, integrating 
the role of ingroup threat. In Study 1 we manipulated the threat that a deviant behaviour could 
represent for ingroup image to test if it determines how ingroup members perceived the 
humanness of the deviant member, compared to the ingroup humanness. We found that in low 
threat condition ingroup members do not need to dehumanise the deviant member, evaluating 
this ingroup member as uniquely human as the ingroup, whereas, in high threat condition we 
see a pattern of dehumanisation of the deviant in comparison to the ingroup.  
In Study 1 we did not find any differences in the perceptions of threat reported by 
participants by experimental condition. However, due to a solid result in the post-test, and a 
consistent pattern of results of the threat measure in Study 2, we are confident that it was 
solely due to the order in which the threat manipulation check was presented. 
The second contribution pertains an integration for Bastian and colleagues’ (2011; 
2013) different relation patterns between HU and moral blame. In our results we did not find 
any differences in the evaluation of moral blame by threat condition, but we did find for 
human uniqueness. Therefore, these results support Bastian and colleagues’ (2013) claim that 
in response to criminal behaviour, dehumanisation and moral blame are independent. The fact 
that the deviant was always considered even more morally blamed in the Swindle condition in 
Study 2 and that this not affect the (de)humanisation of the deviant member, can indicate that 
when associated with a behaviour people can distinguish the two dimensions of morality and 
UH. 
In Study 2 we also wanted to provide ingroup members the possibility to choose other 
strategies to re-establish group image. Specifically, we gave ingroup members the opportunity 
to reduce group identification level, which they did, but only for the behaviour that was 
uniquely human and immoral. Additional, the choice to disidentify enabled keeping the 
Uniquely Humanness of the ingroup intact. When faced with a deviant behaviour that was less 
uniquely human and less immoral, dehumanising the deviant was sufficient to maintain the 
group reputation, not being necessary to reduce the level of group identification. 
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A final contribution related to the exploration of strategies adopted by ingroup 
members, when the group positive image is compromised. Our studies contributes to highlight 
the different strategies that ingroup members choose when dealing with deviance. When faced 
with an immoral and HU behaviour, ingroup members do choose to reduce the identification 
to the ingroup. Cameira and Ribeiro (2014) found that disidentification served as a buffer for 
the negative effects of ingroup deviance, when derogation was not possible.  However in 
Study 2 even when derogation was an option and an option that participants took, ingroup 
members reduced their identification level. This shows us that both strategies may co-occur in 
the presence of a threat posed by an immoral behaviour perpetrated by an ingroup member. It 
is true that we replicated the literature (Ellemers et al., 1990) that stated that the initial level of 
identification determines the individual vs group level of strategies. However we did not 
allow participants to desidentify as a strategy prior to the chance of derogating the deviant 
member. As such it is possible that both groups of people preferring solely each strategy co-
existed. Future studies forcing the choice of one strategy over the other may continue to help 
us understand the effort for an uniquely human an moral identity within groups. 
Also, further studies should allow a direct comparison in line with the black sheep 
effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), allowing people to evaluate an outgroup member 
that behaves immorally, but in an uniquely human way. 
Conclusion 
Taken together we believe that the results presented in this paper made an important 
contribution to understand what means to be immoral and uniquely human in a society that 
values moral behaviour while at the same time blames to a higher extent individuals who are 
considered more uniquely human. Furthermore, we addressed the relation between Human 
Uniqueness and moral blame, providing an alternative variable that impacts this relation. By 
doing so, we also explored group strategies in dealing with ingroup deviants, opening the door 
for new lines of thinking when we talk about humanness and morality within groups. 
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General Discussion 
The thesis presented here focused on the relation between humanness and morality, 
two important social dimensions that groups strive for (Leach, et al., 2007; Leyens et al., 
2007).  
The first goal of this thesis aimed at analysing how groups attribute and deny 
humanness within the moral domain. In emotional dehumanisation the attribution of uniquely 
human emotions is consistently independent of trait valence (Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino & 
Vaes, 2009). However, based on the importance ascribed by groups to morality (Ellemers & 
van den Bos, 2012; Leach et al., 2015), we hypothesised that valence would also be relevant 
in intergroup attributions within the moral domain. Morality is a valued dimension to one’s 
group, hence it is unlikely that ingroup members would be willing to associate their ingroup 
with negative moral traits, even if that allowed to differentiate it from outgroups in human 
terms.  
In the first paper presented we found empirical support sustaining the hypothesis that 
in moral domain the dehumanisation effect is verifiable depending on trait valence. By means 
of two studies we found that positive uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to the 
ingroup, and negative uniquely human moral traits were more ascribed to outgroups. The 
results regarding the non-uniquely human moral traits did not follow this pattern, and 
contributed to discard the alternative explanation stating that our results were only driven by 
ingroup bias and outgroup derogation based on valence. The attributions of non-uniquely 
human moral traits were not consistent in between the two studies, as we discussed in the 
paper, but overall what seems to be consistent was that our results indicated that in what 
morality concerns humanness and valence are two important dimensions in intergroup 
differentiation. 
As we have already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the nature of the 
dimensions of evaluation may be theoretically meaningful (Ellemers et al., 2013). Morality 
plays a crucial role in defining one’s group identity (Leach et al., 2007), and constitutes a 
crucial domain for affirming intergroup distinctiveness (Ellemers et al., 2013), so perhaps 
more than wanting to be uniquely human, groups want to be moral. 
Infrahumanisation represented an innovation as it extended the need for intergroup 
differentiation to a non-valence-based relevant dimension of comparison. In principle, even 
negatively valence group characteristics may fulfil the aim of establishing a distinct group 
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identity (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Morality seems to be an exception, but what is truly 
surprising is the fact that this seems not to apply exclusively to the uniquely human part of 
negative morality. 
In our studies negative uniquely human moral traits were consistently more attributed 
to outgroups, which was not the case for negative non-uniquely human moral traits. There 
seems to exist some reluctance in attributing negative moral traits to the ingroup, but only 
when these are uniquely human. 
The fact that ingroup members perceive ingroup immorality as a threat to ingroup 
image (Brambilla et al., 2013) can explain why ingroup members do not want to be associated 
with negative moral traits, however it does not explain the special reluctance in being 
associated with uniquely human immoral traits.  
In Haslam’s (2006) model of dehumanisation, when people are portrayed as lacking 
uniquely human qualities, among other things, they are perceived as less moral too. However, 
as far as we know, there is no evidence that they are seen as immoral. Although we scaled 
morality in human uniqueness, when linked to groups or people immorality may not be seen 
as uniquely human. 
In paper 2 we found some support sustaining the above idea. In this paper we focused 
mainly on the evaluation of criminal behaviours, and used this evaluation as a proxy to 
address the relation between immorality and humanness. The immorality of this type of 
behaviour had already been pointed out as impacting on the perception of the person who 
practices the behaviour as lacking humanness (Bastian et al., 2013). Therefore we tested the 
correlation between the two dimensions of evaluation upon criminal behaviour, and found that 
immorality and Human Uniqueness did not correlate with each other. This result was in line 
with other similar findings (Wilson & Haslam, 2012), giving more strength to the 
independency of the two dimensions’ hypothesis. 
Our results do not provide a definite answer to our question regarding the relation 
between the two dimensions, but are nevertheless one step forward in that direction. Despite a 
more direct test is still needed in order to clarify whether immorality, as with morality, is a 
uniquely human dimension, or an independent one that is not considered as uniquely human, 
our two papers point in this last direction. 
In the last paper presented in this thesis we change our focus to the intragroup level. 
The recent results addressing the relation between the humanness dimensions and moral status 
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(Bastian et al., 2011; 2013) caught our attention, leading us to wonder how group members 
deal with immorality and humanness within the ingroup. 
Specifically, we addressed the question of how ingroup members perceived the 
humanness of an ingroup member that behaved immorally, integrating the role of ingroup 
threat. We hypothesised that the fact that the deviant was a member of the ingroup, which is 
by definition uniquely human, and had behaved in an immoral way, which jeopardises the 
positive ingroup image, should represent a conflict that ingroup members needed to address. 
Ingroup threat provided the answer: when ingroup members perceived the immoral 
behaviour as representing a threat to ingroup image, they dehumanised the deviant member, in 
an attempt to restore the ingroup image. However, when the deviant behaviour did not 
represent a threat, the humanness of the deviant member remained intact, not differing from 
the humanness evaluation of the ingroup. 
Furthermore, in our studies we did not find any differences in the evaluation of moral 
blame by threat condition, despite having found it for human uniqueness. We interpreted these 
results as supporting Bastian and colleagues’ (2013) reasoning that in response to criminal 
behaviour, dehumanisation and moral blame are independent. The fact that ingroup members 
always considered the deviant member as moral blame, reinforces the idea that when 
associated with a behaviour people can distinguish the humanness and immoral dimensions, 
holding the moral blame of a uniquely human target unchanged. 
These results give us extra insights about the preeminent question underlying this 
thesis. The fact that we did not find a relation between Human Uniqueness and moral blame, 
adds, together with the results of the first two papers, another line into the discussion 
regarding the possibility that immorality is not perceived as a uniquely human dimension, 
when associated to persons or groups. 
Vaes and colleagues (2012) caught the attention for the importance to address ingroup 
humanisation, in order to fully understand the process of differentiation of the ingroup from 
the outgroup in human terms. In previous formulations of infrahumanisation theory it was 
often claimed that it involved simultaneously the tendencies to favour the ingroup and 
derogate the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2007), however more recent empirical findings proposed 
that when identified with the ingroup, people first humanise one’s own group (Gaunt, 2014; 
Vaes & Paladino, 2010).  
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To this date, few moderators of ingroup humanisation are known. Naturally, ingroup 
identification is a determinant variable to this effect, since people need to value their 
membership in order to be motivated to humanise their ingroup. Paladino, Vaes, Castano, 
Demoulin, and Leyens (2004) gave empirical support to this effect, by showing that ingroup 
identification did not moderate the attribution of uniquely human emotions to outgroups, but 
only to the ingroup. Demoulin and colleagues (2009) also showed that varying the meaning of 
the intergroup categorisation criteria moderated the attribution of uniquely human emotions to 
the ingroup. The authors found that only when belonging to a categorisation that had some 
meaning for the participants did they dehumanise the outgroup, but not when belonging to a 
random category. Furthermore, identification also varied in terms of the categorisation 
criteria, showing that only when the identification increased did the people’s tendency to 
humanise the ingroup change. 
The results found by Demoulin and colleagues (2009) are in line with the principles of 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), since in the minimal group paradigm only 
when the group categorisation had some meaning, did people derogate the other group. 
Usually, it is possible to integrate the dehumanisation effect and the processes of ingroup bias 
and outgroup derogation based on valence, but in morality that does not seem to be the case. 
For positive morality we found a similar effect as ingroup humanisation, but for negative 
morality we did not find a dehumanisation effect. This social dimension, alongside with the 
meaning of the categorisation, can be a second way to disentangle the differentiation 
processes driven by dehumanisation and Social Identity Theory.  
The papers presented in this thesis indicated that there is much more about immorality 
than just Human Uniqueness. People need to humanise the ingroup, but the motivation to not 
be seen as immoral overcomes that need. 
Overall, our studies gave a contribution to understand the relation between humanness 
and morality and its implications for groups, but only lift the veil, leaving a lot of questions to 
be answer.  
Future research 
As we have already pointed out, we still need more tests to clarify whether immorality 
is a uniquely human dimension, as it is the case of morality. As a first future step researchers 
might address this question that this thesis does not fully answer.  
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The fact that only negative uniquely human moral traits were not ascribed to 
outgroups is still a puzzle, as we do not know why that turns out to be the case only for these 
specific characteristics. Ingroups do not want to be immoral, but more importantly they do not 
want to be immoral in a uniquely human way. This contradiction between the two 
motivations, to be uniquely human and moral, may be particularly difficult for groups to 
solve. 
Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian and Whelan (2011) found that people humanise 
ingroup flaws by seeing them as part of human nature. When these flaws are of the immoral 
kind, group members probably cannot use the same strategy, hence turning immoral 
humanness into something that ingroup members will be highly motivated to repeal. Future 
research can help to clarify the reasons behind this repulsion.  
Another future step that our research suggests is to address the question of whether 
morality is, in fact, a moderator of ingroup humanisation, and a dimension that enables to 
disentangle the dehumanisation effect and ingroup favouritism. We still need a more direct 
test to this hypothesis, maybe in line with what Desmoulin and colleagues (2009) did.  
In another line of thinking, recent research has addressed the relationship between the 
infrahumanisation approach and the two-dimensional model of humanness. Martínez, 
Rodriguez-Bailona, Moya, and Vaes (2016) created three unknown groups (Humanised, 
Animalised, and Mechanised) that varied in Human Nature and Human Uniqueness, and 
measured the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to each group. The authors found 
that participants attributed more secondary emotions to the humanised when compared with 
the dehumanised groups, but more importantly, the authors found that both animalised and 
mechanised groups were attributed similar amounts of secondary emotions. Martinez and 
colleagues’ research underlines the role of the attribution of secondary emotions in signalling 
both types of dehumanisation, a clearly innovation in dehumanisation literature. 
These new results make us wonder if morality can impact on the two humanness 
dimensions too. Morality is a Uniquely Human dimension, but we still do not know whether 
immorality is also one. Furthermore, the descriptions picturing one’s immoral actions as close 
to animals that sometimes appear in the press, or even in social interactions, indicate that 
immorality is probably diagnostic of animalistic dehumanisation, but does not exclude the 
possibility that it can be informative of mechanistic dehumanisation either. In our second 
paper, some of the criminal behaviours that we scaled in morality and humanness were white-
collar type. This type of behaviour is normally associated with businesspeople, a category that 
94 
 
was demonstrated to be linked to Human Nature (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). But, we also 
found that white-collar type of behaviour is perceived as highly uniquely human. Therefore, 
this could be indicative that immorality may predict both animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanisation. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that it highlighted the different strategies that 
ingroup members choose when dealing with deviance. In the second study of the third paper 
we analysed the strategies adopted by ingroup members in order to deal with ingroup threat. 
We gave ingroup members the opportunity to reduce group identification level, which they 
did when faced with a deviant behaviour that was uniquely human and immoral. But when 
faced with a deviant behaviour that was less uniquely human and less immoral, dehumanising 
the deviant was sufficient to maintain the group reputation, not being necessary to reduce the 
level of group identification. Our results indicated that both strategies may co-occur, even 
when derogation was an option, ingroup members reduced the identification level. 
However, in our studies the action of the deviant fell on ingroup members, was 
committed by an ingroup member upon ingroup members. We suspect that if the receivers of 
the deviant actions were outgroup members, it would be more threatening for ingroup image, 
and will probably impact the strategies used by ingroup members to deal with deviance. As 
Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) found, when ingroup members are confronted with 
ingroup’s wrongdoing, dehumanising others may serve to reduce the affective and moral 
consequences of one’s actions.  
Finally, as we had pointed out in the paper discussion, it would be also interesting to 
see how people evaluate an outgroup member that behaves immorally, but in an uniquely 
human way, allowing a comparison in line with the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & 
Leyens, 1988). 
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 Appendix A: Material and Measures of More human than others, but not immoral: On 
the attribution of humanness with moral characteristics 
 
Dehumanisation measure 
Moral traits used in Study 1and Studies 2a and 2b 
Uniquely Human Non-Uniquely Human 
Humildade, Justiça, Sinceridade, 
Desonestidade, Indecência, Mentira 
Lealdade, Fidelidade, Confiança, 
Agressividade, Egoísmo, Crueldade 
 
Identification Measure 
1 - Eu penso que os Portugueses têm muito de que se orgulhar.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
2 - É agradável ser Português. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
3 - Ser Português dá-me uma sensação agradável.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
4 - Eu penso muitas vezes no facto de que sou Português. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
5 - O facto de que sou Português é uma parte importante da minha identidade.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
6 - Ser Português é uma parte importante de como eu me vejo a mim mesmo.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
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7 - Eu tenho muito em comum com o Português habitual. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
8 - Eu sou parecido com o Português habitual.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
9 – Os Portugueses têm muitos pontos em comum entre si. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
10 – Os Portugueses são muito parecidos. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
11 - Eu sinto uma ligação com os Portugueses. 
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
12 - Eu sinto solidariedade para com os Portugueses.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
13 - Eu sinto dedicação para com os Portugueses.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
 
14 - Eu estou contente por ser Português.  
Discordo completamente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo completamente  
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Appendix B: Statistics of More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution 
of humanness with moral characteristics 
Study 1 
Identification. 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positivas 62 4,5150 1,22181 ,15517 4,2047 4,8253 1,43 6,64 
Negativas 49 4,6662 ,93375 ,13339 4,3980 4,9344 2,43 6,57 
Total 111 4,5817 1,10181 ,10458 4,3745 4,7890 1,43 6,64 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
3,804 1 109 ,054 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups ,626 1 ,626 ,513 ,475 
Within Groups 132,914 109 1,219   
Total 133,539 110    
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
 Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch ,546 1 108,895 ,462 
 
Dehumanisation. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,060 1 ,060 ,137 ,712 ,001 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,060 1,000 ,060 ,137 ,712 ,001 
Huynh-Feldt ,060 1,000 ,060 ,137 ,712 ,001 
Lower-bound ,060 1,000 ,060 ,137 ,712 ,001 
humaness * Condição 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
8,881 1 8,881 20,439 ,000 ,157 
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Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8,881 1,000 8,881 20,439 ,000 ,157 
Huynh-Feldt 8,881 1,000 8,881 20,439 ,000 ,157 
Lower-bound 8,881 1,000 8,881 20,439 ,000 ,157 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
47,797 110 ,435 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
47,797 
110,00
0 
,435 
   
Huynh-Feldt 47,797 
110,00
0 
,435 
   
Lower-bound 47,797 
110,00
0 
,435 
   
Group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
2,744 1 2,744 6,022 ,016 ,052 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2,744 1,000 2,744 6,022 ,016 ,052 
Huynh-Feldt 2,744 1,000 2,744 6,022 ,016 ,052 
Lower-bound 2,744 1,000 2,744 6,022 ,016 ,052 
group * Condição 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
10,136 1 10,136 22,250 ,000 ,168 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10,136 1,000 10,136 22,250 ,000 ,168 
Huynh-Feldt 10,136 1,000 10,136 22,250 ,000 ,168 
Lower-bound 10,136 1,000 10,136 22,250 ,000 ,168 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
50,114 110 ,456 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
50,114 
110,00
0 
,456 
   
Huynh-Feldt 50,114 
110,00
0 
,456 
   
Lower-bound 50,114 
110,00
0 
,456 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,825 1 1,825 3,641 ,059 ,032 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,825 1,000 1,825 3,641 ,059 ,032 
Huynh-Feldt 1,825 1,000 1,825 3,641 ,059 ,032 
Lower-bound 1,825 1,000 1,825 3,641 ,059 ,032 
humaness * group * 
Condição 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
24,289 1 24,289 48,456 ,000 ,306 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
24,289 1,000 24,289 48,456 ,000 ,306 
Huynh-Feldt 24,289 1,000 24,289 48,456 ,000 ,306 
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Lower-bound 24,289 1,000 24,289 48,456 ,000 ,306 
Error(humaness*group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
55,139 110 ,501 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
55,139 
110,00
0 
,501 
   
Huynh-Feldt 55,139 
110,00
0 
,501 
   
Lower-bound 55,139 
110,00
0 
,501 
   
 
Estimates 
Condição humaness group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positivas 
NUH 
Ing ,855 ,102 ,653 1,056 
Outg 1,306 ,096 1,116 1,497 
UH 
Ing 1,145 ,098 ,951 1,340 
Outg ,403 ,083 ,239 ,568 
Negativas 
NUH 
Ing ,680 ,113 ,456 ,904 
Outg ,800 ,107 ,588 1,012 
UH 
Ing ,600 ,109 ,383 ,817 
Outg 1,400 ,092 1,217 1,583 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Condição group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positivas 
Ing 
NUH UH -,290 ,126 ,023 -,540 -,040 
UH NUH ,290 ,126 ,023 ,040 ,540 
Outg 
NUH UH ,903 ,120 ,000 ,666 1,140 
UH NUH -,903 ,120 ,000 -1,140 -,666 
Negativa
s 
Ing 
NUH UH ,080 ,140 ,570 -,198 ,358 
UH NUH -,080 ,140 ,570 -,358 ,198 
Outg 
NUH UH -,600 ,133 ,000 -,864 -,336 
UH NUH ,600 ,133 ,000 ,336 ,864 
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Multivariate Tests 
Condição group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Positivas 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,046 5,300 1,000 110,000 ,023 ,046 
Wilks' lambda ,954 5,300 1,000 110,000 ,023 ,046 
Hotelling's trace ,048 5,300 1,000 110,000 ,023 ,046 
Roy's largest 
root 
,048 5,300 1,000 110,000 ,023 ,046 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,342 57,113 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,342 
Wilks' lambda ,658 57,113 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,342 
Hotelling's trace ,519 57,113 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,342 
Roy's largest 
root 
,519 57,113 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,342 
Negativas 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,003 ,325 1,000 110,000 ,570 ,003 
Wilks' lambda ,997 ,325 1,000 110,000 ,570 ,003 
Hotelling's trace ,003 ,325 1,000 110,000 ,570 ,003 
Roy's largest 
root 
,003 ,325 1,000 110,000 ,570 ,003 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,156 20,325 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,156 
Wilks' lambda ,844 20,325 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,156 
Hotelling's trace ,185 20,325 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,156 
Roy's largest 
root 
,185 20,325 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,156 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Condição humaness (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positivas 
NUH 
Ing Outg -,452 ,129 ,001 -,706 -,197 
Outg Ing ,452 ,129 ,001 ,197 ,706 
UH 
Ing Outg ,742 ,120 ,000 ,505 ,979 
Outg Ing -,742 ,120 ,000 -,979 -,505 
Negativas 
NUH 
Ing Outg -,120 ,143 ,404 -,404 ,164 
Outg Ing ,120 ,143 ,404 -,164 ,404 
UH 
Ing Outg -,800 ,133 ,000 -1,064 -,536 
Outg Ing ,800 ,133 ,000 ,536 1,064 
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Multivariate Tests 
Condição humaness Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Positivas 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,101 12,349 1,000 110,000 ,001 ,101 
Wilks' lambda ,899 12,349 1,000 110,000 ,001 ,101 
Hotelling's trace ,112 12,349 1,000 110,000 ,001 ,101 
Roy's largest 
root 
,112 12,349 1,000 110,000 ,001 ,101 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,259 38,359 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,259 
Wilks' lambda ,741 38,359 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,259 
Hotelling's trace ,349 38,359 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,259 
Roy's largest 
root 
,349 38,359 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,259 
Negativas 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,006 ,703 1,000 110,000 ,404 ,006 
Wilks' lambda ,994 ,703 1,000 110,000 ,404 ,006 
Hotelling's trace ,006 ,703 1,000 110,000 ,404 ,006 
Roy's largest 
root 
,006 ,703 1,000 110,000 ,404 ,006 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,246 35,966 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,246 
Wilks' lambda ,754 35,966 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,246 
Hotelling's trace ,327 35,966 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,246 
Roy's largest 
root 
,327 35,966 1,000 110,000 ,000 ,246 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness group (I) 
Condição 
(J) 
Condição 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing 
Positivas Negativas ,175 ,152 ,253 -,127 ,477 
Negativas Positivas -,175 ,152 ,253 -,477 ,127 
Outg 
Positivas Negativas ,506 ,144 ,001 ,221 ,792 
Negativas Positivas -,506 ,144 ,001 -,792 -,221 
UH 
Ing 
Positivas Negativas ,545 ,147 ,000 ,254 ,836 
Negativas Positivas -,545 ,147 ,000 -,836 -,254 
Outg 
Positivas Negativas -,997 ,124 ,000 -1,243 -,751 
Negativas Positivas ,997 ,124 ,000 ,751 1,243 
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Univariate Tests 
humaness group Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NHU 
Ing 
Contrast ,846 1 ,846 1,319 ,253 ,012 
Error 70,574 110 ,642    
Outg 
Contrast 7,099 1 7,099 12,361 ,001 ,101 
Error 63,177 110 ,574    
UH 
Ing 
Contrast 8,226 1 8,226 13,774 ,000 ,111 
Error 65,694 110 ,597    
Outg 
Contrast 27,500 1 27,500 64,473 ,000 ,370 
Error 46,919 110 ,427    
 
Positive Traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Humanidade 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,823 1 5,823 14,690 ,000 ,194 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,823 1,000 5,823 14,690 ,000 ,194 
Huynh-Feldt 5,823 1,000 5,823 14,690 ,000 ,194 
Lower-bound 5,823 1,000 5,823 14,690 ,000 ,194 
Error(humanidade) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
24,177 61 ,396 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
24,177 61,000 ,396 
   
Huynh-Feldt 24,177 61,000 ,396 
   
Lower-bound 24,177 61,000 ,396 
   
Grupo 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,306 1 1,306 2,297 ,135 ,036 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,306 1,000 1,306 2,297 ,135 ,036 
Huynh-Feldt 1,306 1,000 1,306 2,297 ,135 ,036 
Lower-bound 1,306 1,000 1,306 2,297 ,135 ,036 
Error(grupo) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
34,694 61 ,569 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
34,694 61,000 ,569 
   
Huynh-Feldt 34,694 61,000 ,569 
   
Lower-bound 34,694 61,000 ,569 
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humanidade * grupo 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
22,081 1 22,081 36,483 ,000 ,374 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
22,081 1,000 22,081 36,483 ,000 ,374 
Huynh-Feldt 22,081 1,000 22,081 36,483 ,000 ,374 
Lower-bound 22,081 1,000 22,081 36,483 ,000 ,374 
Error(humanidade*gr
upo) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
36,919 61 ,605 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
36,919 61,000 ,605 
   
Huynh-Feldt 36,919 61,000 ,605 
   
Lower-bound 36,919 61,000 ,605 
   
 
Estimates 
humanidade grupo Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing ,855 ,119 ,617 1,093 
Outg 1,306 ,099 1,108 1,505 
UH 
Ing 1,145 ,105 ,935 1,355 
Outg ,403 ,067 ,269 ,537 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
grupo (I) humanidade (J) humanidade Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH -,290 ,137 ,038 -,564 -,017 
UH NUH ,290 ,137 ,038 ,017 ,564 
Outg 
NUH UH ,903 ,117 ,000 ,670 1,136 
UH NUH -,903 ,117 ,000 -1,136 -,670 
 
Multivariate Tests 
grupo Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,069 4,504a 1,000 61,000 ,038 ,069 
Wilks' lambda ,931 4,504a 1,000 61,000 ,038 ,069 
Hotelling's trace ,074 4,504a 1,000 61,000 ,038 ,069 
Roy's largest root ,074 4,504a 1,000 61,000 ,038 ,069 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,496 60,005a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,496 
Wilks' lambda ,504 60,005a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,496 
Hotelling's trace ,984 60,005a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,496 
Roy's largest root ,984 60,005a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,496 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
humanidade (I) grupo (J) grupo Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing Outg -,452 ,148 ,003 -,748 -,155 
Outg Ing ,452 ,148 ,003 ,155 ,748 
UH 
Ing Outg ,742 ,126 ,000 ,490 ,994 
Outg Ing -,742 ,126 ,000 -,994 -,490 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humanidade Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,132 9,254a 1,000 61,000 ,003 ,132 
Wilks' lambda ,868 9,254a 1,000 61,000 ,003 ,132 
Hotelling's trace ,152 9,254a 1,000 61,000 ,003 ,132 
Roy's largest root ,152 9,254a 1,000 61,000 ,003 ,132 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,363 34,773a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,363 
Wilks' lambda ,637 34,773a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,363 
Hotelling's trace ,570 34,773a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,363 
Roy's largest root ,570 34,773a 1,000 61,000 ,000 ,363 
 
Negative Traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humanidade 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,380 1 3,380 7,012 ,011 ,125 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,380 1,000 3,380 7,012 ,011 ,125 
Huynh-Feldt 3,380 1,000 3,380 7,012 ,011 ,125 
Lower-bound 3,380 1,000 3,380 7,012 ,011 ,125 
Error(humanidade) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
23,620 49 ,482 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
23,620 49,000 ,482 
   
Huynh-Feldt 23,620 49,000 ,482 
   
Lower-bound 23,620 49,000 ,482 
   
grupo 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
10,580 1 10,580 33,620 ,000 ,407 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10,580 1,000 10,580 33,620 ,000 ,407 
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Huynh-Feldt 10,580 1,000 10,580 33,620 ,000 ,407 
Lower-bound 10,580 1,000 10,580 33,620 ,000 ,407 
Error(grupo) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,420 49 ,315 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,420 49,000 ,315 
   
Huynh-Feldt 15,420 49,000 ,315 
   
Lower-bound 15,420 49,000 ,315 
   
humanidade * grupo 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,780 1 5,780 15,544 ,000 ,241 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,780 1,000 5,780 15,544 ,000 ,241 
Huynh-Feldt 5,780 1,000 5,780 15,544 ,000 ,241 
Lower-bound 5,780 1,000 5,780 15,544 ,000 ,241 
Error(humanidade*gr
upo) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,220 49 ,372 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,220 49,000 ,372 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18,220 49,000 ,372 
   
Lower-bound 18,220 49,000 ,372 
   
 
Estimates 
humanidade grupo Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing ,680 ,083 ,513 ,847 
Outg ,800 ,103 ,593 1,007 
UH 
Ing ,600 ,099 ,401 ,799 
Outg 1,400 ,111 1,178 1,622 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
grupo (I) humanidade (J) humanidade Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH ,080 ,124 ,522 -,169 ,329 
UH NUH -,080 ,124 ,522 -,329 ,169 
Outg 
NUH UH -,600* ,137 ,000 -,875 -,325 
UH NUH ,600* ,137 ,000 ,325 ,875 
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Multivariate Tests 
grupo Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,008 ,416 1,000 49,000 ,522 ,008 
Wilks' lambda ,992 ,416 1,000 49,000 ,522 ,008 
Hotelling's trace ,008 ,416 1,000 49,000 ,522 ,008 
Roy's largest root ,008 ,416 1,000 49,000 ,522 ,008 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,281 19,174 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,281 
Wilks' lambda ,719 19,174 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,281 
Hotelling's trace ,391 19,174 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,281 
Roy's largest root ,391 19,174 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,281 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humanidade (I) grupo (J) grupo Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing Outg -,120 ,109 ,278 -,340 ,100 
Outg Ing ,120 ,109 ,278 -,100 ,340 
UH 
Ing Outg -,800 ,125 ,000 -1,050 -,550 
Outg Ing ,800 ,125 ,000 ,550 1,050 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humanidade Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,024 1,205 1,000 49,000 ,278 ,024 
Wilks' lambda ,976 1,205 1,000 49,000 ,278 ,024 
Hotelling's trace ,025 1,205 1,000 49,000 ,278 ,024 
Roy's largest root ,025 1,205 1,000 49,000 ,278 ,024 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,457 41,263 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,457 
Wilks' lambda ,543 41,263 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,457 
Hotelling's trace ,842 41,263 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,457 
Roy's largest root ,842 41,263 1,000 49,000 ,000 ,457 
 
Study 2 
Identification. 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximu
m 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ciganos 36 4,6505 1,04367 ,17394 4,2973 5,0036 2,00 6,32 
marroquinos 31 4,8562 ,96473 ,17327 4,5023 5,2100 2,94 6,94 
Total 67 4,7456 1,00566 ,12286 4,5003 4,9909 2,00 6,94 
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Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Identificação   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
,455 1 65 ,502 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups ,705 1 ,705 ,694 ,408 
Within Groups 66,045 65 1,016   
Total 66,750 66    
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
 Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch ,702 1 64,653 ,405 
 
Study 2a. 
Dehumanisation. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
6,722 1 6,722 18,413 ,000 ,345 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6,722 1,000 6,722 18,413 ,000 ,345 
Huynh-Feldt 6,722 1,000 6,722 18,413 ,000 ,345 
Lower-bound 6,722 1,000 6,722 18,413 ,000 ,345 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
12,778 35 ,365 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
12,778 35,000 ,365 
   
Huynh-Feldt 12,778 35,000 ,365 
   
Lower-bound 12,778 35,000 ,365 
   
valence 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,222 1 ,222 ,245 ,624 ,007 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,222 1,000 ,222 ,245 ,624 ,007 
Huynh-Feldt ,222 1,000 ,222 ,245 ,624 ,007 
Lower-bound ,222 1,000 ,222 ,245 ,624 ,007 
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Error(valence) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
31,778 35 ,908 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
31,778 35,000 ,908 
   
Huynh-Feldt 31,778 35,000 ,908 
   
Lower-bound 31,778 35,000 ,908 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,014 1 ,014 ,075 ,786 ,002 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,014 1,000 ,014 ,075 ,786 ,002 
Huynh-Feldt ,014 1,000 ,014 ,075 ,786 ,002 
Lower-bound ,014 1,000 ,014 ,075 ,786 ,002 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
6,486 35 ,185 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6,486 35,000 ,185 
   
Huynh-Feldt 6,486 35,000 ,185 
   
Lower-bound 6,486 35,000 ,185 
   
humaness * valence 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,500 1 ,500 ,972 ,331 ,027 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,500 1,000 ,500 ,972 ,331 ,027 
Huynh-Feldt ,500 1,000 ,500 ,972 ,331 ,027 
Lower-bound ,500 1,000 ,500 ,972 ,331 ,027 
Error(humaness*valence) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,000 35 ,514 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,000 35,000 ,514 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18,000 35,000 ,514 
   
Lower-bound 18,000 35,000 ,514 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,125 1 1,125 1,886 ,178 ,051 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,125 1,000 1,125 1,886 ,178 ,051 
Huynh-Feldt 1,125 1,000 1,125 1,886 ,178 ,051 
Lower-bound 1,125 1,000 1,125 1,886 ,178 ,051 
Error(humaness*group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
20,875 35 ,596 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
20,875 35,000 ,596 
   
Huynh-Feldt 20,875 35,000 ,596 
   
Lower-bound 20,875 35,000 ,596 
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valence * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,125 1 15,125 23,659 ,000 ,403 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,125 1,000 15,125 23,659 ,000 ,403 
Huynh-Feldt 15,125 1,000 15,125 23,659 ,000 ,403 
Lower-bound 15,125 1,000 15,125 23,659 ,000 ,403 
Error(valence*group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
22,375 35 ,639 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
22,375 35,000 ,639 
   
Huynh-Feldt 22,375 35,000 ,639 
   
Lower-bound 22,375 35,000 ,639 
   
humaness * valence * 
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,014 1 5,014 10,977 ,002 ,239 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,014 1,000 5,014 10,977 ,002 ,239 
Huynh-Feldt 5,014 1,000 5,014 10,977 ,002 ,239 
Lower-bound 5,014 1,000 5,014 10,977 ,002 ,239 
Error(humaness*valence*
group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,986 35 ,457 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,986 35,000 ,457 
   
Huynh-Feldt 15,986 35,000 ,457 
   
Lower-bound 15,986 35,000 ,457 
   
 
 
Estimates 
humaness valence group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Neg 
Ing ,806 ,137 ,527 1,084 
Outg 1,139 ,107 ,923 1,355 
Pos 
Ing ,972 ,152 ,664 1,280 
Outg ,917 ,128 ,656 1,177 
UH 
Neg 
Ing ,278 ,086 ,104 ,451 
Outg ,889 ,137 ,611 1,166 
Pos 
Ing 1,139 ,139 ,857 1,421 
Outg ,306 ,096 ,110 ,501 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
valence group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neg 
Ing 
NUH UH ,528 ,146 ,001 ,231 ,825 
 UH NUH -,528 ,146 ,001 -,825 -,231 
Outg 
NUH UH ,250 ,180 ,173 -,115 ,615 
UH NUH -,250 ,180 ,173 -,615 ,115 
Pos 
Ing 
NUH UH -,167 ,185 ,373 -,542 ,208 
UH NUH ,167 ,185 ,373 -,208 ,542 
Outg 
NUH UH ,611 ,140 ,000 ,328 ,895 
UH NUH -,611 ,140 ,000 -,895 -,328 
 
Multivariate Tests 
valence group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Neg 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,271 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Wilks' lambda ,729 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Hotelling's trace ,372 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Roy's largest root ,372 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,052 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Wilks' lambda ,948 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Hotelling's trace ,055 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Roy's largest root ,055 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Pos 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Wilks' lambda ,977 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Hotelling's trace ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Roy's largest root ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,354 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Wilks' lambda ,646 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Hotelling's trace ,548 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Roy's largest root ,548 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness group (I) 
valence 
(J) 
valence 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing 
Neg Pos -,167 ,216 ,446 -,606 ,273 
Pos Neg ,167 ,216 ,446 -,273 ,606 
Outg 
Neg Pos ,222 ,165 ,186 -,112 ,557 
Pos Neg -,222 ,165 ,186 -,557 ,112 
UH 
Ing 
Neg Pos -,861 ,179 ,000 -1,224 -,498 
Pos Neg ,861 ,179 ,000 ,498 1,224 
Outg 
Neg Pos ,583 ,184 ,003 ,209 ,957 
Pos Neg -,583 ,184 ,003 -,957 -,209 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humaness group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,017 ,593 1,000 35,000 ,446 ,017 
Wilks' lambda ,983 ,593 1,000 35,000 ,446 ,017 
Hotelling's trace ,017 ,593 1,000 35,000 ,446 ,017 
Roy's largest 
root 
,017 ,593 1,000 35,000 ,446 ,017 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,049 1,818 1,000 35,000 ,186 ,049 
Wilks' lambda ,951 1,818 1,000 35,000 ,186 ,049 
Hotelling's trace ,052 1,818 1,000 35,000 ,186 ,049 
Roy's largest 
root 
,052 1,818 1,000 35,000 ,186 ,049 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness valence (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Neg 
Ing Outg -,333 ,169 ,057 -,676 ,010 
Outg Ing ,333 ,169 ,057 -,010 ,676 
Pos 
Ing Outg ,056 ,173 ,751 -,296 ,408 
Outg Ing -,056 ,173 ,751 -,408 ,296 
UH 
Neg 
Ing Outg -,611 ,161 ,001 -,937 -,285 
Outg Ing ,611 ,161 ,001 ,285 ,937 
Pos 
Ing Outg ,833 ,141 ,000 ,547 1,119 
Outg Ing -,833 ,141 ,000 -1,119 -,547 
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Multivariate Tests 
humaness valence Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Neg 
Pillai's trace ,100 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Wilks' lambda ,900 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Hotelling's trace ,111 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Roy's largest 
root 
,111 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Pos 
Pillai's trace ,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Wilks' lambda ,997 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Hotelling's trace ,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Roy's largest 
root 
,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
UH 
Neg 
Pillai's trace ,292 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Wilks' lambda ,708 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Hotelling's trace ,413 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Roy's largest 
root 
,413 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Pos 
Pillai's trace ,500 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Wilks' lambda ,500 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Hotelling's trace 1,000 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Roy's largest 
root 
1,000 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
 
Positive traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,778 1 1,778 3,613 ,066 ,094 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,778 1,000 1,778 3,613 ,066 ,094 
Huynh-Feldt 1,778 1,000 1,778 3,613 ,066 ,094 
Lower-bound 1,778 1,000 1,778 3,613 ,066 ,094 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
17,222 35 ,492 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17,222 35,000 ,492 
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Huynh-Feldt 17,222 35,000 ,492 
   
Lower-bound 17,222 35,000 ,492 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
7,111 1 7,111 16,716 ,000 ,323 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
7,111 1,000 7,111 16,716 ,000 ,323 
Huynh-Feldt 7,111 1,000 7,111 16,716 ,000 ,323 
Lower-bound 7,111 1,000 7,111 16,716 ,000 ,323 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
14,889 35 ,425 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14,889 35,000 ,425 
   
Huynh-Feldt 14,889 35,000 ,425 
   
Lower-bound 14,889 35,000 ,425 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,444 1 5,444 11,510 ,002 ,247 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,444 1,000 5,444 11,510 ,002 ,247 
Huynh-Feldt 5,444 1,000 5,444 11,510 ,002 ,247 
Lower-bound 5,444 1,000 5,444 11,510 ,002 ,247 
Error(humaness*gro
up) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
16,556 35 ,473 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
16,556 35,000 ,473 
   
Huynh-Feldt 16,556 35,000 ,473 
   
Lower-bound 16,556 35,000 ,473 
   
 
Estimates 
humaness group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing ,972 ,152 ,664 1,280 
Outg ,917 ,128 ,656 1,177 
UH 
Ing 1,139 ,139 ,857 1,421 
Outg ,306 ,096 ,110 ,501 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH -,167 ,185 ,373 -,542 ,208 
UH NUH ,167 ,185 ,373 -,208 ,542 
Outg 
NUH UH ,611 ,140 ,000 ,328 ,895 
UH NUH -,611 ,140 ,000 -,895 -,328 
 
Multivariate Tests 
group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Wilks' lambda ,977 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Hotelling's trace ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Roy's largest root ,023 ,814 1,000 35,000 ,373 ,023 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,354 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Wilks' lambda ,646 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Hotelling's trace ,548 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
Roy's largest root ,548 19,163 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,354 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing Outg ,056 ,173 ,751 -,296 ,408 
Outg Ing -,056 ,173 ,751 -,408 ,296 
UH 
Ing Outg ,833 ,141 ,000 ,547 1,119 
Outg Ing -,833 ,141 ,000 -1,119 -,547 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humaness Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Wilks' lambda ,997 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Hotelling's trace ,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
Roy's largest root ,003 ,103 1,000 35,000 ,751 ,003 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,500 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Wilks' lambda ,500 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Hotelling's trace 1,000 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
Roy's largest root 1,000 35,000 1,000 35,000 ,000 ,500 
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Negative traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,444 1 5,444 14,057 ,001 ,287 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,444 1,000 5,444 14,057 ,001 ,287 
Huynh-Feldt 5,444 1,000 5,444 14,057 ,001 ,287 
Lower-bound 5,444 1,000 5,444 14,057 ,001 ,287 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
13,556 35 ,387 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13,556 35,000 ,387 
   
Huynh-Feldt 13,556 35,000 ,387 
   
Lower-bound 13,556 35,000 ,387 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
8,028 1 8,028 20,109 ,000 ,365 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8,028 1,000 8,028 20,109 ,000 ,365 
Huynh-Feldt 8,028 1,000 8,028 20,109 ,000 ,365 
Lower-bound 8,028 1,000 8,028 20,109 ,000 ,365 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
13,972 35 ,399 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13,972 35,000 ,399 
   
Huynh-Feldt 13,972 35,000 ,399 
   
Lower-bound 13,972 35,000 ,399 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,694 1 ,694 1,197 ,281 ,033 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,694 1,000 ,694 1,197 ,281 ,033 
Huynh-Feldt ,694 1,000 ,694 1,197 ,281 ,033 
Lower-bound ,694 1,000 ,694 1,197 ,281 ,033 
Error(humaness*gro
up) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
20,306 35 ,580 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
20,306 35,000 ,580 
   
Huynh-Feldt 20,306 35,000 ,580 
   
Lower-bound 20,306 35,000 ,580 
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Estimates 
humaness group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing ,806 ,137 ,527 1,084 
Outg 1,139 ,107 ,923 1,355 
UH 
Ing ,278 ,086 ,104 ,451 
Outg ,889 ,137 ,611 1,166 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH ,528 ,146 ,001 ,231 ,825 
UH NUH -,528 ,146 ,001 -,825 -,231 
Outg 
NUH UH ,250 ,180 ,173 -,115 ,615 
UH NUH -,250 ,180 ,173 -,615 ,115 
 
Multivariate Tests 
group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,271 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Wilks' lambda ,729 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Hotelling's trace ,372 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Roy's largest root ,372 13,012 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,271 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,052 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Wilks' lambda ,948 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Hotelling's trace ,055 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
Roy's largest root ,055 1,933 1,000 35,000 ,173 ,052 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing Outg -,333 ,169 ,057 -,676 ,010 
Outg Ing ,333 ,169 ,057 -,010 ,676 
UH 
Ing Outg -,611* ,161 ,001 -,937 -,285 
Outg Ing ,611* ,161 ,001 ,285 ,937 
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Multivariate Tests 
humaness Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,100 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Wilks' lambda ,900 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Hotelling's trace ,111 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
Roy's largest root ,111 3,889 1,000 35,000 ,057 ,100 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,292 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Wilks' lambda ,708 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Hotelling's trace ,413 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
Roy's largest root ,413 14,454 1,000 35,000 ,001 ,292 
 
Study 2b. 
Dehumanisation. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
2,133 1 2,133 6,404 ,017 ,176 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2,133 1,000 2,133 6,404 ,017 ,176 
Huynh-Feldt 2,133 1,000 2,133 6,404 ,017 ,176 
Lower-bound 2,133 1,000 2,133 6,404 ,017 ,176 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
9,992 30 ,333 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9,992 30,000 ,333 
   
Huynh-Feldt 9,992 30,000 ,333 
   
Lower-bound 9,992 30,000 ,333 
   
valence 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,198 1 ,198 ,397 ,533 ,013 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,198 1,000 ,198 ,397 ,533 ,013 
Huynh-Feldt ,198 1,000 ,198 ,397 ,533 ,013 
Lower-bound ,198 1,000 ,198 ,397 ,533 ,013 
Error(valence) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
14,927 30 ,498 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14,927 30,000 ,498 
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Huynh-Feldt 14,927 30,000 ,498 
   
Lower-bound 14,927 30,000 ,498 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
4,940 1 4,940 16,133 ,000 ,350 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4,940 1,000 4,940 16,133 ,000 ,350 
Huynh-Feldt 4,940 1,000 4,940 16,133 ,000 ,350 
Lower-bound 4,940 1,000 4,940 16,133 ,000 ,350 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
9,185 30 ,306 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9,185 30,000 ,306 
   
Huynh-Feldt 9,185 30,000 ,306 
   
Lower-bound 9,185 30,000 ,306 
   
humaness * valence 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
2,940 1 2,940 4,719 ,038 ,136 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2,940 1,000 2,940 4,719 ,038 ,136 
Huynh-Feldt 2,940 1,000 2,940 4,719 ,038 ,136 
Lower-bound 2,940 1,000 2,940 4,719 ,038 ,136 
Error(humaness*valence) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,685 30 ,623 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,685 30,000 ,623 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18,685 30,000 ,623 
   
Lower-bound 18,685 30,000 ,623 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,778 1 1,778 2,831 ,103 ,086 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,778 1,000 1,778 2,831 ,103 ,086 
Huynh-Feldt 1,778 1,000 1,778 2,831 ,103 ,086 
Lower-bound 1,778 1,000 1,778 2,831 ,103 ,086 
Error(humaness*group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,847 30 ,628 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,847 30,000 ,628 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18,847 30,000 ,628 
   
Lower-bound 18,847 30,000 ,628 
   
valence * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,391 1 3,391 5,579 ,025 ,157 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,391 1,000 3,391 5,579 ,025 ,157 
Huynh-Feldt 3,391 1,000 3,391 5,579 ,025 ,157 
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Lower-bound 3,391 1,000 3,391 5,579 ,025 ,157 
Error(valence*group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,234 30 ,608 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,234 30,000 ,608 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18,234 30,000 ,608 
   
Lower-bound 18,234 30,000 ,608 
   
humaness * valence * 
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
2,520 1 2,520 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2,520 1,000 2,520 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Huynh-Feldt 2,520 1,000 2,520 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Lower-bound 2,520 1,000 2,520 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Error(humaness*valence*
group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
8,605 30 ,287 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8,605 30,000 ,287 
   
Huynh-Feldt 8,605 30,000 ,287 
   
Lower-bound 8,605 30,000 ,287 
   
 
Estimates 
humaness valence group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Neg 
Ing 1,194 ,135 ,919 1,468 
Outg ,774 ,120 ,529 1,020 
Pos 
Ing 1,065 ,153 ,751 1,378 
Outg ,581 ,121 ,334 ,827 
UH 
Neg 
Ing ,419 ,090 ,235 ,603 
Outg ,742 ,146 ,443 1,041 
Pos 
Ing 1,129 ,137 ,849 1,409 
Outg ,581 ,111 ,353 ,808 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
valence group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neg 
Ing 
NUH UH ,774 ,159 ,000 ,450 1,098 
UH NUH -,774 ,159 ,000 -1,098 -,450 
Outg 
NUH UH ,032 ,210 ,879 -,396 ,461 
UH NUH -,032 ,210 ,879 -,461 ,396 
Pos 
Ing 
NUH UH -,065 ,191 ,738 -,454 ,325 
UH NUH ,065 ,191 ,738 -,325 ,454 
Outg 
NUH UH ,000 ,123 1,000 -,251 ,251 
UH NUH ,000 ,123 1,000 -,251 ,251 
 
Multivariate Tests 
valence group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Neg 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,442 23,80 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Wilks' lambda ,558 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Hotelling's trace ,793 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Roy's largest root ,793 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Wilks' lambda ,999 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Hotelling's trace ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Roy's largest root ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Pos 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Wilks' lambda ,996 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Hotelling's trace ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Roy's largest root ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Wilks' lambda 1,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Hotelling's trace ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Roy's largest root ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness group (I) 
valence 
(J) 
valence 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing 
Neg Pos ,129 ,184 ,489 -,247 ,505 
Pos Neg -,129 ,184 ,489 -,505 ,247 
Outg 
Neg Pos ,194 ,188 ,311 -,190 ,577 
Pos Neg -,194 ,188 ,311 -,577 ,190 
UH 
Ing 
Neg Pos -,71 ,148 ,000 -1,012 -,407 
Pos Neg ,710 ,148 ,000 ,407 1,012 
Outg 
Neg Pos ,161 ,197 ,420 -,242 ,564 
Pos Neg -,161 ,197 ,420 -,564 ,242 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humaness group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,016 ,492 1,000 30,000 ,489 ,016 
Wilks' lambda ,984 ,492 1,000 30,000 ,489 ,016 
Hotelling's trace ,016 ,492 1,000 30,000 ,489 ,016 
Roy's largest 
root 
,016 ,492 1,000 30,000 ,489 ,016 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,034 1,061 1,000 30,000 ,311 ,034 
Wilks' lambda ,966 1,061 1,000 30,000 ,311 ,034 
Hotelling's trace ,035 1,061 1,000 30,000 ,311 ,034 
Roy's largest 
root 
,035 1,061 1,000 30,000 ,311 ,034 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness valence (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Neg 
Ing Outg ,419 ,152 ,010 ,108 ,730 
Outg Ing -,419 ,152 ,010 -,730 -,108 
Pos 
Ing Outg ,484 ,190 ,016 ,095 ,873 
Outg Ing -,484 ,190 ,016 -,873 -,095 
UH 
Neg 
Ing Outg -,323 ,176 ,077 -,682 ,037 
Outg Ing ,323 ,176 ,077 -,037 ,682 
Pos 
Ing Outg ,548 ,166 ,002 ,209 ,888 
Outg Ing -,548 ,166 ,002 -,888 -,209 
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Multivariate Tests 
humaness valence Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Neg 
Pillai's trace ,202 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Wilks' lambda ,798 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Hotelling's trace ,253 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Roy's largest 
root 
,253 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Pos 
Pillai's trace ,177 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Wilks' lambda ,823 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Hotelling's trace ,215 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Roy's largest 
root 
,215 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
UH 
Neg 
Pillai's trace ,101 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Wilks' lambda ,899 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Hotelling's trace ,112 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Roy's largest 
root 
,112 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Pos 
Pillai's trace ,266 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Wilks' lambda ,734 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Hotelling's trace ,363 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Roy's largest 
root 
,363 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
 
Positive Traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,032 1 ,032 ,084 ,773 ,003 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,032 1,000 ,032 ,084 ,773 ,003 
Huynh-Feldt ,032 1,000 ,032 ,084 ,773 ,003 
Lower-bound ,032 1,000 ,032 ,084 ,773 ,003 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
11,468 30 ,382 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
11,468 30,000 ,382 
   
Huynh-Feldt 11,468 30,000 ,382 
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Lower-bound 11,468 30,000 ,382 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
8,258 1 8,258 14,369 ,001 ,324 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8,258 1,000 8,258 14,369 ,001 ,324 
Huynh-Feldt 8,258 1,000 8,258 14,369 ,001 ,324 
Lower-bound 8,258 1,000 8,258 14,369 ,001 ,324 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
17,242 30 ,575 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17,242 30,000 ,575 
   
Huynh-Feldt 17,242 30,000 ,575 
   
Lower-bound 17,242 30,000 ,575 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,032 1 ,032 ,078 ,782 ,003 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,032 1,000 ,032 ,078 ,782 ,003 
Huynh-Feldt ,032 1,000 ,032 ,078 ,782 ,003 
Lower-bound ,032 1,000 ,032 ,078 ,782 ,003 
Error(humaness*gro
up) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
12,468 30 ,416 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
12,468 30,000 ,416 
   
Huynh-Feldt 12,468 30,000 ,416 
   
Lower-bound 12,468 30,000 ,416 
   
 
Estimates 
humaness group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing 1,065 ,153 ,751 1,378 
Outg ,581 ,121 ,334 ,827 
UH 
Ing 1,129 ,137 ,849 1,409 
Outg ,581 ,111 ,353 ,808 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH -,065 ,191 ,738 -,454 ,325 
UH NUH ,065 ,191 ,738 -,325 ,454 
Outg 
NUH UH ,000 ,123 1,000 -,251 ,251 
UH NUH ,000 ,123 1,000 -,251 ,251 
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Multivariate Tests 
group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Wilks' lambda ,996 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Hotelling's trace ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Roy's largest root ,004 ,114 1,000 30,000 ,738 ,004 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Wilks' lambda 1,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Hotelling's trace ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
Roy's largest root ,000 ,000 1,000 30,000 1,000 ,000 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing Outg ,484 ,190 ,016 ,095 ,873 
Outg Ing -,484 ,190 ,016 -,873 -,095 
UH 
Ing Outg ,548 ,166 ,002 ,209 ,888 
Outg Ing -,548 ,166 ,002 -,888 -,209 
 
Multivariate Tests 
humaness Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,177 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Wilks' lambda ,823 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Hotelling's trace ,215 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
Roy's largest root ,215 6,453 1,000 30,000 ,016 ,177 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,266 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Wilks' lambda ,734 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Hotelling's trace ,363 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
Roy's largest root ,363 10,892 1,000 30,000 ,002 ,266 
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Negative Traits. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
humaness 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,040 1 5,040 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,040 1,000 5,040 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Huynh-Feldt 5,040 1,000 5,040 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Lower-bound 5,040 1,000 5,040 8,786 ,006 ,227 
Error(humaness) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
17,210 30 ,574 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17,210 30,000 ,574 
   
Huynh-Feldt 17,210 30,000 ,574 
   
Lower-bound 17,210 30,000 ,574 
   
group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,073 1 ,073 ,214 ,647 ,007 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,073 1,000 ,073 ,214 ,647 ,007 
Huynh-Feldt ,073 1,000 ,073 ,214 ,647 ,007 
Lower-bound ,073 1,000 ,073 ,214 ,647 ,007 
Error(group) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
10,177 30 ,339 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10,177 30,000 ,339 
   
Huynh-Feldt 10,177 30,000 ,339 
   
Lower-bound 10,177 30,000 ,339 
   
humaness * group 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
4,266 1 4,266 8,541 ,007 ,222 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4,266 1,000 4,266 8,541 ,007 ,222 
Huynh-Feldt 4,266 1,000 4,266 8,541 ,007 ,222 
Lower-bound 4,266 1,000 4,266 8,541 ,007 ,222 
Error(humaness*gro
up) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
14,984 30 ,499 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14,984 30,000 ,499 
   
Huynh-Feldt 14,984 30,000 ,499 
   
Lower-bound 14,984 30,000 ,499 
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Estimates 
humaness group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
Ing 1,194 ,135 ,919 1,468 
Outg ,774 ,120 ,529 1,020 
UH 
Ing ,419 ,090 ,235 ,603 
Outg ,742 ,146 ,443 1,041 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
group (I) 
humaness 
(J) 
humaness 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ing 
NUH UH ,774 ,159 ,000 ,450 1,098 
UH NUH -,774 ,159 ,000 -1,098 -,450 
Outg 
NUH UH ,032 ,210 ,879 -,396 ,461 
UH NUH -,032 ,210 ,879 -,461 ,396 
 
Multivariate Tests 
group Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Ing 
Pillai's trace ,442 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Wilks' lambda ,558 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Hotelling's trace ,793 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Roy's largest root ,793 23,802 1,000 30,000 ,000 ,442 
Outg 
Pillai's trace ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Wilks' lambda ,999 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Hotelling's trace ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
Roy's largest root ,001 ,024 1,000 30,000 ,879 ,001 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
humaness (I) group (J) group Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NUH 
1 2 ,419 ,152 ,010 ,108 ,730 
2 1 -,419 ,152 ,010 -,730 -,108 
UH 
1 2 -,323 ,176 ,077 -,682 ,037 
2 1 ,323 ,176 ,077 -,037 ,682 
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Multivariate Tests 
humaness Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
NUH 
Pillai's trace ,202 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Wilks' lambda ,798 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Hotelling's trace ,253 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
Roy's largest root ,253 7,590 1,000 30,000 ,010 ,202 
UH 
Pillai's trace ,101 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Wilks' lambda ,899 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Hotelling's trace ,112 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
Roy's largest root ,112 3,363 1,000 30,000 ,077 ,101 
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Appendix C: Material and Measures of The relation between human uniqueness and 
immorality: An index of behaviours 
 
Criminal behaviours used in paper 2 
Criminal Behaviours 
Agressão; Abuso Sexual de Menores; Assalto; Atropelamento e Fuga; Burla; Condução com 
Excesso de Álcool; Corrupção; Difamação; Extorsão de Bens; Falsificação de Identidade; Fraude; 
Fuga de Impostos; Furto; Homicídio; Imigração Ilegal; Insulto à Autoridade; Pirataria; Plágio; 
Prostituição; Racismo; Rapto; Terrorismo; Tortura; Tráfico; Violação dos Direitos Humanos; 
Violação Sexual; Violência Doméstica 
 
Study Measures 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é honesta? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é sincera? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é de confiança? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é refinada e 
culta? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é racional e 
lógica? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento tem auto-
controlo? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
 
Em que medida considera que praticar este comportamento é grave? 
Nada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Muito  
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Appendix D: Statistics of The relation between human uniqueness and immorality: An 
index of behaviours 
 
Correlation Analyses 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Moralidade_3itens 2,3936 ,82042 27 
Humanidade_3itens 3,2512 ,76619 27 
Gravidade 6,0209 ,83341 27 
 
Correlations 
 Moralidade_3iten
s 
Humanidade_3it
ens 
Gravidade 
Moralidade_3itens 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,092 -,739** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,647 ,000 
N 27 27 27 
Humanidade_3itens 
Pearson Correlation ,092 1 -,511** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,647  ,006 
N 27 27 27 
Gravidade 
Pearson Correlation -,739** -,511** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,006  
N 27 27 27 
 
Clusters Analyses 
Final Cluster Centers 
 Cluster 
1 2 3 4 
Moralidade_3itens 3,36 1,98 3,84 1,94 
Humanidade_3itens 2,51 3,76 3,86 2,46 
 
Distances between Final Cluster Centers 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 
1  1,864 1,426 1,423 
2 1,864  1,864 1,310 
3 1,426 1,864  2,362 
4 1,423 1,310 2,362  
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ANOVA 
 Cluster Error F Sig. 
Mean Square df Mean Square df 
Moralidade_3itens 4,966 3 ,113 23 43,898 ,000 
Humanidade_3itens 3,776 3 ,171 23 22,079 ,000 
 
Number of Cases in each 
Cluster 
Cluster 
1 3,000 
2 12,000 
3 4,000 
4 8,000 
Valid 27,000 
Missing ,000 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens 1,302 3 23 ,298 
Humanidade_3itens ,971 3 23 ,423 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens 
Between Groups 14,898 3 4,966 43,898 ,000 
Within Groups 2,602 23 ,113   
Total 17,500 26    
Humanidade_3itens 
Between Groups 11,329 3 3,776 22,079 ,000 
Within Groups 3,934 23 ,171   
Total 15,263 26    
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
 Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens Welch 73,737 3 9,679 ,000 
Humanidade_3itens Welch 20,927 3 7,371 ,001 
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Group Statistics 
 
Agrupamento_clusters_Moralidade N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Moralidade_3itens 
Baixa Moralidade (1 e 2) 12 1,9758 ,37889 ,10938 
Alta Moralidade (3 e 4) 8 1,9365 ,33369 ,11798 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Moralidade_3it
ens 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
,002 ,968 ,238 18 ,815 ,03931 ,16522 -,30781 ,38643 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
,244 16,46
4 
,810 ,03931 ,16088 -,30095 ,37958 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Agrupamento_clusters_Humanidade N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Humanidade_3itens 
Alta Humanidade (1 e 3) 12 3,7643 ,45249 ,13062 
Baixa Humanidade (2 e 4) 8 2,4550 ,37750 ,13346 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Humanidad
e_3itens 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,805 ,381 6,751 18 ,000 1,30925 ,19394 ,90180 1,71671 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
7,011 16,94
1 
,000 1,30925 ,18675 ,91515 1,70336 
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Descriptives 
 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Moralidade_3iten
s 
1 12 1,9758 ,37889 ,10938 1,7351 2,2165 1,29 2,63 
2 8 1,9365 ,33369 ,11798 1,6575 2,2155 1,45 2,37 
3 4 3,8377 ,27479 ,13740 3,4004 4,2750 3,49 4,15 
4 3 3,3580 ,09168 ,05293 3,1303 3,5857 3,29 3,46 
Total 27 2,3936 ,82042 ,15789 2,0690 2,7181 1,29 4,15 
Humanidade_3ite
ns 
1 12 3,7643 ,45249 ,13062 3,4768 4,0518 3,18 4,45 
2 8 2,4550 ,37750 ,13346 2,1394 2,7706 1,96 2,85 
3 4 3,8573 ,40822 ,20411 3,2077 4,5068 3,34 4,20 
4 3 2,5142 ,30352 ,17524 1,7602 3,2682 2,27 2,85 
Total 27 3,2512 ,76619 ,14745 2,9481 3,5543 1,96 4,45 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens 1,302 3 23 ,298 
Humanidade_3itens ,971 3 23 ,423 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens 
Between Groups 14,898 3 4,966 43,898 ,000 
Within Groups 2,602 23 ,113   
Total 17,500 26    
Humanidade_3itens 
Between Groups 11,329 3 3,776 22,079 ,000 
Within Groups 3,934 23 ,171   
Total 15,263 26    
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
 Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Moralidade_3itens Welch 73,737 3 9,679 ,000 
Humanidade_3itens Welch 20,927 3 7,371 ,001 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) Ward 
Method 
(J) Ward 
Method 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Moralidade_3itens 
1 
2 ,03931 ,15352 ,800 -,2783 ,3569 
3 -1,86190* ,19419 ,000 -2,2636 -1,4602 
4 -1,38220* ,21711 ,000 -1,8313 -,9331 
2 
1 -,03931 ,15352 ,800 -,3569 ,2783 
3 -1,90121* ,20597 ,000 -2,3273 -1,4751 
4 -1,42151* ,22771 ,000 -1,8926 -,9505 
3 
1 1,86190* ,19419 ,000 1,4602 2,2636 
2 1,90121* ,20597 ,000 1,4751 2,3273 
4 ,47970 ,25689 ,075 -,0517 1,0111 
4 
1 1,38220* ,21711 ,000 ,9331 1,8313 
2 1,42151* ,22771 ,000 ,9505 1,8926 
3 -,47970 ,25689 ,075 -1,0111 ,0517 
Humanidade_3ite
ns 
1 
2 1,30925* ,18877 ,000 ,9188 1,6998 
3 -,09298 ,23877 ,701 -,5869 ,4010 
4 1,25013* ,26696 ,000 ,6979 1,8024 
2 
1 -1,30925* ,18877 ,000 -1,6998 -,9188 
3 -1,40224* ,25326 ,000 -1,9261 -,8783 
4 -,05913 ,27999 ,835 -,6383 ,5201 
3 
1 ,09298 ,23877 ,701 -,4010 ,5869 
2 1,40224* ,25326 ,000 ,8783 1,9261 
4 1,34311* ,31587 ,000 ,6897 1,9965 
4 
1 -1,25013* ,26696 ,000 -1,8024 -,6979 
2 ,05913 ,27999 ,835 -,5201 ,6383 
3 -1,34311* ,31587 ,000 -1,9965 -,6897 
 
Descriptives 
Gravidade   
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 12 6,0766 ,45314 ,13081 5,7886 6,3645 5,20 6,61 
2 8 6,7386 ,10822 ,03826 6,6481 6,8291 6,59 6,93 
3 4 4,3442 ,26579 ,13290 3,9213 4,7671 4,10 4,71 
4 3 6,1201 ,19141 ,11051 5,6446 6,5956 5,90 6,26 
Total 27 6,0209 ,83341 ,16039 5,6912 6,3506 4,10 6,93 
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Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Gravidade   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
5,206 3 23 ,007 
 
ANOVA 
Gravidade   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 15,433 3 5,144 45,058 ,000 
Within Groups 2,626 23 ,114   
Total 18,059 26    
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
Gravidade   
 Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 89,239 3 6,333 ,000 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Gravidade   
 
(I) Ward Method (J) Ward Method Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 -,66205 ,15423 ,000 -,9811 -,3430 
3 1,73236 ,19508 ,000 1,3288 2,1359 
4 -,0435 ,21811 ,843 -,4948 ,4076 
2 
1 ,66205 ,15423 ,000 ,3430 ,9811 
3 2,39441 ,20691 ,000 1,9664 2,8224 
4 ,61848 ,22875 ,013 ,1453 1,0917 
3 
1 -1,73236 ,19508 ,000 -2,1359 -1,3288 
2 -2,39441 ,20691 ,000 -2,8224 -1,9664 
4 -1,77593 ,25807 ,000 -2,3098 -1,2421 
4 
1 ,0435 ,21811 ,843 -,4076 ,4948 
2 -,61848 ,22875 ,013 -1,0917 -,1453 
3 1,77593 ,25807 ,000 1,2421 2,3098 
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Appendix E: Material and Measures of Human Uniqueness and Moral Blame: The Role 
of Group Threat 
 
Study 1 Manipulation 
 
Low Threat Condition. 
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High Threat Condition. 
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Deviant and ingroup dehumanisation measure. 
 
Em que medida considera que o Daniel Silva/ os alunos do ISPA: 
 
  Nada        Muito 
É/são refinado(s) e culto(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
É/são racional(s) e lógico(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tem/têm auto-controlo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
É/são sofisticado(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Blame and threat questions. 
 
Em que medida considera: 
 Nada    
    
Muito 
O Daniel Silva culpado pelo seu comportamento 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
O Daniel Silva responsável pelo seu comportamento 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer 
os valores centrais dos alunos do ISPA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer 
os costumes dos alunos do ISPA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer a 
identidade dos alunos do ISPA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá diminuir a 
reputação dos alunos do ISPA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
O Daniel Silva imoral pelo seu comportamento  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Study 2 
Agression Manipulation. 
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Swindle Manipulation. 
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Identification measure. 
 
 
 
 
Discordo 
fortemente 
Concordo 
fortemente 
Eu penso que os/as alunos/as do ISPA têm muito de 
que se orgulhar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
É agradável ser aluno/a do ISPA. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ser aluno/a do ISPA dá-me uma sensação agradável. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu penso muitas vezes no facto de que sou aluno/a 
do ISPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
O facto de ser aluno/a do ISPA é uma parte 
importante da minha identidade. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ser aluno/a do ISPA é uma parte importante de como 
eu me vejo a mim mesmo/a. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu tenho muito em comum com o/a aluno/a habitual 
do ISPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu sou parecido/a com o/a aluno/a habitual do ISPA. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Os/as alunos/as do ISPA têm muitos pontos em 
comum entre si. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Os/as alunos/as do ISPA são muito parecidos/as. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu sinto uma ligação com os/as alunos/as do ISPA. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu sinto solidariedade para com os/as alunos/as do 
ISPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu sinto dedicação para com os/as alunos/as do 
ISPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eu estou contente por ser aluno/a do ISPA. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix F: Statistics of Human Uniqueness and Moral Blame: The Role of Group 
Threat 
 
Study 1 
Measures Reliability. 
Deviant Dehumanisation. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,800 4 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
UH1_alvo 3,1296 1,46720 54 
UH2_alvo 3,5185 1,74551 54 
UH3_alvo 3,2037 1,67534 54 
UH4_alvo 3,0185 1,46004 54 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
UH1_alvo 9,7407 15,894 ,625 ,746 
UH2_alvo 9,3519 13,402 ,697 ,706 
UH3_alvo 9,6667 15,245 ,559 ,779 
UH4_alvo 9,8519 16,317 ,586 ,764 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
12,8704 25,360 5,03589 4 
 
Ingroup Dehumanisation. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,846 4 
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Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
UH1_alunos 3,7963 1,08818 54 
UH2_alunos 4,1296 1,11670 54 
UH3_alunos 4,3519 1,19996 54 
UH4_alunos 3,6296 1,17033 54 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
UH1_alunos 12,1111 8,176 ,802 ,756 
UH2_alunos 11,7778 8,591 ,689 ,803 
UH3_alunos 11,5556 8,403 ,648 ,821 
UH4_alunos 12,2778 8,770 ,607 ,838 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
15,9074 14,350 3,78811 4 
 
Moral Blame. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,899 2 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MoralB1 6,4600 ,88548 50 
MoralB2 6,5600 ,90711 50 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
MoralB1 6,5600 ,823 ,816 . 
MoralB2 6,4600 ,784 ,816 . 
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Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
13,0200 2,918 1,70820 2 
 
Threat Perception. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,898 3 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Threat1 3,2453 1,88012 53 
Threat2 2,4906 1,44944 53 
Threat3 2,5849 1,58641 53 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Threat1 5,0755 8,379 ,770 ,898 
Threat2 5,8302 10,259 ,855 ,820 
Threat3 5,7358 9,813 ,802 ,851 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
8,3208 20,299 4,50544 3 
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Deviant and Ingroup Dehumanisation. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
UH 
Sphericity Assumed 15,565 1 15,565 14,544 ,000 ,219 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,565 1,000 15,565 14,544 ,000 ,219 
Huynh-Feldt 15,565 1,000 15,565 14,544 ,000 ,219 
Lower-bound 15,565 1,000 15,565 14,544 ,000 ,219 
UH  Ameaça 
Sphericity Assumed 5,787 1 5,787 5,408 ,024 ,094 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,787 1,000 5,787 5,408 ,024 ,094 
Huynh-Feldt 5,787 1,000 5,787 5,408 ,024 ,094 
Lower-bound 5,787 1,000 5,787 5,408 ,024 ,094 
Error(UH) 
Sphericity Assumed 55,648 52 1,070    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
55,648 52,000 1,070 
   
Huynh-Feldt 55,648 52,000 1,070    
Lower-bound 55,648 52,000 1,070    
 
Estimates 
Ameaça UH Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Baixa Ameaça 
Deviant 3,343 ,243 2,854 3,831 
Ingroup 3,639 ,172 3,294 3,983 
Alta Ameaça 
Deviant 3,093 ,243 2,604 3,581 
Ingroup 4,315 ,172 3,970 4,659 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
UH (I) Ameaça (J) Ameaça Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Devia
nt 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
Alta Ameaça ,250 ,344 ,471 -,441 ,941 
Alta Ameaça 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
-,250 ,344 ,471 -,941 ,441 
Ingrou
p 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
Alta Ameaça -,676 ,243 ,007 -1,163 -,189 
Alta Ameaça 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
,676 ,243 ,007 ,189 1,163 
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Univariate Tests 
UH Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Deviant 
Contrast ,844 1 ,844 ,528 ,471 ,010 
Error 83,162 52 1,599    
Ingroup 
Contrast 6,168 1 6,168 7,753 ,007 ,130 
Error 41,366 52 ,795    
 
Estimates 
Ameaça UH Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Baixa Ameaça 
Deviant 3,343 ,243 2,854 3,831 
Ingroup 3,639 ,172 3,294 3,983 
Alta Ameaça 
Deviant 3,093 ,243 2,604 3,581 
Ingroup 4,315 ,172 3,970 4,659 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Ameaça (I) UH (J) UH Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Baixa Ameaça 
Dev Ing -,296 ,282 ,297 -,861 ,269 
Ing Dev ,296 ,282 ,297 -,269 ,861 
Alta Ameaça 
Dev Ing -1,222 ,282 ,000 -1,787 -,657 
Ing Dev 1,222 ,282 ,000 ,657 1,787 
 
Multivariate Tests 
Ameaça Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
Pillai's trace ,021 1,107 1,000 52,000 ,297 ,021 
Wilks' lambda ,979 1,107 1,000 52,000 ,297 ,021 
Hotelling's trace ,021 1,107 1,000 52,000 ,297 ,021 
Roy's largest 
root 
,021 1,107 1,000 52,000 ,297 ,021 
Alta Ameaça 
Pillai's trace ,266 18,845 1,000 52,000 ,000 ,266 
Wilks' lambda ,734 18,845 1,000 52,000 ,000 ,266 
Hotelling's trace ,362 18,845 1,000 52,000 ,000 ,266 
Roy's largest 
root 
,362 18,845 1,000 52,000 ,000 ,266 
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Moral Blame. 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
24 6,6042 ,70679 ,14427 6,3057 6,9026 4,00 7,00 
Alta Ameaça 26 6,4231 ,97665 ,19154 6,0286 6,8176 4,00 7,00 
Total 50 6,5100 ,85410 ,12079 6,2673 6,7527 4,00 7,00 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
2,546 1 48 ,117 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups ,409 1 ,409 ,556 ,460 
Within Groups 35,336 48 ,736   
Total 35,745 49    
 
Perception of Threat. 
Descriptives 
 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
ThreatQ 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
27 2,8580 1,70137 ,32743 2,1850 3,5311 1,00 6,67 
Alta 
Ameaça 
27 2,8272 1,46285 ,28152 2,2485 3,4058 1,00 5,00 
Total 54 2,8426 1,57164 ,21387 2,4136 3,2716 1,00 6,67 
Reputation 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
27 3,2593 2,04925 ,39438 2,4486 4,0699 1,00 7,00 
Alta 
Ameaça 
27 3,2963 1,81479 ,34926 2,5784 4,0142 1,00 6,00 
Total 54 3,2778 1,91732 ,26091 2,7545 3,8011 1,00 7,00 
Imoral 
Baixa 
Ameaça 
27 6,0000 1,33012 ,25598 5,4738 6,5262 2,00 7,00 
Alta 
Ameaça 
27 6,0370 1,28547 ,24739 5,5285 6,5456 3,00 7,00 
Total 54 6,0185 1,29572 ,17633 5,6649 6,3722 2,00 7,00 
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Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
ThreatQ ,115 1 52 ,736 
Reputation ,404 1 52 ,528 
Imoral ,026 1 52 ,872 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
ThreatQ 
Between Groups ,013 1 ,013 ,005 ,943 
Within Groups 130,899 52 2,517   
Total 130,912 53    
Reputation 
Between Groups ,019 1 ,019 ,005 ,944 
Within Groups 194,815 52 3,746   
Total 194,833 53    
Imoral 
Between Groups ,019 1 ,019 ,011 ,918 
Within Groups 88,963 52 1,711   
Total 88,981 53    
 
Post-test 
Descriptive Statistics 
manipulacao_ameaça Mean Std. Deviation N 
baixa ameaça 2,3529 ,98228 17 
alta ameaça 3,5111 1,14688 15 
Total 2,8958 1,19868 32 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 10,689a 1 10,689 9,472 ,004 ,240 
Intercept 274,022 1 274,022 242,836 ,000 ,890 
manipulacao_ameaça 10,689 1 10,689 9,472 ,004 ,240 
Error 33,853 30 1,128    
Total 312,889 32     
Corrected Total 44,542 31     
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manipulacao_ameaça 
manipulacao_ameaça Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
baixa ameaça 2,353 ,258 1,827 2,879 
alta ameaça 3,511 ,274 2,951 4,071 
 
Study 2 
Measures Reliability. 
Deviant Dehumanisation 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
,734 ,741 4 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
HU1_deviant 3,4316 1,48505 95 
HU2_deviant 3,2000 2,10673 95 
HU3_deviant 2,5158 1,81520 95 
HU4_deviant 3,0211 1,72577 95 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
HU1_deviant 8,7368 20,153 ,480 ,427 ,703 
HU2_deviant 8,9684 15,371 ,542 ,319 ,673 
HU3_deviant 9,6526 18,846 ,420 ,221 ,734 
HU4_deviant 9,1474 16,063 ,702 ,564 ,572 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
12,1684 28,759 5,36270 4 
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Ingroup Dehumanisation. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
,739 ,740 4 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
HU1_ingroup 4,7579 1,05906 95 
HU2_ingroup 4,7474 1,10095 95 
HU3_ingroup 4,5684 1,11711 95 
HU4_ingroup 4,6000 1,26659 95 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
HU1_ingroup 13,9158 7,333 ,553 ,331 ,669 
HU2_ingroup 13,9263 7,133 ,558 ,320 ,664 
HU3_ingroup 14,1053 7,542 ,462 ,224 ,717 
HU4_ingroup 14,0737 6,431 ,559 ,322 ,665 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
18,6737 11,626 3,40975 4 
 
Moral Blame. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
,721 ,723 2 
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Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Check_guilt 6,0947 1,42227 95 
Check_responsability 6,0526 1,56673 95 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Check_guilt 6,0526 2,455 ,566 ,320 . 
Check_responsability 6,0947 2,023 ,566 ,320 . 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
12,1474 6,999 2,64562 2 
 
Threat Perception. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
,913 ,913 3 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Check_threat1 3,4947 2,08783 95 
Check_threat2 3,0842 1,96059 95 
Check_threat3 3,5789 1,92729 95 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Check_threat1 6,6632 12,907 ,879 ,775 ,829 
Check_threat2 7,0737 14,452 ,816 ,698 ,883 
Check_threat3 6,5789 15,012 ,785 ,636 ,907 
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Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
10,1579 30,454 5,51847 3 
 
Perception of Threat. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Manipulation Order Mean Std. Deviation N 
ThreatQ 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 4,1333 1,77507 20 
1ºVD 3,1515 1,79572 22 
Total 3,6190 1,83251 42 
Agression 
1ºThQ 3,9467 2,10748 25 
1ºVD 2,7083 1,28278 24 
Total 3,3401 1,84402 49 
Total 
1ºThQ 4,0296 1,94731 45 
1ºVD 2,9203 1,54789 46 
Total 3,4689 1,83382 91 
Imoral 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 5,9500 1,09904 20 
1ºVD 5,8182 1,36753 22 
Total 5,8810 1,23372 42 
Agression 
1ºThQ 5,2400 1,78606 25 
1ºVD 4,8750 2,04966 24 
Total 5,0612 1,90840 49 
Total 
1ºThQ 5,5556 1,54560 45 
1ºVD 5,3261 1,80190 46 
Total 5,4396 1,67471 91 
Reputation 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 4,4000 1,66702 20 
1ºVD 3,4545 2,10955 22 
Total 3,9048 1,94823 42 
Agression 
1ºThQ 4,2000 1,68325 25 
1ºVD 3,1250 1,56906 24 
Total 3,6735 1,70034 49 
Total 
1ºThQ 4,2889 1,65999 45 
1ºVD 3,2826 1,83379 46 
Total 3,7802 1,81232 91 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
ThreatQ 3,338 3 87 ,023 
Imoral 3,997 3 87 ,010 
Reputation 2,375 3 87 ,076 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 
ThreatQ 30,635a 3 10,212 3,266 ,025 ,101 
Imoral 17,010b 3 5,670 2,095 ,107 ,067 
Reputation 24,725c 3 8,242 2,647 ,054 ,084 
Intercept 
ThreatQ 1097,098 1 1097,098 350,876 ,000 ,801 
Imoral 2703,649 1 2703,649 999,192 ,000 ,920 
Reputation 1300,909 1 1300,909 417,821 ,000 ,828 
Manipulation 
ThreatQ 2,240 1 2,240 ,716 ,400 ,008 
Imoral 15,430 1 15,430 5,703 ,019 ,062 
Reputation 1,583 1 1,583 ,508 ,478 ,006 
Order 
ThreatQ 27,829 1 27,829 8,900 ,004 ,093 
Imoral 1,394 1 1,394 ,515 ,475 ,006 
Reputation 23,048 1 23,048 7,402 ,008 ,078 
Manipulation  
Order 
ThreatQ ,371 1 ,371 ,119 ,731 ,001 
Imoral ,307 1 ,307 ,113 ,737 ,001 
Reputation ,095 1 ,095 ,030 ,862 ,000 
Error 
ThreatQ 272,027 87 3,127    
Imoral 235,408 87 2,706    
Reputation 270,880 87 3,114    
Total 
ThreatQ 1397,667 91     
Imoral 2945,000 91     
Reputation 1596,000 91     
Corrected Total 
ThreatQ 302,662 90     
I Imoral 252,418 90     
Reputation 295,604 90     
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Comparisons between manipulation. 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable Manipulation Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ThreatQ 
Swindle 3,642 ,273 3,099 4,185 
Agression 3,328 ,253 2,825 3,830 
Imoral 
Swindle 5,884 ,254 5,379 6,389 
Agression 5,058 ,235 4,590 5,525 
Reputation 
Swindle 3,927 ,273 3,385 4,469 
Agression 3,663 ,252 3,161 4,164 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
Manipulation 
(J) 
Manipulation 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ThreatQ 
Swindle Agression ,315 ,372 ,400 -,425 1,054 
Agression Swindle -,315 ,372 ,400 -1,054 ,425 
Imoral 
Swindle Agression ,827 ,346 ,019 ,139 1,515 
Agression Swindle -,827 ,346 ,019 -1,515 -,139 
Reputation 
Swindle Agression ,265 ,371 ,478 -,473 1,003 
Agression Swindle -,265 ,371 ,478 -1,003 ,473 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pillai's trace ,066 2,001a 3,000 85,000 ,120 ,066 
Wilks' lambda ,934 2,001a 3,000 85,000 ,120 ,066 
Hotelling's trace ,071 2,001a 3,000 85,000 ,120 ,066 
Roy's largest root ,071 2,001a 3,000 85,000 ,120 ,066 
 
Univariate Tests 
Dependent Variable Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
ThreatQ 
Contrast 2,240 1 2,240 ,716 ,400 ,008 
Error 272,027 87 3,127    
Imoral 
Contrast 15,430 1 15,430 5,703 ,019 ,062 
Error 235,408 87 2,706    
Reputation 
Contrast 1,583 1 1,583 ,508 ,478 ,006 
Error 270,880 87 3,114    
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Comparisons by order. 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable Order Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ThreatQ 
1ºThQ 4,040 ,265 3,513 4,567 
1ºVD 2,930 ,261 2,411 3,449 
Imoral 
1ºThQ 5,595 ,247 5,105 6,085 
1ºVD 5,347 ,243 4,864 5,829 
Reputation 
1ºThQ 4,300 ,265 3,774 4,826 
1ºVD 3,290 ,260 2,772 3,807 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Dependent Variable (I) Order (J) Order Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ThreatQ 
1ºThQ 1ºVD 1,110 ,372 ,004 ,371 1,850 
1ºVD 1ºThQ -1,110 ,372 ,004 -1,850 -,371 
Imoral 
1ºThQ 1ºVD ,248 ,346 ,475 -,440 ,936 
1ºVD 1ºThQ -,248 ,346 ,475 -,936 ,440 
Reputation 
1ºThQ 1ºVD 1,010 ,371 ,008 ,272 1,748 
1ºVD 1ºThQ -1,010 ,371 ,008 -1,748 -,272 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pillai's trace ,100 3,156 3,000 85,000 ,029 ,100 
Wilks' lambda ,900 3,156 3,000 85,000 ,029 ,100 
Hotelling's trace ,111 3,156 3,000 85,000 ,029 ,100 
Roy's largest root ,111 3,156 3,000 85,000 ,029 ,100 
 
Univariate Tests 
Dependent Variable Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
ThreatQ 
Contrast 27,829 1 27,829 8,900 ,004 ,093 
Error 272,027 87 3,127    
Imoral 
Contrast 1,394 1 1,394 ,515 ,475 ,006 
Error 235,408 87 2,706    
Reputation 
Contrast 23,048 1 23,048 7,402 ,008 ,078 
Error 270,880 87 3,114    
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Moral Blame. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Manipulation Order Mean Std. Deviation N 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 6,4773 ,80884 22 
1ºVD 6,5682 ,89036 22 
Total 6,5227 ,84189 44 
Agression 
1ºThQ 5,8800 1,30926 25 
1ºVD 6,1136 ,93773 22 
Total 5,9894 1,14441 47 
Total 
1ºThQ 6,1596 1,13303 47 
1ºVD 6,3409 ,93244 44 
Total 6,2473 1,03916 91 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2,059 3 87 ,112 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 7,195a 3 2,398 2,318 ,081 ,074 
Intercept 3554,906 1 3554,906 3436,704 ,000 ,975 
Manipulation 6,273 1 6,273 6,064 ,016 ,065 
Order ,597 1 ,597 ,577 ,449 ,007 
Manipulation  Order ,116 1 ,116 ,112 ,739 ,001 
Error 89,992 87 1,034    
Total 3648,750 91     
Corrected Total 97,187 90     
 
Comparisons by manipulation. 
 
Estimates 
Manipulation Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Swindle 6,523 ,153 6,218 6,827 
Agression 5,997 ,149 5,701 6,292 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
(I) Manipulation (J) Manipulation Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Swindle Agression ,526 ,214 ,016 ,101 ,950 
Agression Swindle -,526 ,214 ,016 -,950 -,101 
 
Deviant and ingroup dehumanisation. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Manipulation Order Mean Std. Deviation N 
HU_Deviant 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 3,4886 1,41732 22 
1ºVD 3,8750 1,40070 24 
Total 3,6902 1,40652 46 
Agression 
1ºThQ 2,4800 ,98668 25 
1ºVD 2,3854 ,90883 24 
Total 2,4337 ,94066 49 
Total 
1ºThQ 2,9521 1,29761 47 
1ºVD 3,1302 1,38954 48 
Total 3,0421 1,34068 95 
HU_Ingroup 
Swindle 
1ºThQ 4,6932 ,67670 22 
1ºVD 4,5938 ,77604 24 
Total 4,6413 ,72390 46 
Agression 
1ºThQ 4,7800 1,09049 25 
1ºVD 4,6042 ,82724 24 
Total 4,6939 ,96456 49 
Total 
1ºThQ 4,7394 ,91181 47 
1ºVD 4,5990 ,79349 48 
Total 4,6684 ,85244 95 
 
Box's Test of Equality of 
Covariance Matrices 
Box's M 14,673 
F 1,565 
df1 9 
df2 91414,925 
Sig. ,119 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
target 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
122,935 1 122,935 113,125 ,000 ,554 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
122,935 1,000 122,935 113,125 ,000 ,554 
Huynh-Feldt 122,935 1,000 122,935 113,125 ,000 ,554 
Lower-bound 122,935 1,000 122,935 113,125 ,000 ,554 
target  Manipulation 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
19,955 1 19,955 18,363 ,000 ,168 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
19,955 1,000 19,955 18,363 ,000 ,168 
Huynh-Feldt 19,955 1,000 19,955 18,363 ,000 ,168 
Lower-bound 19,955 1,000 19,955 18,363 ,000 ,168 
target  Order 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,952 1 ,952 ,876 ,352 ,010 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,952 1,000 ,952 ,876 ,352 ,010 
Huynh-Feldt ,952 1,000 ,952 ,876 ,352 ,010 
Lower-bound ,952 1,000 ,952 ,876 ,352 ,010 
target  Manipulation    
Order 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,485 1 ,485 ,446 ,506 ,005 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,485 1,000 ,485 ,446 ,506 ,005 
Huynh-Feldt ,485 1,000 ,485 ,446 ,506 ,005 
Lower-bound ,485 1,000 ,485 ,446 ,506 ,005 
Error(target) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
98,891 91 1,087 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
98,891 91,000 1,087 
   
Huynh-Feldt 98,891 91,000 1,087 
   
Lower-bound 98,891 91,000 1,087 
   
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
HU_Deviant 2,859 3 91 ,041 
HU_Ingroup ,783 3 91 ,506 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 2828,460 1 2828,460 2612,343 ,000 ,966 
Manipulation 17,077 1 17,077 15,772 ,000 ,148 
Order ,001 1 ,001 ,001 ,978 ,000 
Manipulation  Order ,920 1 ,920 ,850 ,359 ,009 
Error 98,528 91 1,083    
 
Estimates 
target Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 3,057 ,123 2,814 3,301 
2 4,668 ,089 4,492 4,844 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
(I) target (J) target Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -1,611 ,151 ,000 -1,911 -1,310 
2 1 1,611 ,151 ,000 1,310 1,911 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pillai's trace ,554 113,125a 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,554 
Wilks' lambda ,446 113,125a 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,554 
Hotelling's trace 1,243 113,125a 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,554 
Roy's largest root 1,243 113,125a 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,554 
 
Estimates 
Manipulation target Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Swindle 
1 3,682 ,176 3,332 4,032 
2 4,643 ,127 4,391 4,896 
Agression 
1 2,433 ,171 2,094 2,772 
2 4,692 ,123 4,447 4,937 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
target (I) Manipulation (J) Manipulation Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
Swindle Agression 1,249 ,245 ,000 ,762 1,736 
Agression Swindle -1,249 ,245 ,000 -1,736 -,762 
2 
Swindle Agression -,049 ,177 ,784 -,401 ,303 
Agression Swindle ,049 ,177 ,784 -,303 ,401 
 
Univariate Tests 
target Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
1 
Contrast 36,976 1 36,976 25,949 ,000 ,222 
Error 129,672 91 1,425    
2 
Contrast ,056 1 ,056 ,075 ,784 ,001 
Error 67,748 91 ,744    
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Manipulation (I) target (J) target Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Swindle 
1 2 -,962 ,218 ,000 -1,394 -,529 
2 1 ,962 ,218 ,000 ,529 1,394 
Agression 
1 2 -2,259 ,211 ,000 -2,678 -1,841 
2 1 2,259 ,211 ,000 1,841 2,678 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
Manipulation Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Swindle 
Pillai's trace ,177 19,535 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,177 
Wilks' lambda ,823 19,535 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,177 
Hotelling's trace ,215 19,535 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,177 
Roy's largest root ,215 19,535 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,177 
Agression 
Pillai's trace ,558 115,039 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,558 
Wilks' lambda ,442 115,039 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,558 
Hotelling's trace 1,264 115,039 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,558 
Roy's largest root 1,264 115,039 1,000 91,000 ,000 ,558 
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Identification. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Manipulation Mean Std. Deviation N 
Identification_Beginning 
Swindle 4,8618 1,05220 46 
Agression 4,8309 ,78038 49 
Total 4,8459 ,91718 95 
Identification_End 
Swindle 4,6910 1,12335 46 
Agression 4,7289 ,76167 49 
Total 4,7105 ,94906 95 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
identification 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,883 1 ,883 5,554 ,021 ,056 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,883 1,000 ,883 5,554 ,021 ,056 
Huynh-Feldt ,883 1,000 ,883 5,554 ,021 ,056 
Lower-bound ,883 1,000 ,883 5,554 ,021 ,056 
identification * 
Manipulation 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,056 1 ,056 ,353 ,554 ,004 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,056 1,000 ,056 ,353 ,554 ,004 
Huynh-Feldt ,056 1,000 ,056 ,353 ,554 ,004 
Lower-bound ,056 1,000 ,056 ,353 ,554 ,004 
Error(identification) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
14,788 93 ,159 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14,788 93,000 ,159 
   
Huynh-Feldt 14,788 93,000 ,159 
   
Lower-bound 14,788 93,000 ,159 
   
 
Regression. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Identification_Beginning 4,8618 1,05220 46 
difIngDev ,9511 1,60867 46 
Identification_End 4,6910 1,12335 46 
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Correlations 
 Identification_B
eginning 
difIngDev Identification_E
nd 
Pearson Correlation 
Identification_Beginning 1,000 ,289 ,936 
difIngDev ,289 1,000 ,273 
Identification_End ,936 ,273 1,000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Identification_Beginning . ,026 ,000 
difIngDev ,026 . ,033 
Identification_End ,000 ,033 . 
N 
Identification_Beginning 46 46 46 
difIngDev 46 46 46 
Identification_End 46 46 46 
 
Variables Entered/Removed 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 difIngDevb . Enter 
2 
Identification_E
ndb 
. Enter 
 
Model Summary 
Mode
l 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 ,289a ,084 ,063 1,01854 ,084 4,023 1 44 ,051 
2 ,937b ,877 ,872 ,37699 ,794 278,184 1 43 ,000 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4,174 1 4,174 4,023 ,051 
Residual 45,647 44 1,037   
Total 49,820 45    
2 
Regression 43,709 2 21,855 153,775 ,000 
Residual 6,111 43 ,142   
Total 49,820 45    
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Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 4,682 ,175  26,759 ,000 
difIngDev ,189 ,094 ,289 2,006 ,051 
2 
(Constant) ,770 ,243  3,166 ,003 
difIngDev ,024 ,036 ,036 ,657 ,515 
Identification_End ,867 ,052 ,926 16,679 ,000 
 
Excluded Variables 
Model Beta In t Sig. Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 Identification_End ,926b 16,679 ,000 ,931 ,925 
 
